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Analyst herding and investor protection:  
A cross-country study 
 
ALEXANDER G. KERLa          THOMAS PAULSb 
 
 
Abstract - Using a multi-national dataset, we investigate the herd-
ing behavior of financial analysts. Our results across a range of 
different countries suggest that analysts consistently deviate from 
their true forecasts and issue earnings forecasts that are biased 
by anti-herding. Furthermore, the level of bias (i.e. anti-herding) 
seems to be systematically higher for forecasts on companies from 
European countries compared to the US or Japan. We argue that 
such differences might stem from diverse levels of investor pro-
tection and corporate governance as analysts deviate less from 
true forecasts when the overall information environment is more 
transparent and company disclosures are of higher quality. 
Thereby, we proxy investor protection based on the company-
level share of institutional ownership as well as on country-level 
investor protection measures. Our results show that increasing 
levels of investor protection and corporate governance mitigate 
the anti-herding behavior. Especially, when companies that are 
located in high investor protection countries are held by an in-
creasing number of institutional investors, analysts are most re-
luctant to issue biased forecasts. 
 
 
Keywords:  Corporate governance; analyst herding; investor protection; earn-
ings forecasts 
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1. Introduction 
Financial analysts serve as information intermediaries in financial markets. It 
is their job to gather and analyze all available information on a company in order 
to support investors in their investment decisions. Since analyst research generally 
contains information value (Asquith et al., 2005), it could be shown in various 
papers (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2014) that investors actually rely on this infor-
mation. At the same time, numerous studies found analyst forecasts and recom-
mendations to be systematically biased by herding or anti-herding behavior, call-
ing the information value of analyst research into question.  
In this context, herding describes the tendency to ‘stick to the crowd’ even 
though the analysts’ private information would indicate otherwise.1 Studies by, 
for example, Trueman (1994) or Hong et al. (2000) suppose reputational and 
career concerns to explain analyst herding. The authors believe that analysts herd 
in order to signal a higher forecasting ability to investors and employers. Thereby, 
Hong et al. (2000) found young and inexperienced analysts to be especially prone 
to herding as they are punished more harshly for poor forecast performance. The 
opposite behavior to herding would be anti-herding. This means that analysts 
overemphasize their analyses and issue forecasts away from the consensus of prec-
edent forecasts by other analysts.2 Again, the literature suggests that anti-herding 
might be explained by career concerns as analysts try to ‘stand out from the 
crowd’. The findings of Clement and Tse (2005), for example, indicate that ana-
lysts are more likely to anti-herd with a higher general experience and prior ac-
curacy.  
However, both types of biases (i.e. herding as well as anti-herding) basically 
represent situations where forecasts do not represent the analysts’ best knowledge 
and in that, both constrain the analysts’ function as information intermediaries. 
As different kinds of market participants rely on analyst research to conduct 
investment decisions, herding as well as anti-herding might eventually skew mar-
ket prices, foster stock market volatility or contribute to the development of mar-
ket bubbles.3 This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the (anti-) 
herding behavior from a cross-country perspective. Although the literature has 
generally found that the informativeness and accuracy of analyst research differs 
                                      
1
 See, for example, Trueman (1994), Hong et al. (2000), Clement and Tse (2005), or Jegadeesh 
and Kim (2010). 
2
 See, for example, Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt et al. (2006), Chen and Jiang (2006) or Naujoks 
et al. (2009). 
3
  For a more elaborated discussion on the consequences of herding in financial markets see, for 
example, De Bondt and Forbes (1999) or Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001). 
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across different countries (see, e.g., Bhat et al., 2006 or Arand et al., 2015), to 
the best of our knowledge, it has not yet been analyzed if financial analysts’ 
herding behavior differs, depending on the country a certain company is located 
in. As a second contribution, we provide first evidence that analysts’ deviation 
from their true estimates depends on the prevailing company- and country-level 
means of investor protection and corporate governance environment.  
Reviewing the research that has been done on analyst herding, one has to 
differentiate among two different types of forecasts: Stock recommendations and 
earnings forecasts. With respect to stock recommendations, Welch (2000) not only 
found that the prevailing consensus has a positive influence on recommendation 
revisions, but also found that such revisions influence the following two revisions 
made by consequent analysts. Accordingly, Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) found an-
alysts to herd while issuing stock recommendations. With respect to earnings 
forecasts, Trueman (1994) also found analysts to issue forecasts not in an unbiased 
manner, but to herd towards the consensus of previously issued forecasts. He 
explained the herding behavior with analysts’ career and reputational concerns. 
Similarly, subsequent studies by, for example, Hong et al. (2000) or Clement and 
Tse (2005) found earnings forecasts to be biased by herding. In contrast, more 
recent studies (see, e.g., Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt et al. (2006), Chen and Jiang 
(2006) or Naujoks et al. (2009)) emphasized that the previous studies’ results 
might suffer from various problems such as correlated information signals, unex-
pected common shocks and systematic optimism or pessimism.4 Thus, they ad-
justed their methodologies to control for these issues. In contrast to the former 
studies, they uniformly found analysts to anti-herd, meaning to issue earnings 
forecasts farther from the consensus than their private information would suggest.  
The literature indicates that analyst forecast accuracy is strongly determined 
by a company’s investor protection environment. While Byard, et al. (2006) found 
company-level investor protection to improve analysts’ forecast accuracy, Bhat et 
al. (2006) revealed the importance of country-level investor protection and corpo-
rate governance. To explain this finding, Arand et al. (2015) argued that investor 
protection leads to high-quality corporate disclosures, and thus, to better inputs 
for analyst research. Even in more detail, Frankel et al. (2006) showed that the 
informativeness of analyst research and financial statements are complements. If 
a higher investor protection environment improves the inputs for analyst research 
and, consequently, analysts’ forecast accuracy, one could reasonably assume that 
investor protection might also effect analysts’ herding or anti-herding behavior. 
                                      
4
 For a detailed discussion of problems arising within former studies on herding, see Bernhardt 
et al. (2006). 
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We hypothesize that an increase in disclosure and information quality eases the 
assessment of the companies’ situation and future earnings expectations not only 
for analysts themselves but, additionally, for all other market participants. As a 
consequence, biased forecasts might be recognized more easily, and eventually, 
analysts might feel compelled to issue forecasts closer to their true estimates. The 
first indication was provided by Naujoks et al. (2009), who show that German 
analysts deviate less from their own forecasts in case of larger companies. As the 
German Corporate Governance Codex plays an increasing role for large companies 
in Germany, the company’s size can be seen as proxy for investor protection.5   
As a more direct company-level investor protection measure, the literature has 
revealed a company’s share of institutional ownership to be associated with the 
quality of financial reporting. As Yeo et al. (2002) emphasized, this could be due 
to the fact that large institutional shareholders have an interest in gathering all 
available information and, hence, monitor the respective company’s management. 
The authors highlighted that institutional shareholders, by exercising voting 
rights for example, have the necessary control over the management to enforce 
their interests. Velury and Jenkins (2006) extended the study of Yeo et al. (2002) 
and found that large institutional owners indeed fulfil a monitoring role and that 
a larger fraction of institutional ownership leads to an increased quality of re-
ported earnings.6 Ljungqvist et al. (2007) even linked ownership directly to the 
quality of analyst reports. They found that the presence of institutional investors 
provides incentives for analysts to publish unbiased forecasts, as issuing biased 
research would undermine their reputation with institutional investors. Ulti-
mately, this is due to the fact that institutions are the primary customers of 
analyst research. Thus, we hypothesize that analysts are less likely to deviate 
from their true forecasts (in terms of herding or anti-herding) in case of institu-
tional investors performing monitoring efforts.  
A company’s investor protection environment can be described not only on 
the company level, but also on the country level. Based on our cross-country 
sample, we employ four conceptually different measures of country-level investor 
protection. The measures describe whether a country’s legal system depends on 
code law or common law (La Porta et al., 1998); the efficiency of a country’s anti-
self-dealing mechanisms (Djankov et al., 2008); a country’s ability of legal en-
forcement (Leuz et al., 2003) and a country’s capability to remedy, prevent and 
                                      
5
 See Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code (2013). 
6
  For further literature on the effect of institutional ownership on the quality of reported earn-
ings, see Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Frankel et al. (2006) or Chen et al. (2007). 
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punish law violations (Jackson & Roe, 2009). Similar to the company-level argu-
ment, we hypothesize that analysts should be less likely to herd or anti-herd when 
country-level investor protection is high.  
Our research, therefore, aims to answer two questions: First, does the (anti-) 
herding behavior of financial analysts differ between companies located in differ-
ent countries? And second, to what extent do the company- and country-level 
measures of investor protection influence the (anti-) herding behavior of analysts? 
For our analysis, we utilize earnings forecasts from 814,088 analyst reports from 
January 2005 to June 2010 from eight different countries and employ the herding 
methodology of Bernhardt et al. (2006).  
In line with previous literature (see, e.g., Chen & Jiang, 2006), we find analysts 
to anti-herd when issuing earnings forecasts. Considering the results for each 
country separately, anti-herding remains prevalent for all countries in our sample. 
We find the anti-herding bias to be more severe for forecasts on companies from 
European countries compared to forecasts on companies from Japan or the US. 
In addition, our results show that the level of forecast bias (in terms of anti-
herding) significantly decreases in case of high levels of company-level investor 
protection and corporate governance (as proxied by high shares of institutional 
ownership). Similarly, we find a considerably lower level of forecast bias in case 
of a strong country-level investor protection environment, as measured by four 
conceptually different country-level proxies. Finally, as a company’s investor pro-
tection environment can only be comprehensively described by combining both 
company- and country-level measures, we analyze both effects simultaneously. 
Our results show that company-level investor protection only lowers the forecast-
ing bias of analyst research in situations where country-level investor protection 
and governance are yet strong. In contrast, when country-level investor protection 
is weak, the additional effect of company-level investor protection has no influ-
ence. Thus, we conclude that institutional ownership is not a substitute for but 
conditional on country-level investor protection when it comes to analyst herd-
ing/anti-herding behavior.  
This research continues as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data set and 
variables and in Section 3 we explain the methodology by Bernhardt et al. (2006) 
that we apply. In Section 4 we present our empirical results before we finally draw 
a conclusion in Section 5. 
 
2. Data set and variables 
We collect analyst report data from FactSet. For each report, our data set 
contains publication date, earnings per share (EPS) forecast, the actual EPS as 
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reported at the fiscal year’s end, the company’s International Securities Identifi-
cation Number (ISIN) and the country of primary listing. Penny stocks as well 
as companies that are covered by less than four different analysts per year are 
dropped from our sample. Our final sample consists of 814,088 analyst reports 
from January 2005 to June 2010. The reports are written by 9,977 analysts on 
3,741 companies located in eight different countries (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US). These countries account for more 
than 59% of the world’s total market capitalization7, and thus, represent the most 
important financial and economic centers worldwide. Furthermore, they embody 
different regulatory environments and therefore represent a suitable sample for 
the purpose of our research.  
To measure investor protection and the prevailing corporate governance envi-
ronment, we apply company- and country-level measures. With respect to the 
company-level, we gather a company’s share of institutional ownership 
(INSTHOLD) from FactSet. In our sample, it ranges between 0.02% and 100% 
while the average equals 55.84% and the SD 28.53%. With respect to country-
level investor protection, we utilize four conceptually different measures. The first 
measure (COMMON) is a dummy variable describing the country’s legal origin. 
It equals 1 if the country’s legal system depends on common law and 0 in case of 
code law. According to La Porta et al. (1998), common law countries feature 
stronger investor protection than code law countries. The second measure is the 
anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) from Djankov et al. (2008), which addresses the 
country-level protection of minority shareholders against self-dealing by majority 
shareholders. The third measure (PUBL_ENF) follows Leuz et al. (2003) and 
represents a proxy for legal enforcement. It represents the average of three vari-
ables from La Porta et al. (1998), namely the efficiency of the judicial system, the 
rule of law and the level of corruption. The final measure (STAFF_ENF) is taken 
from Jackson and Roe (2009) and represents a measure of a country’s capability 
to remedy, prevent and punish law violations. It is derived by the number of 
securities regulator’s staff members divided by the country’s population. For 
ASDI, PUBL_ENF and STAFF_ENF, a higher value indicates a higher level of 
investor protection. Generally, we expect the level of forecast bias (i.e. herd-
ing/anti-herding) to be lower in environments of high investor protection.  
Table I-1 provides summary statistics for the country-level measures of inves-
tor protection. It shows that ASDI is highest for the UK (0.95) and the US (0.65) 
while it is sharply lower for continental European countries (between 0.27 and 
0.42). Looking at PUBL_ENF, the highest values can be found for Switzerland 
                                      
7
  According to the World Bank as per 2012. 
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(10.0), the US (9.54) and the UK (9.22). The lowest values can be found for the 
South-European countries Italy (7.07) and Spain (7.14). For STAFF_ENF, the 
results appear to be quite similar: the US (23.75) and the UK (19.04) have the 
highest values, while the levels for continental European countries are severely 
lower (between 4.43 and 8.87). 462,766 of our 814,088 reports (approximately 
56.85%) were issued by US analysts. This is similar to several international stud-
ies on analysts like, for example, Barniv et al. (2005) and Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2006). 
 
Table I-1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of different country-level measures of investor protection for the countries in our 
sample, namely France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US. COMMON is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 in case of common law origin and 0 in case of code law origin. ASDI represents the anti-self-dealing index 
by Djankov et al. (2008). PUBL_ENF represents the legal enforcement index by Leuz et al. (2003). STAFF_ENF is a 
proxy for a country’s capability to remedy, prevent and punish law violations by Jackson and Roe (2009). For ASDI, 
PUBL_ENF and STAFF_ENF, a higher value indicates a higher level of country-level investor protection. N reflects the 
number of observations. 
Country COMMON ASDI PUBL_ENF   STAFF_ENF N 
France Code 0.38 8.68 5.91 67,497 
Germany Code 0.28 9.05 4.43 64,830 
Italy Code 0.42 7.07 7.25 23,430 
Japan Code 0.50 9.17 4.32 47,879 
Spain Code 0.37 7.14 8.50 23,234 
Switzerland Code 0.27 10.00 8.87 35,978 
United Kingdom Common 0.95 9.22 19.04 88,474 
United States Common 0.65 9.54 23.75 462,766 
Mean  0.59 9.26 17.51  
Median   0.65 9.54 23.75   
 
3. Methodology 
For the purpose of this study, we employ the methodology introduced by 
Bernhardt et al. (2006). Their methodology is designed to be robust against sev-
eral methodological issues such as correlated information signals and unexpected 
market wide earnings shocks that were not addressed in the previous literature. 
Furthermore, it also accounts for the specific time of information arrival in the 
forecasting cycle since analysts that issue forecasts later in the course of a year 
regularly base their forecasts on a richer set of information.8  
Key assumption of the applied methodology is that an analyst should issue 
unbiased forecasts incorporating all available information. The probability that 
the forecast undershoots or overshoots the actual earnings should then be exactly 
                                      
8
  For a more elaborated discussion on the advantages of this methodology, see Bernhardt et al. 
(2006). 
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0.5. Moreover, it should be independent of whether the forecast exceeds or falls 
short of the consensus which is based on earlier forecasts. We estimate the condi-
tional overshooting and undershooting probabilities as follows: 
 
  po = Pr (Fτ > Aτ | Fτ > Cτ ; Fτ ≠ Aτ ) = 0.5    and 
(1) 
  pu = Pr (Fτ < Aτ | Fτ < Cτ ; Fτ ≠ Aτ ) = 0.5 
 
where po is the conditional overshooting probability and pu is the conditional 
undershooting probability. Furthermore, τ describes a unique identifier for each 
analyst report in our sample and Fτ describes the analyst’s earnings forecast in 
report τ. Aτ displays the respective company’s actual earnings at the end of the 
report’s forecasting period and Cτ describes the company-specific consensus earn-
ings forecast at the time report τ is published. We estimate the prevailing con-
sensus forecast for any report as the mean of all outstanding earnings forecasts 
on the respective company and forecast horizon. Thereby, as we expect analysts 
to incorporate other analysts’ forecasts with a time lag, we exclude forecasts that 
were made on the same day as the report under consideration.9 Furthermore, as 
we do not expect analysts to include forecasts that are outstanding for a rather 
long time and can therefore be considered as stale, we exclude forecasts that have 
been published 90 days before the report under consideration.10  
In case of herding, the conditional probabilities to overshoot or undershoot the 
actual earnings will be smaller than 0.5 (po < 0.5 and pu < 0.5). In case of anti-
herding (i.e. the opposite bias), the conditional probabilities to overshoot or un-
dershoot the actual earnings will be greater than 0.5 (po > 0.5 and pu > 0.5). To 
measure herding behavior, (Bernhardt et al., 2006) constructed a test statistic ‘S’ 
that is defined as the sample average of the conditional overshooting and under-
shooting probability estimates. It can be interpreted as a measure of how close 
analysts issue forecasts to their unbiased estimates based on their private infor-
mation (i.e. the true forecast). If analysts issue their unbiased best estimates, the 
S-statistic should be equal to 0.5. A value of S which is lower than 0.5 reveals 
that analysts are not publishing their unbiased best estimates but rather under-
emphasize their private information and herd towards the consensus forecast. 
                                      
9
  While Clement and Tse (2005) use a 3-day lag, excluding reports from only the report’s pub-
lishing date is consistent with Zitzewitz (2001) and Naujoks et al. (2009). 
10
 Including only reports of the last 90 days into the consensus is consistent with Clement and 
Tse (2005) and Naujoks et al. (2009). 
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Accordingly, a value of S which is larger than 0.5 means that analysts overem-
phasize their private information and anti-herd away from the consensus forecast.  
 
4. Empirical results  
Within our first analysis as presented in Table I-2, we present not only the 
herding results for the overall sample (Panel A) but also the results regarding 
country-specific herding effects (Panel B). Table I-2 is therefore organized as fol-
lows: Next to the number of observations N, the table presents unconditional 
overshooting probabilities, conditional over- and undershooting probabilities, the 
S-statistic as well as 95% confidence intervals and t-statistics. 
 
Table I-2: Herding results for the overall sample and by country 
Notes: The columns of this table are organized as follows: N reflects the number of observations. The unconditional 
overshooting probability presents the frequency analyst forecasts exceed actual earnings. The conditional overshooting 
(undershooting) probability depicts the frequency analyst forecasts overshoot (undershoot) the actual earnings, conditional 
on overshooting (undershooting) the consensus forecast. The S-statistic is the sample average of both conditional proba-
bilities. The null hypothesis of unbiased forecasts translates into S = 0.5. Values of S less than (greater than) 0.5 indicate 
herding (anti-herding) behaviour. Lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence intervals as well as t-statistics are also 
reported. Panel A of this table reports the S-statistic as introduced by Bernhardt et al. (2006) for our whole sample. Panel 
B reports the S-statistics for subsamples based on each company’s country of primary listing.  
  
N 
Unconditional 
overshooting 
probability 
Conditional 
overshooting 
probability 
Conditional 
undershooting 
probability 
S- 
Statistic 
Lower 
CI 
Upper 
CI 
t- 
Statistic 
Panel A: Whole sample 
  814,088 0.467 0.517 0.568 0.543 0.542 0.544 77.22 
Panel B: Country-specific herding 
France 67,497 0.541 0.646 0.560 0.603 0.599 0.607 53.57 
Germany 64,830 0.528 0.608 0.548 0.578 0.574 0.582 39.68 
Italy 23,430 0.534 0.642 0.548 0.595 0.589 0.602 29.17 
Japan 47,879 0.546 0.564 0.464 0.514 0.501 0.519 6.17 
Spain 23,234 0.472 0.599 0.649 0.624 0.617 0.630 37.64 
Switzerland 35,978 0.533 0.626 0.568 0.597 0.592 0.602 36.77 
UK 88,474 0.389 0.459 0.696 0.578 0.574 0.581 45.84 
USA 462,766 0.446 0.476 0.559 0.517 0.516 0.519 23.62 
 
With regard to the overall herding analysis, results show that analysts uncon-
ditionally overshoot the actual earnings only 46.7% of the time. Under the condi-
tion that forecasts exceed the consensus, they exceed the actual earnings 51.7% 
of the time. Under the condition that they fall short of the consensus, they fall 
short of the actual earnings 56.8% of the time. The results are similar, albeit 
smaller, compared to the results of Bernhardt et al. (2006). In their US-sample, 
they find forecasts to exceed earnings unconditionally only 45% of the time and 
conditionally to exceed (fall short) earnings 55.6% (62.8%) of the time.  
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Panel A of Table I-2 also presents the S-statistic for the whole sample. The S-
statistic equals 0.543, which means that analysts overshoot the actual earnings in 
the opposite direction of the consensus by a chance of 54.3%. This result indicates 
that analysts do not publish their unbiased estimates but instead anti-herd. In 
other words, analysts highlight their own forecasts by overemphasizing them. This 
is in line with Bernhardt et al. (2006) and Naujoks et al. (2009), who also found 
strong evidence for anti-herding based on US and German data. 
To the best of our knowledge, the herding behavior of analysts - based on a 
methodology that is robust to various methodological issues (see Bernhardt et al., 
2006) - has not been investigated from a cross-country perspective. Panel B of 
Table I-2 therefore presents results for different subsamples according to a com-
pany’s country of primary listing. The most prevalent finding is that forecasts on 
companies from all countries seem to be biased by anti-herding. Results show S-
statistics which are significantly above 0.5 for all different countries. However, 
comparing the results across all subsamples of countries, we find significant dif-
ferences not only for the S-statistics, but also for the unconditional and condi-
tional overshooting and undershooting probabilities.  
For the UK, the US and Spain, the unconditional overshooting probabilities 
are below 0.5 and the conditional overshooting probabilities are lower than the 
conditional undershooting probabilities. Following the argumentation of Bern-
hardt et al. (2006), this indicates pessimism or the prevalence of positive unfore-
seen earnings shocks. However, this relation does not hold for the remaining coun-
tries of our sample. For France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland, the un-
conditional overshooting probabilities are above 0.5 and, at the same time, the 
conditional overshooting probabilities are higher than the conditional undershoot-
ing probabilities. Hence, forecasts on companies from these countries seem to be 
more optimistic, or alternatively, more frequently challenged by negative unfore-
seen earnings shocks. For Germany, our results are in line with Naujoks et al. 
(2009), who analyzed forecasts on German companies from 1994 to 2005. 
Investigating the herding behavior for analysts forecasting companies from 
European countries, our results report the highest S-statistics for companies from 
Spain (0.624) and France (0.603). The anti-herding bias for forecasts on compa-
nies from Switzerland and Italy is somewhat smaller with corresponding S-statis-
tics of 0.597 and 0.595, respectively. For forecasts on companies from Germany 
and the UK, we find the S-statistic to equal 0.578. This is close to the results of 
Naujoks et al. (2009), who reported the S-statistic for forecasts on German com-
panies to equal 0.583. For the US, our results reveal a much lower degree of anti-
herding compared to European countries. In fact, the S-statistic for forecasts on 
US companies is the second lowest in our sample as the respective S-statistic 
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equals 0.517. Hence, it seems as if at least for this very recent time period, fore-
casts on US companies are much less biased compared to forecasts on all other 
countries including Europe. In contrast, Bernhardt et al. (2006), who also ana-
lyzed forecasts on US companies found a much higher S-statistic of 0.592 for the 
period from 1989 to 2001. However, the anti-herding bias in our more recent 
sample period seems to be much lower. As our sample ranges from 2005 to 2010, 
a change in analyst behavior over time might explain the difference to Bernhardt 
et al. (2006). Finally, forecasts on Japanese companies suffer the lowest levels of 
anti-herding in our sample with a corresponding S-statistic of 0.514.  
Anti-herding and investor protection 
Among others, Yeo et al. (2002) and Velury and Jenkins (2006) have shown 
that the presence of institutional owners is positively associated with the quality 
of companies’ information disclosures. We, therefore, hypothesize that the im-
proved information quality eases the assessment of the companies’ situation and 
future earnings for all kinds of market participants. Consequently, one can assume 
that biased analyst forecasts would be recognized more easily by other market 
participants. Hence, in case of high quality disclosures as proxied by the presence 
of institutional ownership, analysts might feel compelled to issue forecasts that 
are less biased (by anti-herding effects) and closer to their true estimates.  
Within Panel A of Table I-3, we therefore present evidence concerning the 
herding behavior of analysts, relative to the prevailing level of institutional own-
ership. Results show that the unconditional overshooting probabilities are above 
0.5 in case of low levels of institutional ownership (quintile 1 and 2) and below 
0.5 for high levels of institutional ownership (quintile 3 to 5). Similarly, the con-
ditional overshooting probabilities are higher than the conditional undershooting 
probabilities within the two lowest quintiles of INSTHOLD, whereas this associ-
ation reverses for higher levels of institutional ownership. Hence, it seems as if 
analysts are less likely to issue optimistic forecasts along increasing levels of in-
stitutional ownership. With respect to the S-statistic that is consistently above 
0.5, our results show that forecasts on companies with different levels of institu-
tional ownership are biased by anti-herding behavior. However, within an increas-
ing level of institutional ownership, we find the anti-herding bias to shrink. For 
the quintile of companies with the lowest levels of institutional ownership, the S-
statistic equals 0.574. It decreases to a value of 0.517 for the quintile of companies 
with the highest levels of institutional ownership. Hence, analysts’ forecasts not 
only are less optimistic in case of a higher share of institutional ownership but 
also appear to be less biased by anti-herding behavior and are, therefore, closer 
to the analysts’ true estimates. Apart from the company-specific level of investor 
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protection, one might also proxy protection and corporate governance levels by 
country-specific measures. 
 
Table I-3: Herding results split by investor protection 
Notes: Panel A of this table reports the S-statistics for subsamples based on a company’s share of institutional ownership 
(INSTHOLD). The quintiles are ordered from low (quintile 1) to high (quintile 5) institutional ownership. Panel B shows 
herding results based on subsamples of low and high investor protection and corporate governance environments. COM-
MON is a dummy variable that equals 1 in case of common law origin and 0 in case of code law origin. For all other 
variables, we split the sample into subsamples based on the median. ASDI represents the anti-self-dealing index by Djankov 
et al. (2008). PUBL_ENF represents the legal enforcement index by Leuz et al. (2003). STAFF_ENF is a proxy for a 
country’s capability to remedy, prevent and punish law violations by Jackson and Roe (2009). The columns of this table 
are organized as follows: N reflects the number of observations. The unconditional overshooting probability presents the 
frequency analyst forecasts exceed actual earnings. The conditional overshooting (undershooting) probability depicts the 
frequency analyst forecasts overshoot (undershoot) the actual earnings, conditional on overshooting (undershooting) the 
consensus forecast. The S-statistic is the sample average of both conditional probabilities. The null hypothesis of unbiased 
forecasts translates into S = 0.5. Values of S less than (greater than) 0.5 indicate herding (anti-herding) behaviour. Lower 
and upper bounds of 95% confidence intervals as well as t-statistics are also reported.  
Sample N 
Uncondi-
tional over-
shooting 
probability 
Conditional 
overshooting 
probability 
Conditional 
undershooting 
probability 
S- 
statistic Lower CI 
Upper 
CI 
t- 
Statistic 
Panel A: Quintiles of institutional ownership 
1 (low) 162,835 0.517 0.596 0.552 0.574 0.572 0.577 59.78 
2 162,849 0.516 0.585 0.541 0.563 0.560 0.565 50.67 
3 162,809 0.459 0.506 0.569 0.538 0.535 0.540 30.38 
4 162,825 0.421 0.458 0.599 0.528 0.526 0.531 22.76 
5(high) 162,770 0.424 0.450 0.583 0.517 0.514 0.519 13.48 
Panel B: Country-level measures of investor protection 
By COMMON 
Code 262,848 0.531 0.615 0.546 0.581 0.579 0.583 82.65 
Common 551,240 0.437 0.473 0.580 0.526 0.525 0.528 39.14 
By ASDI 
low 191,539 0.527 0.624 0.568 0.596 0.594 0.598 83.89 
high 622,549 0.449 0.485 0.568 0.527 0.526 0.528 42.37 
By STAFF_ENF 
low 203,636 0.537 0.615 0.531 0.573 0.571 0.575 65.94 
high 610,452 0.444 0.487 0.582 0.534 0.533 0.536 53.31 
By PUBL_ENF 
low 178,991 0.527 0.625 0.565 0.595 0.593 0.598 80.75 
high 635,097 0.451 0.488 0.569 0.529 0.527 0.530 45.48 
 
Panel B of Table I-3, therefore, presents results for high versus low investor 
protection subsamples, as measured by country-level proxies. Apart from a sam-
ple-split into common and code law origin, we also split the sample into high and 
low investor protection subsamples based on the ASDI, the staff enforcement 
index (STAFF_ENF) and the public enforcement index (PUBL_ENF), as ex-
plained in Section 2. The results for the unconditional and conditional overshoot-
ing and undershooting probabilities are similar to the results based on using the 
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company-level investor protection measure. The unconditional overshooting prob-
abilities are above 0.5 for low levels of country-level investor protection, while 
they shrink to values below 0.5 for high levels. Furthermore, the differences be-
tween the conditional overshooting and conditional undershooting probabilities 
are positive for low country-level investor protection environments and negative 
for high country-level investor protection environment in terms of all four used 
measures. Overall, it is unlikely that increasing levels of investor protection and 
corporate governance lead analysts to become more pessimistic about the respec-
tive companies. Therefore, one might follow Bernhardt et al.’s (2006) second ex-
planation for positive differences between conditional over- and undershooting 
probabilities, which argues that analysts are less often surprised by negative earn-
ings shocks. This seems reasonable as the analysts’ potential to identify prospec-
tive earnings risks should be fostered by the improved information which we as-
sume to come in hand with a higher investor protection environment. Looking at 
the S-statistics for the subsamples based on the country-level measures of investor 
protection, Panel B of Table I-3 proves anti-herding to be severely lower for fore-
casts on companies from common law countries (S = 0.526) compared to those on 
companies from code law countries (S = 0.581). Similar results are found for all 
other three proxies of country-specific investor protection. In case of high investor 
protection and corporate governance (i.e. above median levels of ASDI, 
STAFF_ENF and PUBL_ENF), S-statistics are much lower compared to the 
respective subsamples of low investor protection environments. Nevertheless, as 
the S-statistics remain above 0.5, we find anti-herding throughout all of our sub-
samples although the forecast bias within high investor protection environments 
is much lower in relative terms.  
So far, we have shown that both company- and country-level investor protec-
tion measures influence the forecasting behavior of analysts. Within the next 
analysis, we now combine both effects. Therefore, we provide S-statistics for all 
kinds of combinations between company- and country-level investor protection 
levels.  
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Table I-4: Herding results matrix on investor protection 
Notes: This table is organized as follows: each row of the table represents one quintile based on the company-level investor 
protection (i.e. the share of institutional ownership). The quintiles are ordered from low (quintile 1) to high (quintile 5) 
share of institutional ownership. With respect to each column, the sample is split based on country-level investor protection 
(i.e. low and high investor protection and corporate governance environments). For the legal origin, we differentiate 
between code and common law. COMMON is a dummy variable that equals 1 in case of common law origin and 0 in case 
of code law origin. For all other variables, we split the sample into subsamples based on the median. ASDI represents the 
anti-self-dealing index by Djankov et al. (2008). PUBL_ENF represents the legal enforcement index by Leuz et al. (2003). 
STAFF_ENF is a proxy for a country’s capability to remedy, prevent and punish law violations by Jackson and Roe 
(2009). For each combination of company- and country-level investor protection, we provide the subsample’s S-statistic 
and the number of observations (in parentheses). Q5-Q1 computes the difference in the S-statistic between the highest 
and the lowest quintile. The reported t-statistic’s null hypothesis analyses whether the difference Q5-Q1 is equal to zero. 
 Legal Origin ASDI STAFF_ENF PUBL_ENF 
INSTHOLD Code  Common low high low high low high 
  (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) (N) 
1 (low) 0.583 0.537 0.594 0.538 0.573 0.570 0.597 0.543 
 (52,682) (110,258) (38,360) (124,515) (40,730) (122,137) (35,802) (127,025) 
2 0.579 0.531 0.601 0.536 0.572 0.536 0.601 0.536 
 (52,478) (110,332) (38,360) (124,510) (40,743) (122,222) (35,882) (127,218) 
3 0.572 0.524 0.594 0.525 0.560 0.525 0.591 0.527 
 (52,562) (110,219) (38,307) (124,537) (40,719) (121,924) (35,738) (126,902) 
4 0.572 0.533 0.591 0.533 0.570 0.533 0.592 0.532 
 (52,673) (110,345) (38,239) (124,600) (40,766) (122,136) (35,785) (126,995) 
5 (high) 0.596 0.508 0.600 0.509 0.591 0.509 0.596 0.510 
  (52,453) (110,086) (38,273) (124,387) (40,678) (122,033) (35,784) (126,957) 
Q5-Q1 0.012 -0.029 0.006 -0.03 0.018 -0.061 -0.001 -0.033 
t-Statistic 3.96 -13.69 1.60 -14.78 5.16 -30.20 -0.36 -16.78 
 
Table I-4 is organized as follows: each row of the table represents one quintile 
based on the company-level investor protection (i.e. the share of institutional 
ownership). The quintiles are ordered from low (quintile 1) to high (quintile 5) 
share of institutional ownership. With respect to each column, the sample is split 
based on country-level investor protection (i.e. low versus high investor protection 
and corporate governance environments). Quite interestingly, all differences in S-
statistics between the lowest and highest quintile of institutional ownership (Q5-
Q1) for the subsamples of low country-level investor protection appear quite low 
and are, at least partly, not statistically significant. For code law countries, for 
example, the S-statistic of the low ownership quintile (S = 0.583) almost equals 
the S-statistic of the high ownership quintile (S = 0.596). Similar findings apply 
to all subsamples of low investor protection. Hence, our results do not reveal any 
positive influence (i.e. forecast bias decreasing effect) based on the presence of 
institutional ownership, conditional on low investor protection and governance 
countries. On the contrary, once we purely focus on countries with high levels of 
investor protection and strong corporate governance, all differences in S-statistics 
between the lowest and highest quintile of institutional ownership (Q5-Q1) are 
substantial and highly significant. For common law countries, for example, the 
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S-statistic of the low ownership quintile equals 0.537 whereas it sharply decreases 
to 0.508 for the high ownership quintile. Table I-4 summarizes similar findings 
for all other subsamples of high country-level investor protection. Overall, the 
corresponding S-statistics are very close to 0.5. Hence, analysts are very reluctant 
to issue biased forecasts in situations of strong country-level investor protection, 
possibly due to an overall increase in information quality. Nevertheless, large 
shareholders’ ability to put pressure on companies’ management in order to im-
prove the information quality comes only into effect in high investor protection 
environments. This indicates that institutional ownership is not able to serve as 
a substitute for a lack of country-level investor protection with respect to analyst 
herding. However, if high institutional ownership and a high country-level inves-
tor protection environment come in hand, the combination is very effective in 
bringing analysts to issue forecasts close to the analysts’ best estimates.  
 
5. Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, the herding behavior of analysts has not yet 
been investigated in a cross-country study that, at the same time, employs a 
methodology robust to methodological issues like, for example, correlated infor-
mation signals, unexpected market wide earnings shocks or systematic optimism.  
For the whole sample, our results show that analysts anti-herd with respect 
to their earnings forecasts. Anti-herding represents a situation where analysts 
overemphasize their private information and, therefore, anti-herd away from the 
consensus of precedent analysts. Our results are consistent with research on ana-
lyst herding by Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt et al. (2006), Chen and Jiang (2006) 
or Naujoks et al. (2009). 
However, while using a multi-national dataset, we contribute to the literature 
by showing that all forecasts are biased by anti-herding, irrespective of the coun-
try that we focus on. Thereby, our results show more severe anti-herding behavior 
for forecasts on companies from European countries compared to forecasts on 
companies from Japan or the US. In addition, we hypothesize that the cross-
country differences stem from the company’s investor protection and corporate 
governance environment. This might be due to the fact that the overall investor 
protection environment improves a company’s disclosure quality which eases the 
assessment of the company’s situation and future earnings for all kinds of market 
participants. Consequently, biased analyst forecasts could be recognized more eas-
ily by other market participants. Hence, analysts might be reluctant to issue bi-
ased forecasts and remain closer to their true estimates. Our results back this 
argumentation since higher company-level investor protection, as proxied by the 
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share of institutional ownership, significantly reduces the anti-herding behavior 
of analysts. Similarly, strong country-level investor protection and corporate gov-
ernance environments, as measured by a country’s common versus code law 
origin, the efficiency of a country’s anti-self-dealing mechanisms, a country’s abil-
ity of legal enforcement and a country’s capability to remedy, prevent and punish 
law violations, also sharply reduce forecast biases of analysts. 
Finally, as a company’s investor protection environment can only be compre-
hensively described by combining company-level and country-level means of in-
vestor protection, we investigate the combined effect of a company’s share of 
institutional ownership and the different country-level measures of investor pro-
tection. We find that institutional ownership cannot serve as a substitute for 
country-level investor protection when it comes to analyst anti-herding as its 
effect does only come into play in environments of high investor protection. Con-
sequently, based on our results, analyst forecasts are least biased for companies 
with high shares of institutional ownership which are located in countries with 
high investor protection and corporate governance environments. 
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Abstract - In this study, we investigate how two key dimensions 
of trust formation, i.e. interpersonal trust in the advisor (narrow-
scope trust) and broader trust in the business context in which 
the advisor operates (broad-scope trust), impact households’ 
overall trust in financial advice. To capture the potential influ-
ence of broad-scope trust, we make use of novel survey data ob-
tained from the Panel on Household Finances (PHF) and contrast 
households’ propensity to trust financial advice provided by ad-
visors employed at community banks versus large banks, which 
have been shown to feature fundamentally different trust profiles. 
We document that financial advice provided by large-bank advi-
sors is significantly less likely to be trusted, thus rejecting the 
notion that trust in financial advice is essentially equivalent to 
trusting one’s financial advisor. Instead, we provide strong evi-
dence in support of an integrated conceptualization of clients’ 
trust in financial advice, which highlights the importance of es-
tablishing broad-scope trust. 
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1. Introduction 
In light of an increasing responsibility of households for the planning of their 
personal finances along with the well-documented lack of financial literacy1 to 
master this task autonomously, seeking expert financial advice seems a beneficial 
step for consumers to take in order to arrive at informed financial decisions. In-
deed, according to a recent poll in Germany, as much as 81% of all households 
report the financial advisor at their house bank to be the single source of infor-
mation to consult when it comes to financial matters (DSGV, 2014). Chater et 
al. (2010) reach similar conclusions in their large-scale survey of advisees across 
eight member countries of the European Union (EU): 80% of households inter-
acted with a personal advisor prior to purchasing investment products. 
Moreover, trustworthiness is the key criterion when selecting a financial advi-
sor (Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Lachance & Tang, 2012) and most advisees indeed 
have a high level of trust in the advisor with whom they consult (e.g. Mullaina-
than et al., 2013; Monti et al., 2014; Gennaioli et al., 2015), even though the 
literature documents a largely negative record of expert advice when it comes to 
improving households’ financial decisions (e.g. Bergstresser et al., 2009; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Mullainathan et al., 2013; Von Gaudecker, 2015). This 
counter-intuitive finding has been explained by a considerable knowledge asym-
metry which prevents customers from assessing the quality of the advice they 
receive. Absent a sufficient level of financial literacy, clients are forced to trust 
financial advice. Moreover, the lacking transparency about fee schedules and po-
tential conflicts of interest created by sales-based incentives require a substantial 
leap of faith on the part of advisees when entrusting large sums of their money 
to advisors (e.g. Georgarakos & Inderst, 2011). 
At the same time, however, owing to the integrity violations of many market 
players uncovered in the aftermath to the financial crisis, global trust in the 
banking industry has declined dramatically, making banks and financial services 
the least trusted industries by a long way (Guiso, 2010; Edelman, 2015). Taken 
together, individuals thus seem to trust their financial advisors whereas they have 
rather low levels of trust in the financial system in general.  
In this study, we investigate how these two dimensions of trust formation, i.e. 
interpersonal trust in the advisor and broader trust in the financial industry, 
impact households’ overall trust in financial advice. Given that the two trust 
components appear to have unique antecedents, analyzing their respective influ-
ence seems worthwhile in order to enhance our understanding about how trust 
                                      
1
  See Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) for a recent review of the literature on financial literacy.  
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develops in the context of financial advice, i.e. a setting where clients have been 
found to be largely ignorant of conflicts of interest and thus are particularly vul-
nerable to opportunistic behavior exploiting their interpersonal trust in the finan-
cial advisor.2 
Interestingly, however, while a number of studies in economics and marketing 
have examined contextual determinants of trust in advice that go beyond con-
sumers’ trust in the advisor (Moorman et al., 1993; Smith & Barclay, 1997; 
McMillan & Woodruff, 1999; Jeffries & Reed, 2000), prior research in household 
finance has focused on the role of interpersonal trust between advisee and advisor, 
thereby implicitly equating trust in financial advice with trust in the financial 
advisor. In fact, a review of the literature reveals that Grayson et al. (2008) are 
the only ones to explicitly allow for additional dimensions of trust formation in 
the financial services context and only recently, Monti et al. (2014) revisit the 
issue stating that “it would be interesting to see if other contextual cues would 
lead advisees to wisely choose a different mode of trust formation in an environ-
ment with less well aligned incentives to avoid the pitfalls of trusting senders 
misleading signals with harmful intent.” (p. 1756). Yet, presumably owing to data 
limitations, they do not analyze this question empirically. 
We fill this gap and extend the literature on the determinants of trust for-
mation in the context of financial advice by applying the integrated conceptual-
ization developed in Grayson et al. (2008) to take into account the potential 
impact of broad-scope trust for advisees’ overall trust in financial advice. Using 
novel survey data obtained from the Panel on Household Finances (PHF) pro-
vided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, we contrast households’ trust in financial 
advisors employed at community banks versus large banks, i.e. two bank types 
which have been shown to feature fundamentally different trust profiles (Hurley 
et al., 2014). This unique setting allows us to differentiate two layers of trust, i.e. 
narrow-scope trust towards a representative of a given financial services provider 
and broad-scope trust in the business context in which the financial services pro-
vider operates.  
To preview our key results, we document that financial advice provided by 
large-bank advisors is significantly less likely to be trusted by the households 
surveyed in the PHF. Thus, our results prompt us to reject the notion that trust 
in financial advice is essentially equivalent to trusting one’s financial advisor. 
Instead, we provide strong evidence in support of an integrated conceptualization 
of customers’ trust in financial advice, which highlights the role of advisees’ broad-
                                      
2
  See section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of the related evidence.  
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scope trust in the business context in which the provider of financial advice op-
erates.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 2, we relate our 
work to prior research on trust in the context of financial advice and derive our 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents our data and descriptive statistics. In sections 4 
and 5, we present and discuss our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related research and hypothesis development 
2.1. Interpersonal trust formation: The customer-advisor interaction 
Theory on how trust is formed in an advice context posits that the alignment 
of advisor and consumer incentives is the most significant factor for consumer 
trust to develop at the interpersonal level (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Sniezek & 
Van Swol, 2001). However, despite a few contributions that either model clients 
as rational agents who are aware of the advisor’s selling incentives (Calcagno & 
Monticone, 2015) or allow for them to vary in their understanding of the advisor’s 
conflict of interest (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012), empirical studies in the field over-
whelmingly document that consumers do not possess the discernment to tell con-
flicted recommendations from unbiased advice. Based on a large-scale survey 
among six thousand investment advisees in eight EU member states, Chater et 
al. (2010), for instance, show that respondents are largely ignorant of conflicts of 
interest. 
Instead, several studies document that advisees turn to salient factors when 
forming their impressions about the trustworthiness of the advisor. In an early 
study, Johnson and Grayson (2005) examine relationships between consumers and 
financial advisors and conceptualize trust as having cognitive and affective di-
mensions. While cognitive trust is knowledge-driven, affective trust arises from 
the confidence the client places in her advisor based on feelings generated by the 
level of care and concern which the advisor demonstrates. Given that a substantial 
knowledge asymmetry typically prevents customers from assessing the quality of 
the advice they receive, the authors highlight the role of affective trust in financial 
advice. This finding is corroborated in a comprehensive audit study by Mullain-
athan et al. (2013), in which trained mystery shoppers consult with financial 
advisors to discuss their portfolio composition. The authors report that, on aver-
age, advisors fail to debias the auditors and even encourage misconceptions which 
are in line with their own interests by reinforcing return chasing and promoting 
the reallocation of assets into actively managed funds with higher fees. Paradox-
ically enough, the majority of mystery shoppers nevertheless stated that they 
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would return to the advisors they consulted in order to obtain real-world recom-
mendations even after they had learned about their self-interested catering strat-
egies in the subsequent debriefing. 
In a related study, Monti et al. (2014) survey retail investors at an Italian 
cooperative bank and show that actual investment decisions can be explained in 
large part by a simple heuristic based on how customers perceive the communi-
cation style of their financial advisors rather than by the features of the recom-
mended investment products. Similarly, Agnew et al. (2014) document in an ex-
perimental setting that customers use advisors’ professional credentials as a sign 
of expertise, but face severe difficulties discriminating fake credentials from real 
ones, which undoes the signal effect. Taken together, customers seem to be largely 
naïve to moral hazard issues when judging their advisors’ trustworthiness, alt-
hough recent research suggests that this mode of interpersonal trust formation 
- i.e. independent of fundamentals - may well be exploited by opportunistic advi-
sors. Gennaioli et al. (2015) present a model in which trusted advisors do not 
correct investors’ errors but instead have a strong incentive to cater to their bi-
ased beliefs. This prediction is supported by the experimental results in Agnew 
et al. (2014) who demonstrate that a customer’s perception of her advisor’s ability 
can be manipulated by using a simple strategy where confirming the client’s pre-
existing view on an easy topic builds trust in the advisor which subsequently 
persists regardless of the quality of future advice.3 
2.2. An integrated conceptualization of customer trust formation 
Given that customers’ trust in the financial advisor may not always be de-
served and appears to be rather easily won by simple catering strategies, are there 
other levels of trust formation which determine peoples’ overall trust in financial 
advice? While a number of studies in economics and marketing have examined 
contextual determinants of trust in advice that go beyond consumers’ trust in the 
advisor (Moorman et al., 1993; Smith & Barclay, 1997; McMillan & Woodruff, 
1999; Jeffries & Reed, 2000), Grayson et al. (2008) are the first to allow for addi-
tional dimensions of trust formation in the financial services context and conclude 
that trust in the advisor is not the same as trust in the advice. Instead, they find 
that customers are influenced not only by how much they trust a given company 
                                      
3
  Note that Johnson and Grayson (2005) provide early anecdotal evidence in support of advisor 
catering: one of the financial advisors interviewed in the study states that “a tactic use by 
advisers to gain the trust of first-time customers is to recommend a product that saves the 
customer transaction fees and earns little or no commission for the adviser. The adviser informs 
the customer of this act of benevolence, which elicits an emotional bond of trust in the financial 
adviser.” (p. 501).  
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and its representatives but also by how much they trust the broader context in 
which the market exchange is taking place. Accordingly, they present an inte-
grated conceptualization of customer trust formation in the context of financial 
services, which distinguishes two layers of trust, i.e. narrow-scope trust at the 
interpersonal level and broad-scope trust in the business context in which a fi-
nancial services provider operates. At this, interpersonal trust is narrow in scope 
because it only affects the relationship from which it has originated. Broad-scope 
trust, on the other hand, depends on the social context in which the relationship 
is maintained (Driscoll, 1978). While the research of Grayson et al. (2008) is 
somewhat related to ours, their focus lies on testing two rival sociological per-
spectives regarding the influence of customer trust in the broader context and 
they conclude that broad-scope trust and narrow-scope trust are complements 
rather than substitutes. By contrast, we are interested in how the two dimensions 
of trust, i.e. trust in the advisor and broader trust in the industry providing 
financial advisory services, impact advisees’ overall trust in financial advice. 
2.3. Trust profiles of community banks versus large banks 
To capture the potential influence of broad-scope trust, we make use of a 
unique feature of our data, i.e. the fact that not only we know households’ likeli-
hood to trust the financial advice of their house bank, but also have information 
about the bank type to which it belongs. Given this setting, we are able to com-
pare households’ propensity to trust financial advice provided by advisors em-
ployed at community banks versus large banks, which, in a recent study by Hurley 
et al. (2014), have been shown to feature fundamentally different trust profiles. 
Hurley et al. (2014) apply the framework of customer trust developed by Grayson 
et al. (2008) to case study data and show that core elements of trustworthiness 
ingrained in the business model of community banks are missing in many large 
banks.  
The first aspect addresses differences in the general value proposition of the 
two bank types to their respective customers as well as the wider society. Specif-
ically, community banks have a mandate to serve the public interest (savings 
banks) and promote local economic development (cooperative banks), and earn 
significant “benevolence credits” through a number of community-building activ-
ities that are well-aligned with their business models. By contrast, large banks do 
not have a tradition of connecting their core business models to socially redeeming 
purposes but instead have predominantly been committed to maximizing share-
holder value. 
Second, regarding the sustainability of the business model, most community 
banks (as opposed to the majority of large banks) have accepted slower growth 
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in the run-up to the financial crisis so as to avoid venturing into lines of business 
where client conflicts were likely. Similarly, they refrained from securitizing their 
mortgage portfolios to show alignment with local borrowers. 
Third and finally, the recent crises have uncovered substantial problems re-
garding the integrity and compliance of the business models of many large banks 
all over the world. Fraudulent behavior and deception such as ‘robosigning’ of 
mortgage contracts or the manipulation of interest rates revealed that in many 
cases, the original goal of many banks was to increase bonuses and the short-term 
market value, irrespective of the long term risk to stakeholders and the society. 
The fact that several large banks were eventually bailed out despite severe integ-
rity violations not only undermined peoples’ trust in the regulatory authorities 
but also further damaged the reputation of and trust in large banks. 
2.4. Hypotheses 
Hurley et al. (2014) conjecture that these differences in the respective business 
models have undermined peoples’ broad-scope trust in large banks in the after-
math of the financial crisis of 2008 and thus provide us with an empirically test-
able implication. Combining the findings on interpersonal trust formation dis-
cussed in section 2.1 with the differences in the trust profiles of community banks 
as opposed to large banks, we investigate the respective roles of narrow-scope 
trust in the advisor and broad-scope trust in the business context as determinants 
of individuals’ overall trust in financial advice. Specifically, we hypothesize that 
the considerable differences in strategy and culture of community banks versus 
large banks should manifest in significantly lower trust levels of clients advised 
at large banks in case broad-scope trust indeed plays a role in customer trust 
formation. If, however, trust in financial advice is essentially equivalent to trust-
ing one’s financial advisor, we should not observe material differences in trust 
levels of advisees at community banks and large banks, respectively. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. The Panel on Household Finances (PHF) 
To obtain individuals’ propensity to trust their advisors depending on what 
type of bank the latter are employed with, we draw on novel survey data on 
household finance and wealth in Germany provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
in the Panel on Household Finances (PHF) which is representative of the German 
population. Interviews with the 3,565 households sampled in the first wave of the 
PHF were conducted between September 2010 and July 2011 and questions cover 
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a wide range of items related to the household balance sheet including financial 
and non-financial assets as well as household debt. This information is then sup-
plemented with demographic and psychological characteristics of the household 
members as well as a household-specific financial literacy score. Detailed variable 
descriptions are given in Appendix II-1.  
Finally, the PHF features (a) survey weights to adjust for the oversampling of 
wealthy households during the data collection4 and (b) multiple imputations in 
order to mitigate the issue of missing data due to item non-response. Following 
Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer (2014), we do not use imputed values for our 
dependent variables and thus omit the respective households from our final sam-
ple.5 
For the subsample of households who have received financial advice within 
two years prior to being interviewed (N=965), we assess trust in the advice using 
the PHF items “Looking to the near future: How likely is it that your household 
will follow the advice provided by your house bank” with possible answers coded 
in a binary variable (“Rather likely.” versus “Rather unlikely.”)6 and “To which 
banking group does your household belong?” (“Savings bank”, “Cooperative bank“, 
“Large bank”, “Direct bank”, “Other”). Straightforwardly, we classify savings 
banks and cooperative banks as community banks and contrast them with the 
group of large banks. Moreover, we exclude direct banks and other institutions 
since they do not offer retail financial advice. By explicitly relating the trust item 
to the respondent’s primary relationship bank (‘house bank’), the PHF captures 
the great majority of advised individuals in Germany: Hackethal et al. (2010) 
document that, unlike consumers in the US or the UK, German retail investors 
overwhelmingly report to seek financial advice at their house banks. 
 
                                      
4
  We make use of the survey weights and the corresponding replicate weights to adjust point 
estimates as well as variance and standard error estimates in all our baseline analyses. In section 
4.2.2, we analyze if this correction of the sampling design affects our main results.  
5
  Note that for the independent variables, we use the average of the five imputed values provided 
in the data. For robustness, we re-estimate our main model using multiple imputations via 
Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1996). Results remain virtually unchanged and are reported in Appen-
dix II-3.  
6
  This approach of eliciting a client’s trust in her financial advisor via the likelihood with which 
she heeds her recommendations seizes on the notion that trust should translate into behavioral 
manifestations of trust (Mayer et al., 1995) and follows Lachance and Tang (2012), who meas-
ure trust in financial advice based on the extent to which respondents to the National Financial 
Capability Survey (NFCS) agree to “accept what [the financial professional] recommends”. 
Johnson and Grayson (2005) choose a similar trust construct by inquiring into the degree to 
which interviewees “have no reservations about acting on [their financial advisors’] advice”. 
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Table II-1: Descriptive statistics  
This table provides descriptive statistics for the households in our sample obtained from the Panel on Household Finances 
(PHF). The data are weighted and representative for Germany. The PHF is provided with multiple imputations which 
are estimated via Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo method (Zhu & Eisele, 2013). We do not use multiple imputations for our 
dependent variable. For the remaining variables, we use the average of the five imputed data points. Appendix II-1 
provides variable descriptions. 
 Advised  Non-advised  
   
 N Mean SD Min. Median Max.  N Mean SD  Diff. 
 t-test 
Panel A: Financial variables 
TRUST_FA  929 0.615 0.487 0 1 1 
      
COMMUN_BANK 945 0.775 0.417 0 1 1 
 
2,173 0.810 0.392 
 
-0.035 
 
1.37 
FIN_LITERACY 955 2.550 0.686 0 3 3 
 
2,243 2.447 0.757 
 
0.103 
 
1.53 
FIN_WEALTH 965 67,444 168,875 0 31,800 5,000,000 
 
2,287 23,730 77,142 
 
43,714 *** 8.02 
RISK_PROP 965 1.558 0.552 1 2 4 
 
2,286 1.327 0.546 
 
0.231 *** 7.22 
Panel B: Sociodemographic characteristics 
GENDER 965 0.578 0.494 0 1 1 
 
2,287 0.487 0.5 
 
0.091 *** 3.2 
MARRIED 965 0.535 0.499 0 1 1 
 
2,287 0.491 0.5 
 
0.044 
 
1.58 
AGE 965 51.9 16.8 19 50 90 
 
2,287 52.6 18.0 
 
-0.674 
 
0.58 
INCOME 965 2,727 1,806 350 2,300 40,000 
 
2,287 2,178 2,453 
 
549 *** 5.99 
WEALTH 965 238,229 823,083 0 115,000 60,000,000   2,287 129,508 378,000   108,721 *** 4.98 
EDU_HIGH 965 0.669 0.914 0 0 3 
 
2,287 0.461 0.790 
 
0.2071 *** 3.93 
EMPL_SELF 965 0.054 0.227 0 0 1 
 
2,287 0.070 0.256 
 
-0.016 
 
1.25 
TRUST_GEN 964 5.565 1.912 0 5 10 
 
2,283 5.342 2.185 
 
0.22 * 1.94 
 
Table II-1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables which we include in 
our analysis. Specifically, the dummy variable TRUST_FA equals one for the 
61.5% of respondents who considered it “rather likely” to implement the financial 
advice they had obtained, while the remaining 38.5% of households who had 
sought financial advice during the period under review stated that they were 
“rather unlikely” to follow it. Moreover, 77.5% of advisees report their house bank 
to be a community bank (in which case the dummy variable COMMUN_BANK 
takes the value one). Finally, Table II-1 shows that the demographic profile of 
advised respondents is only partly representative of the average household. Com-
pared to the group of non-advised households, we find that they do not differ 
materially in terms of age, family and employment status as well as financial 
literacy levels and the likelihood of having a community bank as their house bank. 
At the same time, however, advised respondents on average dispose of substan-
tially higher income and wealth, are more educated, more likely to be males, and 
have a greater risk appetite. 
3.2. Demographic profiles of bank clienteles 
Before we turn to explaining our key variable TRUST_FA, we explore our 
main sample of advised households in more detail and now use a multivariate 
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setting to investigate if the clienteles of community banks and large banks differ 
systematically with respect to their demographic profiles. 
 
Table II-2: Demographic profiles of bank clienteles 
This table reports average marginal effects of a series of probit regressions with COMMUN_BANK as the dependent 
variable. Appendix II-1 provides variable descriptions. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: COMMUN_BANK 
 All    Advised    Non-advised 
         
FIN_LIT -0.0010  0.0212  -0.0050  
 (0.0170)  (0.0343)  (0.0157)  
FIN_WEALTH(log) -0.0020  -0.0058  -0.0001  
 (0.0043)  (0.0144)  (0.0048)  
RISK_PROP -0.0458 **  -0.0658 *  -0.0404 * 
 (0.0221)  (0.0353)  (0.0238)  
GENDER -0.0022  0.0173  -0.0022  
 (0.0200)  (0.0433)  (0.0219)  
MARRIED -0.0013  0.0315  -0.0123  
 (0.0264)  (0.0378)  (0.0280)  
AGE_36-50 -0.0255  -0.0645  -0.0212  
 (0.0377)   (0.0766)  (0.0383)  
AGE_51-65 -0.0037  -0.0803  0.0231  
 (0.0354)  (0.0742)  (0.0389)  
AGE_65+ 0.0345  -0.0593  0.0581  
 (0.0379)  (0.0785)  (0.0402)  
EDU_HIGH -0.0606 ***  -0.0654 ***  -0.0569 *** 
 (0.0111)  (0.0235)  (0.0138)  
SELF_EMPL 0.0215  -0.1780 *  0.0768 *** 
 (0.0346)  (0.1014)  (0.0286)  
WEALTH(log) 0.0029  0.0006  0.0038  
 (0.0040)  (0.0126)  (0.0041)  
INCOME(log) -0.0081  0.0763 **  -0.0372  
 (0.0206)  (0.0369)  (0.0244)         
N    3,067          935   
     2,129   
Wald Chi2 
(p-value) 
 66.82 
(0.000)    
26.97 
(0.008)   
74.13 
(0.000)  
 
Table II-2 reports regressions of COMMUN_BANK on the various parameters 
capturing the financial situation of the households and the demographics available 
in the PHF, both for the full sample as well as for the subsamples of advised 
versus non-advised households. We observe a number of interesting results. First, 
both the basic demographic characteristics of advised households and their finan-
cials (with the exception of income) turn out insignificant in distinguishing be-
tween the clienteles of community banks and large banks. Second, the significant 
difference between community-bank clients and large-bank clients regarding their 
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general educational background does not translate into a relevant gap when it 
comes to their knowledge in financial matters as measured by the financial liter-
acy score. Third and last, we note that the demographic profiles of non-advised 
versus advised households do not differ materially, suggesting that the compara-
bility of the customer groups across the different bank pillars does not hinge upon 
whether or not they have sought advice in the past. 
3.3. Trust determinants 
Since we are the first to make use of the PHF survey for an analysis of house-
holds’ trust in financial advice, we follow Lachance and Tang (2012) and start by 
developing a better understanding of our key variable TRUST_FA. To this end, 
we compare it to the generalized trust in people question (TRUST_GEN) which 
has been used in early studies relating trust and financial markets (e.g. Guiso et 
al., 2008; Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011) and is worded “Are you generally a person 
who trusts others or do you tend to be distrustful of others?” with possible scores 
ranging from 0 (“I do not trust others at all.”) to 10 (“I trust others completely.”). 
A direct comparison of the two interpersonal trust constructs allows us to learn 
more about consumers’ trust in financial advisors by testing whether or not it is 
different from their trust in people in general. To facilitate comparison between 
the two items, we recode TRUST_GEN by means of a median split in order to 
have it on the same scale as TRUST_FA.7 We estimate a probit model for each 
trust construct, regressing it on the available household characteristics. 
Table II-3 reports the corresponding results. Interestingly, the goodness-of-fit 
statistics indicate that a model using a comprehensive set of households’ basic 
demographics and financial parameters as inputs is not able to explain their gen-
eral trust towards others as captured in TRUST_GEN (p-value of the corre-
sponding Wald test equals 0.146). 
 
                                      
7
  Note that OLS regression results using the unadjusted scale of TRUST_GEN (available upon 
request) produce qualitatively similar results.  
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Table II-3: Trust determinants 
This table reports average marginal effects of probit regressions with 
TRUST_FA and TRUST_GENERAL as the dependent variables. Appen-
dix II-1 provides variable descriptions. Standard errors are reported below 
the coefficients in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 TRUST_FA  TRUST_GEN 
FIN_LIT -0.0951 **  0.0416  
 (0.0448)  (0.0387)  
FIN_WEALTH(log) 0.0431 **  -0.0229  
 (0.0169)  (0.0165)  
RISK_PROP 0.0227  0.1321 *** 
 (0.0403)  (0.0476)  
GENDER -0.0683  -0.0205  
 (0.0462)  (0.0554)  
MARRIED 0.1121 **  0.0105  
 (0.0530)  (0.0608)  
AGE_36-50 -0.0476  -0.0506  
 (0.0850)   (0.0878)  
AGE_51-65 -0.1316  0.0483  
 (0.0963)  (0.0973)  
AGE_65+ -0.0323  0.0006  
 (0.0843)  (0.0987)  
EDU_HIGH -0.0152  0.0256  
 (0.0271)  (0.0260)  
SELF_EMPL -0.0855  -0.1816 * 
 (0.0905)  (0.0940)  
WEALTH(log) 0.0164  -0.0079  
 (0.0173)  (0.0151)  
INCOME(log) -0.0277  0.1127 * 
 (0.0575)  (0.0623)       
N 919   918  
Wald Chi2 
(p-value) 
 25.63 
(0.012)    
17.10 
(0.146)  
 
Turning to the determinants of TRUST_FA, we first observe a similar pattern 
for the demographic variables. Specifically, respondents’ age, gender, education, 
self-employment as well as their income and aggregate wealth do not significantly 
impact the trust they have in their financial advisors. When looking at the pa-
rameters describing the households’ financial situation, however, we find that 
households featuring above-average financial wealth and comparatively low finan-
cial literacy turn out to be significantly more likely to trust their financial advi-
sors. Given that low financial literacy has been shown to further decrease advisees’ 
ability to discern good from bad advice (Georgarakos & Inderst, 2011; Hackethal 
et al., 2012) and, at the same time, the damage from bad advice likely increases 
in financial wealth, this result highlights the importance of using a context-based 
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measure when analyzing the interpersonal trust component of customers’ overall 
trust in financial advice. 
 
Figure II-1: Trust in financial advice and general trust 
This figure plots respondents’ average levels of general trust towards other people (TRUST_GEN) as well 
as their trust towards financial advice they have received (TRUST_FA), thereby differentiating between 
the different bank clienteles. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
To capture the impact of broad-scope trust, we contrast the trust levels of 
customers at community banks and large banks, respectively. Figure II-1 plots 
the corresponding results and shows that, while general trust levels are virtually 
identical across the different bank pillars, trust in financial advisors differs sharply 
between clients at community banks versus large banks. Specifically, community-
bank advisees are as much as 19 percentage points more likely to follow the advice 
of the financial professionals they have consulted (65.5% versus 46.5%, t=3.07). 
Thus, our initial univariate comparison supports the hypothesis that the funda-
mental differences in the trustworthiness of the business models of community 
banks versus large banks manifest in significantly lower trust levels of clients 
advised at large banks. This implies that broad-scope trust is important for cus-
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tomer trust formation and rejects the idea that trust in financial advice is essen-
tially equivalent to trusting one’s financial advisor. In what follows, we investigate 
if this difference persists in a multivariate setting. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
To examine the impact of the respondents’ affiliation to either of the two bank 
types on their likelihood to trust financial advice, we estimate simple probit mod-
els whose results we report in Table II-4. 
In what follows, we briefly discuss our findings in light of prior evidence on 
particularly robust determinants of financial advice other than trust, i.e. financial 
literacy and financial wealth as well as age. First, our finding that financial liter-
acy is negatively related with trust in financial advice ties in with robust evidence 
presented in a number of studies including Lachance and Tang (2012) and Cal-
cagno and Monticone (2015) and, for the German market, Hackethal et al. (2010), 
Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2015), and Stolper (2016), who all document that 
individuals are less likely to implement the advice given to them when their fi-
nancial sophistication is higher. To rationalize the adverse impact of financial 
knowledge on trust in financial advice, it is argued in the literature that increased 
financial sophistication involves the competence to question the advice along with 
better skills to process information relevant for decision-making privately. Thus, 
households seem to become more critical as to the value proposition offered by 
financial advisors once they have gathered a sufficient degree of financial literacy. 
Again, this finding is particularly relevant when turning to the less financially 
knowledgeable customers who do not possess an outside option and need to rely 
on the recommendations they receive from their advisors. Clearly, these clients 
are particularly vulnerable to opportunistic behavior exploiting their trust in the 
financial advisor. Moreover, the positive impact of financial wealth on households’ 
propensity to trust their advisors supports the findings in Bhattacharya et al. 
(2012) and Lachance and Tang (2012), who show that individuals who are wealth-
ier in financial assets are more likely to follow the recommendations of their ad-
visors. On the one hand, this may be justified in light of survey evidence of Tilmes 
and Jakob (2012), who document that the discretionary power of advisors typi-
cally increases in the financial assets they are entrusted with by a given advisee. 
Combined with their finding that advisors’ self-reported perception of conflicts 
between their own interests and the customer benefit on average decreases in the 
individual discretion they are conceded when advising their clients, the observed 
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increase in trust among advisees with greater financial wealth might as well be 
“earned”. 
 
Table II-4: Bank clienteles and trust in financial advice 
This table reports average marginal effects of a series of probit regressions featuring TRUST_FA as the dependent 
variable. Column (1) reports univariate results for our key explanatory variable COMMUN_BANK. Column (2) reports 
the results of a multivariate regression including all control variables. For ease of comparison, column (3) replicates column 
(1) of Table II-3, i.e. a multivariate regression on the controls only. Appendix II-1 provides variable descriptions. Standard 
errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: TRUST_FA 
COMMUN_BANK 0.1904 ***  0.1936 ***      
 (0.0670)  (0.0658)     
TRUST_GEN   0.0329 ***  0.0349 ***    
 
   (0.0125)  (0.0128)   
FIN_LIT   -0.1072 ***  -0.1019 **  -0.0951 ** 
 
   (0.0393)  (0.0423)  (0.0448)  
FIN_WEALTH(log)   0.0451 ***  0.0455 ***  0.0431 ** 
 
   (0.0168)  (0.0172)  (0.0169)  
RISK_PROP   0.0128  0.0027  0.0227  
 
   (0.0434)  (0.0432)  (0.0403)  
GENDER   -0.0540  -0.0648  -0.0683  
 
   (0.0470)  (0.0450)  (0.0462)  
MARRIED   0.1124 **  0.1085 **  0.1121 ** 
 
   (0.0526)  (0.0522)  (0.0530)  
AGE_36-50   -0.0284  -0.0325  -0.0476  
 
   (0.0832)  (0.0844)   (0.0850)  
AGE_51-65   -0.1082  -0.1262  -0.1316  
 
   (0.0929)  (0.0928)  (0.0963)  
AGE_65+   -0.0237  -0.0323  -0.0323  
 
   (0.0828)  (0.0830)  (0.0843)  
EDU_HIGH   -0.0073  -0.0176  -0.0152  
 
   (0.0256)  (0.0264)  (0.0271)  
SELF_EMPL   -0.0416  -0.0637  -0.0855  
 
   (0.0885)  (0.0890)  (0.0905)  
WEALTH(log)   0.0166  0.0175  0.0164  
 
   (0.0162)  (0.0171)  (0.0173)  
INCOME(log)   -0.0432  -0.0402  -0.0277  
 
   (0.0541)  (0.0558)  (0.0575)           
N     909        898   
 918   919  
Wald Chi2 
(p-value) 
 8.03 
(0.005)      
61.61 
(0.000)     
 38.66 
(0.000)      
 25.63 
(0.012)    
 
On the other hand, however, a less favorable interpretation of the results could 
be that advisors put more effort in catering strategies to build client trust since 
generating credibility is arguably more profitable in case of financially wealthier 
customers. Under this scenario, an increase in trust levels does not necessarily 
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reflect better advice and potential disadvantages from receiving self-interested 
recommendations would become worse the higher the stakes of the advisee. 
Third, neither age nor risk propensity feature explanatory power in our sam-
ple. This is somewhat at odds with the results in Mullainathan et al. (2013) and 
Lachance and Tang (2012) who report that elder advisees are less trustful of their 
advisors. Similar to the interpretation of the adverse effect of financial literacy on 
trust, these studies propose that elder clients are more experienced in financial 
matters and thus also more skeptical regarding the benefits of financial advice. 
We cannot confirm this relation for our sample of advised households. 
Finally, we note that the coefficients of the previously identified drivers of 
trust in financial advice reported in Table II-3 and, for ease of comparison, repli-
cated in the rightmost column of Table II-4, are virtually unchanged once we add 
customers’ bank type as an additional trust determinant. Thus, our key variable 
TRUST_FA introduces a new dimension of the client-advisor trust formation 
process which has not yet been captured by prior explanations. Taken together, 
the results presented in this section prompt us to reject the notion that that trust 
in financial advice is essentially equivalent to trusting one’s financial advisor. 
Instead, we provide strong evidence in support of an integrated conceptualization 
of customers’ trust in financial advice, which highlights the role of advisees’ broad-
scope trust in the business context in which the provider of financial advice op-
erates. 
4.2. Robustness analysis 
4.2.1. Potential endogeneity of bank choice 
To examine the robustness of our key findings, we consider potential endoge-
neity concerns when studying households’ choice of their house bank (community 
bank versus large bank) as well as their likelihood to trust the financial advice 
they receive at their house bank. Since respondents in our sample are asked to 
express their propensity to follow the financial advice at their house bank condi-
tional on having received advice at that bank, reverse causality (i.e. bank choice 
endogenously determined by a given household’s trust in their financial advisor) 
is rather unlikely to be an issue in our analysis. However, we consider the possi-
bility that an unobserved variable simultaneously drives both the selection of the 
type of house bank and the propensity to trust the financial advisor employed at 
the chosen type of bank. Given the evidence in Mullainathan et al. (2008), who 
emphasize that banks tend to advertise their trustworthiness rather than their 
performance, one such omitted factor might be a bank’s reputation. If consumers 
are trustful towards the bank as an organization and choose to become a customer 
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of the bank as a result thereof, chances are that the bank’s reputation positively 
affects their perception of the trustworthiness of the advisor working for that 
bank, too.8 
We address this potential source of endogeneity by means of an two-stage 
instrumental variables (IV) regression approach featuring the two instruments 
RURAL and JOINT_DECISION, where RURAL represents a dummy variable 
that equals one if the respondent lives in a small municipality as opposed to a 
city. Similarly, JOINT_DECISION takes a value of one if household members 
report to decide financial matters jointly, and zero otherwise.  
We argue that, since branches of large banks are much less densely distributed 
in the rural regions of Germany than are branches of community banks, house-
holds living in rural areas are likely to be limited in their choice options when 
selecting their house bank. Likewise, joint decision making presumably requires 
an increased organizational effort on the part of the advised household, e.g. due 
to the fact that all decision makers wish to attend the personal meetings with the 
advisor. Hence, households who live in rural areas and whose members jointly 
care about their household finances are arguably more likely to choose a house 
bank close to their place of residence. Given the much higher branch density of 
community banks outside of Germany’s larger cities, these households should thus 
be more likely to be advised at a savings or co-operative bank as compared to a 
large bank. 
Consequently, our two instrumental variables should both be highly correlated 
with the potentially endogenous variable COMMUN_BANK. Similarly, neither 
living in a rural area nor joint financial decision-making should have an impact 
on a household’s propensity to trust their financial advisor, such that both in-
struments can reasonably be assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term of 
the first-stage regression. 
 
                                      
8
  Ideally, we would of course want to control for bank reputation when analyzing the impact of 
clients’ trust in financial advice. Owing to the aggregation level of the PHF data, however, we 
do not have any information at the level of the individual bank. 
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Table II-5: Robustness – Potential endogeneity of bank choice 
This table reports the results of an IV regression along with the corresponding test 
statistics. The upper part of Table II-5 reports the first-stage estimates of a linear 
probability model estimated via GMM. The lower part of Table II-5 presents the 
second-stage estimates of the linear probability model. Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. Additional (control) variables are used but not reported. Appen-
dix II-1 provides variable descriptions. Standard errors are reported below the coeffi-
cients in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: First stage (Dependent variable: COMMUN_BANK) 
 
RURAL 0.2410 ***   
 (0.0485)       
JOINT_DEC 0.0927 **   
 (0.0425)       
(other regressors suppressed) 
     
N 898   
R2 0.113       
F-test excl. instr. (p-value) 15.11  (0.000)      
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.765  (0.382)  
     
Endogeneity test (p-value) 2.513  (0.113)       
Panel B: Main equation (Dependent variable: TRUST_FA) 
 
COMMUN_BANK 0.5187 **   
 (0.2159)       
(other regressors suppressed) 
     
N 898    
R2     0.046        
 
Panel A of Table II-5 reports the results of a re-estimation of our main model 
allowing for potential endogeneity as specified above. The estimates obtained from 
a first-stage regression indicate that both instruments are strongly correlated with 
COMMUN_BANK. Additional test statistics provided in the lower part of Ta-
ble II-5 show that the IV model does not suffer from a weak instruments problem 
(F-test of excluded instruments: p=0.000) and provide evidence supporting the 
instruments’ validity (Hansen J statistic: p=0.382). Finally, a formal endogeneity 
test supports the null hypothesis that households’ bank choice is exogenous at all 
conventional significance levels (p=0.113). In summary, we thus conclude that 
the relationship between households’ bank choice and their propensity to trust 
their financial advisor is robust to potential endogeneity. 
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4.2.2. Correction of standard error estimates 
Recall that wealthy households are oversampled in the PHF data. To control 
for the oversampling, i.e. to provide adjusted point estimates which are repre-
sentative of the German population, the data features survey weights which coun-
terbalance the unequal selection probabilities caused by the biased sampling de-
sign. As recommended when using the PHF, we take these survey weights to 
adjust point estimates as well the corresponding replicate weights to adjust vari-
ance and standard error estimates in our main analysis. In order to assess if the 
weighting method applied to the standard error estimates potentially affects our 
results, we check for robustness by re-estimating our baseline model using (a) a 
Taylor linearization as an alternative weighting technique and (b) (unweighted) 
robust standard errors. Appendix II-2 documents the corresponding results and 
shows that they turn out virtually identical regardless of which correction method 
is applied. Specifically, the standard error of our key explanatory variable COM-
MUN_BANK is largest (albeit not materially different in magnitude) for the 
recommended correction method featuring replicate weights. This indicates that, 
if anything, our baseline model slightly understates the statistical significance of 
the effect of households’ bank choice on their likelihood to trust their financial 
advisor, and we conclude that our main results prove robust to alternative meth-
ods of correcting the standard error estimates, too. 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1.1. Implications 
Our results highlight the importance of establishing a climate of trust in the 
generic business context so as to enhance customers’ propensity to trust financial 
advice which is nonetheless provided by individual representatives of specific play-
ers in that industry. Because of this collective goods problem, managers at large 
banks may refrain from investing in the development of broad-scope trust, since 
all banks within that group would benefit from higher levels of broad-scope trust. 
However, the substantially higher trustworthiness of German community banks 
among advisees suggests that the support of umbrella organizations (Deutscher 
Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV) in case of savings banks and Bun-
desverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken (BVR) for cooper-
ative banks, respectively) can be a worthwhile investment in the development of 
broad-scope trust. Moreover, Grayson et al. (2008) show that firm trust is essen-
tial even in a trusted environment, implying that banks must still provide the 
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means to establish narrow-scope trust before they can fully benefit from the cus-
tomer attitudes and behaviors that are fostered by trust. Thus, for any given 
bank, the possibility to free ride on their competitors’ investments in broad-scope 
trust is limited. 
Similarly, effective regulation which enforces industry standards and codes of 
conduct may be a fruitful avenue to foster advisees’ trust in the broader business 
context of large banks. Still, many managers oppose industry regulation for fear 
of precluding their firms from profitable business activities. Clearly, however, 
while not supporting government authorities and umbrella associations may even-
tually result in reduced regulatory requirements, this strategy is also unlikely to 
improve clients’ broad-scope trust and hence negatively feeds back into their trust 
in financial advice. 
5.1.2. Limitations and directions for future research 
While the survey data provided in the Panel on Household Finances (PHF) 
allows us to draw our conclusions from a representative sample of clients across 
the entire universe of community banks and large banks throughout Germany, 
our empirical analysis has two potential shortcomings worth mentioning. First, 
we capture broad-scope trust by contrasting customer trust in financial advisors 
employed at community banks versus large banks. While the two bank types have 
been shown to feature fundamentally different trust profiles (e.g. Hurley et al. 
2014), we do not claim our methodological approach to be ideal. Even though 
dummy variables have widely been used to proxy for broad-scope trust (e.g. 
McMillan & Woodruff, 1999; Guseva & Rona-Tas, 2001), a categorical differenti-
ation presents a rather coarse measure of clients’ trust in the broader context in 
which the advisor operates. Since customers within a given bank group likely vary 
in their levels of broad-scope trust, the respective group mean may be an inaccu-
rate representation of the broad-scope trust of a given individual in that group. 
Unfortunately, we lack the interval data to address this drawback. However, the 
difference in trust levels between the two bank groups is so large in magnitude 
that we are confident that our results prove economically meaningful for the ma-
jority of households under review. Still, eliciting more nuanced perceptions of 
individuals’ trust in the broader business context in which different bank groups 
operate presents a worthwhile avenue for further research and should improve the 
quality of future metrics of broad-scope trust. 
A second potential limitation of this study is that idiosyncracies pertaining to 
our sample drive the observed effects. Specifically, the period under review which 
we examine in this study was marked by a dramatic loss of trust in large banks 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Guiso, 2010; Hurley et al., 2014). 
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Thus, our findings might not be generalizable to other, more regular market cy-
cles. However, the most recent wave of the Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Finan-
cial Trust Index which elicits the percentage of people trusting various types of 
banks suggests otherwise (Sapienza & Zingales, 2016). The survey explicitly dif-
ferentiates between peoples’ trust in credit unions and local banks (i.e. community 
banks) as opposed to their trust in national banks (i.e. large banks) and finds 
that while in December 2015, 59% and 61% of respondents report to trust credit 
unions and local banks, respectively, this share amounts to only 32% for the group 
of national banks. Thus, even though trust in both bank groups has slightly in-
creased ever since 2009, the substantial gap in trustworthiness persists and has 
narrowed only marginally to about 28 percentage points since it peaked at roughly 
37 percentage points in 2011. Based on this recent evidence corroborating the 
trust gap between community banks and large banks along with the fact that 
most large banks have largely maintained their business models ever since the 
financial crisis (Tilmes & Jakob, 2012), our key results should be robust to the 
sample period under review. However, overcoming this data limitation also makes 
a good candidate for future research on trust formation in the context of financial 
advice. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Without the confidence and financial literacy to bank autonomously, most 
households must trust financial advisors to gain access to the ever complex market 
for financial products and services. Consequently, learning about how clients form 
impressions about the trustworthiness of their advisors is key to understanding 
the customer-advisor relationship and, given the vulnerability of most households 
to opportunistic behavior of their advisors, addresses a matter of great relevance. 
By contrasting clients’ trust in the services of financial advisors employed at 
two banks types with fundamentally different trust profiles, i.e. community banks 
and large banks, this study contributes to the literature on customer trust for-
mation in financial advisory services and provides evidence supporting the notion 
that advisees take into consideration the broader context when assessing the 
trustworthiness of the financial advice they receive. Thus, our results prompt us 
to reject the notion that trust in financial advice is essentially equivalent to trust-
ing one’s financial advisor. Instead, we provide strong evidence in support of an 
integrated conceptualization of customers’ trust in financial advice, which shows 
that trust formation is influenced not only by the actions of an individual organ-
ization and its representatives but also by the broader trust profile of the business 
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model the organization commits to. Managerial implications include the poten-
tially positive effect of an investment in professional associations and the support 
and enforcement of regulatory standards in order to enhance clients’ broad-scope 
trust in financial advice. We hope that this study stimulates further research on 
the antecedents of trust formation in the context of financial advice, ideally with 
a focus on determinants outside the client-advisor interaction. 
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8. Appendix 
Appendix II-1: Variable descriptions 
This table describes the variables used in the study in alphabetical order. 
Name   Description 
     
AGE_36-50 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is aged 36 to 50 years. Zero otherwise. 
AGE_51-65 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is aged 51 to 65 years. Zero otherwise. 
AGE_65+ 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is aged more than 65 years. Zero otherwise. 
COMMUN_BANK 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has received financial advice at a community bank 
(i.e. savings bank or cooperative bank) and zero otherwise. Corresponding PHF item: "To which 
banking group does your household's house bank belong?"   1–Savings bank/Landesbank; 2–Coope-
rative bank; 3–Commercial bank 
EDU_HIGH 
 
Ordinal variable that describes the respondent’s highest degree of education: 1–Higher education 
entrance qualification; 2–University degree; 3–Ph.D. or higher qualification. Zero otherwise. 
FIN_LITERACY 
 
Ordinal variable that measures the number of correctly answered financial literacy questions. Cor-
responding PHF items: 
Question 1: Compound interest effect 
"Let us assume that you have a balance of 100 EUR on your savings account. This balance bears 
interest at a rate of 2% per year and you leave it for 5 years on this account. How high do you 
think your balance will be after 5 years?"  
1–More than 102 EUR [correct]; 2–Exactly 102 EUR; 3–Less than 102 EUR 
Question 2: Inflation 
"Let us assume that your savings account bears interest at a rate of 1% per year and the rate of 
inflation is 2% per year. Do you think that in one year's time the balance on your savings account 
will buy the same as, more than, or less than today?" 1–More than today; 2–The same as today; 3–
Less than today [correct] 
Question 3: Diversification 
"Do you agree with the following statement: 'Investing in shares of a company is less risky than in-
vesting in a fund containing shares of similar companies'?" 1–Agree; 2–Disagree [correct] 
FIN_WEALTH 
 
Continuous variable that measures the households’ financial wealth (EUR). 
GENDER 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is male, zero for female. 
INCOME 
 
Continuous variable that measures the household’s monthly income (EUR). 
JOINT_DEC 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the household members decide financial matters jointly. Zero 
otherwise. Corresponding PHF item: "In general, how does your household make investment deci-
sions?" 1–Generally each person in the household makes their own decisions; 2–We decide important 
things together; 3–One household member decides for the whole household; 4–Depends 
MARRIED 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is married, zero otherwise. 
RISK_PROP 
 
Ordinal variable that measures the respondents’ propensity to take financial risks. Corresponding 
PHF item: "Which of the following statements comes closest to describing the attitude to risk when 
your household makes savings or investment decisions?" 1–We are not willing to take any financial 
risks; 2–We take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns; 3–We take above-average 
financial risks expecting to earn above-average returns; 4–We take substantial financial risks expect-
ing to earn substantial returns 
RURAL 
 
Dummy variable that equals zero (one) if the respondent lives in a city (small municipality). 
SELF_EMPL 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is self-employed or entrepreneur. Zero otherwise. 
TRUST_GEN 
 
Ordinal variable that measures the respondents’ trust on a scale from 0 to 10. Corresponding PHF-
item: "Are you generally a person who trusts others or do you tend to be distrustful of others?" 0–
"I do not trust others at all."; […]; 10–"I trust others completely." 
TRUST_FA 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent reports to be likely to trust the financial advice 
provided by his house bank in the future (conditional on having used financial advice in the past two 
years prior to being interviewed). Corresponding PHF item: "Looking to the near future: How likely 
is it that your household will follow the advice provided by its house bank?" 1–"Rather likely."; 2–
"Rather unlikely." 
WEALTH   Continuous variable that measures the household’s gross wealth (EUR). 
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Appendix II-2: Robustness - Correction of standard error estimates 
This table reports average marginal effects of probit regressions with COMMUN_BANK as the dependent variable. 
Appendix II-1 provides variable descriptions. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. ***,**, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: TRUST_FA 
 Replicate weights  Taylor Linearization  No adjustment 
 
COMMUN_BANK 0.1936 ***  0.1936 ***  0.1936 *** 
 (0.0658)  (0.0588)  (0.0558)  
TRUST_GEN 0.0329 ***  0.0329 ***  0.0329 ** 
 (0.0125)  (0.0124)  (0.0129)  
FIN_LIT -0.1072 ***  -0.1072 ***  -0.1072 *** 
 (0.0393)  (0.0323)  (0.0344)  
FIN_WEALTH(log) 0.0451 ***  0.0451 ***  0.0451 *** 
 (0.0168)  (0.0152)  (0.0149)  
RISK_PROP 0.0128  0.0128  0.0128  
 (0.0434)  (0.0376)  (0.0422)  
GENDER -0.0540  -0.0540  -0.0540  
 (0.0470)  (0.0375)  (0.0461)  
MARRIED 0.1124 **  0.1124 **  0.1124 ** 
 (0.0526)  (0.0518)  (0.0517)  
AGE_36-50 -0.0284  -0.0284  -0.0284  
 (0.0832)  (0.0757)  (0.0762)  
AGE_51-65 -0.1082  -0.1082  -0.1082  
 (0.0929)  (0.0834)  (0.0828)  
AGE_65+ -0.0237  -0.0237  -0.0237  
 (0.0828)  (0.0759)  (0.0783)  
EDU_HIGH -0.0073  -0.0073  -0.0073  
 (0.0256)  (0.0243)  (0.0256)  
SELF_EMPL -0.0416  -0.0416  -0.0416  
 (0.0885)  (0.0767)  (0.0804)  
WEALTH(log) 0.0166  0.0166  0.0166  
 (0.0162)  (0.0140)  (0.0135)  
INCOME(log) -0.0432  -0.0432  -0.0432  
 (0.0541)  (0.0502)  (0.0486)         
N               898   
               898   
               899   
Wald Chi2 
(p-value) 
61.61 
(0.000)   
55.74 
(0.000)  
57.95 
(0.000)  
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Appendix II-3: Robustness - Multiple imputations via Rubin’s rule 
This table reports average marginal effects of a series of probit regressions which replicate our main results using multiple 
imputations via Rubin's rule (Rubin, 1996). Appendix II-1 provides variable descriptions. Standard errors are reported 
below the coefficients in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively. 
 Dependent Variable: TRUST_FA 
 
COMMUN_BANK 0.1904 ***  0.1935 ***      
 (0.0670)  (0.0658)     
TRUST_GEN   0.0328 ***  0.0348 ***    
 
   (0.0125)  (0.0128)   
FIN_LIT   -0.1070 ***  -0.1017 **  -0.0949 ** 
 
   (0.0393)  (0.0424)  (0.0448)  
FIN_WEALTH(log)   0.0442 **  0.0446 **  0.0423 ** 
 
   (0.0177)  (0.0179)  (0.0176)  
RISK_PROP   0.0132  0.0032  0.0230  
 
   (0.0437)  (0.0436)  (0.0406)  
GENDER   -0.0538  -0.0646  -0.0681  
 
   (0.0473)  (0.0452)  (0.0464)  
MARRIED   0.1120 **  0.1080 **  0.1116 ** 
 
   (0.0527)  (0.0523)  (0.0531)  
AGE_36-50   -0.0283  -0.0324  -0.0474  
 
   (0.0832)  (0.0843)   (0.0849)  
AGE_51-65   -0.1069  -0.1249  -0.1303  
 
   (0.0928)  (0.0927)  (0.0961)  
AGE_65+   -0.0222  -0.0307  -0.0309  
 
   (0.0828)  (0.0831)  (0.0843)  
EDU_HIGH   -0.0072  -0.0175  -0.0152  
 
   (0.0257)  (0.0264)  (0.0272)  
SELF_EMPL   -0.0409  -0.0630  -0.0848  
 
   (0.0886)  (0.0891)  (0.0906)  
WEALTH(log)   0.0164  0.0173  0.0162  
 
   (0.0162)  (0.0169)  (0.0171)  
INCOME(log)   -0.0414  -0.0384  -0.0261  
 
   (0.0540)  (0.0558)  (0.0574)           
N            909               898   
 918   919  
Wald Chi2 
(p-value) 
 8.03 
(0.005)      
60.02 
(0.000)    
 37.93 
(0.000)     
 25.10 
(0.014)    
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Abstract - We study the role of gender and financial literacy for 
household over-indebtedness. Our results indicate that financially 
illiterate women restrain themselves from the debt markets. 
Those women who hold debt are significantly better in coping 
with their debt burdens compared to men, as they are dramati-
cally less often over-indebted, particularly when it comes to un-
secured consumer debt. Further, for both genders, we find that 
financial literacy significantly reduces over-indebtedness and 
show this effect to be robust against potential endogeneity. 
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1. Introduction 
Whenever households have to conduct financial decisions, a profound under-
standing of basic financial concepts, commonly referred to as financial literacy, is 
of vital importance. Financially illiterate households are repeatedly found to con-
duct less favorable financial decisions. For example, they less frequently plan for 
their retirement (Bucher-Koenen & Lusardi, 2011; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008), 
have lower capital market participation rates (van Rooij et al., 2011), hold less 
diversified portfolios (von Gaudecker, 2015), and in general, are more prone to 
miscellaneous investment mistakes (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014; Stolper & Walter, 
2017). Unfortunately, financial illiteracy is found to be quite widespread through-
out the population and women seem to be particularly affected. Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2008) find that women are less financially literate and less likely to plan 
their financials compared to men, and thus, less prepared for their retirement. In 
a subsequent study, van Rooij et al. (2011) confirm women’s lower financial lit-
eracy and find women to participate less often in financial markets. Almenberg 
and Dreber (2015) confirm their results and find that a lack of financial literacy 
explains a significant part of the lower stock market participation of women. 
Recently, literature has begun to elaborate on the role of financial literacy and 
household debt behavior, whereby the debtors’ gender received only sparse atten-
tion yet. Lusardi and Scheresberg (2013) highlight that great shares of the popu-
lation do not understand the basics of interest compounding and that financially 
less literate debtors are much more likely to engage in high-cost credit card bor-
rowing. Lusardi and Tufano (2015) find that households with less financial liter-
acy are more frequently unsure about the appropriateness of their debt position 
and Disney and Gathergood (2013) document that financially illiterate debtors as 
well as debtors with self-control problems are more likely over-indebted and more 
frequently fail to repay their debt. Investigating the relationship of financial lit-
eracy, gender and credit card behavior, Mottola (2013) finds that women engage 
more often in costly credit card behavior than men, but that much of the differ-
ence can be attributed to demographic characteristics and financial literacy. Lu-
sardi and Tufano (2015) show that women more often rely on high cost borrowing.  
However, all existing studies ignore potential gender specific differences in the 
self-assessment of financial capabilities. Bucher-Koenen et al. (2016) specifically 
elaborate on the role of women’s financial literacy and, in line with the literature, 
find them to possess severely less financially literacy compared to men. Besides 
this finding, the authors show women to more often answer financial literacy 
questions with “do not know” and, when asked to self-assess their financial 
knowledge, to assign themselves lower scores compared to men. Consequently, the 
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authors argue that women might be aware of their financial illiteracy or at least 
unsecure about their financial capabilities. A notion which gains support by Lu-
sardi and Tufano (2015), who find that women, when asked to self-assess the 
appropriateness of their debt-levels, more frequently answer with “just do not 
know” compared to men. Given that financially illiterate women might possess a 
higher awareness of their financial illiteracy or at least seem to be more frequently 
unsecure about their financial capabilities, we hypothesize that they might re-
strain themselves from participating in the debt markets in the first place.  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, although we find women 
to possess less financial literacy compared to men on population level, the level 
of financial literacy for the subsample of debtors does not differ with respect to 
gender. Thus, our results indicate that financially illiterate women restrain them-
selves from participating in the debt markets, whereas we cannot observe a similar 
selection process with respect to financial literacy for men. Second, we show that 
women are actually better in coping with their debt as they are significantly less 
often defaulting on their debt, particularly when using unsecured consumer cred-
its which are commonly associated with self-control problems. While the proba-
bility of being over-indebted is virtually unchanged for women holding any debt 
compared to women holding only unsecured consumer debt, the respective prob-
ability increases dramatically for men. Finally, for both genders, we find that 
financial literacy reduces over-indebtedness significantly and we show this effect 
to be robust against potential endogeneity. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
We analyze the determinants of household over-indebtedness using the Panel 
on Household Finances (PHF), a representative survey of German households by 
the Deutsche Bundesbank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013). The PHF features a rich 
set of items related to the household balance sheet as well as broad socio-demo-
graphic characteristics, allowing profound insights into household’s assets and 
liabilities. The PHF was conducted between September 2010 and July 2011 and 
includes the responses of 3,565 households. 
For the dependent variable in our regressions, we follow Gathergood (2012) 
and measure household over-indebtedness as actual credit repayment struggles. 
We classify households as over-indebted if they were unable to make all the due 
payments on their loans within 12 months before the survey took place. We grasp 
the households’ financial literacy via the three commonly used financial literacy 
questions introduced by Lusardi and Mitchell (2008), whereby we refer to the 
sum of correct answers as our measure for financial literacy. To control for the 
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respondents’ formal education, we generate dummies for low-, mid- and high-level 
education following Dick and Jaroszek (2015). We also control for the respond-
ents’ general risk attitude, measured on a scale from 0 [highly risk averse] to 10 
[very happy to take risks]. Moreover, we control for potential wealth and employ-
ment shocks, the respondents’ age, marital status, income and wealth. Gathergood 
(2012) highlights that unsecured consumer credit, which is frequently used by 
debtors to facilitate impulse-driven consumption purchases, can be characterized 
by being easily accessible, comparably costly and having the potential to get out 
of hand quickly. Women, who are found highly vulnerable to compulsive buying 
(Achtziger et al., 2015; Dittmar, 2005), might thus be especially endangered to 
become over-indebted by financing their consumption using unsecured consumer 
debt. Thus, we acknowledge the distinct characteristics and demands of unsecured 
consumer debt and, next to our analyses on our whole sample of debtors, run sub-
sample analyses on debtors holding only unsecured consumer debt. Furthermore, 
as recent literature has acknowledged the potential endogeneity of financial liter-
acy, we estimate linear probability instrumental variable models instrumenting 
financial literacy using generated instruments after Lewbel (2012). For a complete 
description of our variables, please refer to Appendix III-1. All analysis are survey 
weighted and representative for German households. 
 
3. Results  
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table III-1 shows descriptive statistics on German households on population 
level as well as on the subsample of households holding debt, differentiating be-
tween men and women. On the population level, we find the respondents average 
age to be 52.0 years. Women are significantly less willing to accept risks compared 
to men, which is in line with recent literature (Almenberg & Dreber, 2015; Ban-
nier & Neubert, 2016). Further, they possess significantly less income and wealth 
compared to men. In line with, for example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2008) or 
Bucher-Koenen et al. (2016), we find women to possess significantly less financial 
literacy compared to men on population level. Nevertheless, women take on debt 
as often as men. Around one third of all men and women take on any debt, and 
around 13% of all men and women take on only unsecured debt, indicating that 
women do not per se restrain themselves from the debt markets. 
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Table III-1: Descriptive statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics. The data are weighted and representative for German households.  
 Debtors    German Population  
Variable All Female Male Diff T-Stat  All Female Male Diff T-Stat 
              
Financial literacy 2.548 2.544 2.551 -0.007 0.12  2.471 2.420 2.518 -0.098 2.52 ** 
Female 0.472       0.490      
Risk attitude 4.0 3.8 4.3 -0.5 2.51 **  3.6 3.3 4.0 -0.6 5.47 *** 
Age 46.9 45.4 48.3 -2.9 2.76 ***  51.2 52.4 51.7 0.7 0.74 
Married 0.636 0.613 0.656 -0.044 1.04  0.502 0.456 0.547 -0.091 3.69 *** 
Divorced 0.129 0.116 0.140 -0.025 0.84  0.123 0.143 0.104 0.039 2.27 ** 
Education (low) 0.328 0.261 0.387 -0.126 3.27 ***  0.419 0.400 0.436 -0.036 1.45 
Education (mid) 0.358 0.433 0.291 0.142 3.75 ***  0.285 0.325 0.246 0.079 3.64 *** 
Education (hi) 0.314 0.306 0.322 -0.016 0.44  0.296 0.275 0.317 -0.043 1.95 * 
Income 2,983 2,846 3,104 -258 1.30  2,326 2,206 2,441 -235 2.46 ** 
Wealth 193,254 178,240 206,677 -28,437 0.99  156,453 141,739 170,565 -28,826 1.86 * 
Shock: wealth 0.148 0.180 0.119 0.061 2.09 **  0.147 0.168 0.128 0.040 2.30 ** 
Shock: job 0.045 0.065 0.027 0.038 1.99 **  0.036 0.042 0.030 0.012 1.26 
Debtor        0.344 0.331 0.355 -0.024 1.05 
Unsecured debtor 0.365 0.390 0.343 0.047 1.16  0.125 0.129 0.122 0.007 0.43 
Debt 75,967 70,892 80,504 -9,611 1.37       
Unsecured debt 13,289 14,855 11,695 3,161 0.68       
              
Observations 1,381 606 755       3,565 1,596 1,969     
 
With respect to our sub-sample of respondents holding debt, the average 
debtor’s age is 46.9 years and debt-holding women are 2.9 years younger than 
men. 47.2% of the debtors are women and, on average, German households owe 
€75,967 (all debt). Here, women’s debt holdings are not statistically different 
from men’s. 36.5% of the debtors in our sample possess only unsecured consumer 
debt and the respective average amount owed is €13,289. As for debt-holding in 
general, women do neither differ in their propensity to hold unsecured debt, nor 
do they hold more unsecured debt in absolute terms compared to men. With 
respect to formal education, our sample of debtors is quite evenly divided. 32.8% 
of our households possess only low education, 35.8% mid-level education, and 
31.4% higher education. Here, women equally often possess higher education com-
pared to men. With respect to low- and mid-level education, debt-holding women 
- as opposed to men - possess less frequently low-level education and more fre-
quently mid-level education. Looking at the debt-holding households’ risk atti-
tude, women are significantly less willing to accept risks compared to men. Debt-
holding women do neither earn significantly less income, nor possess significantly 
less wealth compared to men. 
Looking at the debtors’ financial literacy, the average score is 2.55, whereby, 
in contrast to our findings on population level, female debtholders achieve similar 
MEYLL/PAULS/WALTER When do households fail to repay their debt?  
 
III-54 
 
scores compared to their male counterparts. Given that women as often take on 
debt as men, the vanished financial literacy gap is quite surprising. Thus, Fig-
ure III-1 relates the decision to take on debt to the debtors’ gender and financial 
literacy. 
 
Figure III-1: Debt market participation, financial literacy and gender 
 
 
Interestingly, the decision to take on debt seems to be unrelated to financial 
literacy levels for men. For any level of financial literacy, about one third of the 
men takes on debt. In contrast, Figure III-1 shows that women with low financial 
literacy scores less frequently take on debt. Particularly, while the share of debt-
holding women equals 37.4% and 33.8% for financial literacy scores of three and 
two, the respective shares decrease to 22.0% and even 10.0% for women with a 
financial literacy score of one and zero, respectively. Our results indicate that 
financially illiterate women, in contrast to their male counterparts, restrain them-
selves from the debt markets which might be explained by those women being 
aware of their financial illiteracy or at least being unsecure about their capabilities 
as argued by Bucher-Koenen et al. (2016). 
Figure III-2 relates over-indebtedness to our main explanatory variables, fi-
nancial literacy and gender, for the sub-sample of debtors. It shows that household 
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over-indebtedness decreases sharply with each financial literacy question an-
swered correctly. While the average probability for being over-indebted in our 
sample equals 7.06%, it equals 41.3% for debtors with the lowest possible financial 
literacy score compared to 4.4% for debtors with the highest scores. With respect 
to gender, men’s probability to be over-indebted equals 8.5%, while it equals only 
5.5% for women. 
 
Figure III-2: Over-indebtedness, financial literacy and gender 
 
   
3.2. Regression Results 
Table III-2 reports results from multivariate Probit regressions of financial 
literacy, gender and a comprehensive set of control variables on over-indebted-
ness. In an additional setting, we restrict our sample to debtors who hold only 
unsecured consumer debt. We find financial literacy to be negatively related to 
over-indebtedness in both settings. Particularly, a one unit increase in the finan-
cial literacy score results in a significant reduction of the probability to be over-
indebted by 3.2%. For the sample of households holding consumer debt, this effect 
is more pronounced and equals 4.2%. For our sample of all debtors, being female 
reduces the probability to suffer from over-indebtedness significantly by 3.3%. 
When it comes to unsecured consumer debt, being female reduces the probability 
to be over-indebted by an impressive 10.1%. As univariately found, women seem 
to be better in coping with their debt-burdens, particularly when it comes to 
unsecured consumer debt. 
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Table III-2: Probit regressions 
This table shows probit regressions using household over-indebtedness as dependent variable. Tailor linearized standard 
errors are in parentheses. The data are weighted and representative for German households.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 All Debt  Unsecured debt 
  Av. marginal effect Std. error   Av. marginal effect Std. error 
      
Financial literacy -0.032*** (0.011)  -0.042** (0.021) 
Female -0.033* (0.018)  -0.101** (0.041) 
Education (mid) -0.032 (0.020)  -0.056 (0.040) 
Education (hi) -0.024 (0.022)  0.036 (0.057) 
Risk attitude 0.007* (0.004)  0.011 (0.009) 
Married -0.048* (0.028)  -0.043 (0.043) 
Divorced -0.037* (0.022)  0.018 (0.056) 
Age 0.010* (0.005)  0.011 (0.012) 
Age² -0.000* (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) 
log(income) -0.045** (0.019)  -0.097** (0.046) 
log(wealth) -0.015*** (0.004)  -0.021** (0.009) 
Shock: wealth 0.037 (0.025)  0.093* (0.050) 
Shock: job 0.081 (0.055)  0.187** (0.084) 
log(all debt) 0.006 (0.006)    
log(unsecured debt)    0.015 (0.014) 
      
Observations 1,362   353  
F-test 4.575   2.991  
(p-value) (0.000)   (0.000)  
 
In order to further illustrate the effects of financial literacy on over-indebted-
ness, we present margins plots featuring the predictive probabilities of being over-
indebted with respect to gender and debt-type. Holding all remaining explanatory 
variables at the sample mean, Figure III-3 shows that the households’ probability 
to be over-indebted declines sharply with the financial literacy score for both 
genders. We find the probabilities of being over-indebted to be generally higher 
for men compared to women. For all debt, the probability of being over-indebted 
for a man who answers no financial literacy question correctly equals 18.0% and 
declines to 3.0% if he answers all three questions correctly. For women, in con-
trast, the respective probabilities are with 10.4% and 1.3% severely lower. In 
particular, a debt-holding man with a financial literacy score of zero is 1.7 times, 
and a man with a financial literacy score of three is 2.3 times more likely to be 
over-indebted when compared to a woman with the same financial literacy scores. 
Looking at unsecured consumer debt, the respective man’s probabilities to be 
over-indebted dramatically increase. Here, the probability of being over-indebted 
for a man who answers no financial literacy question correctly equals 29.0% and 
still remains 7.4% if he answers all three questions correctly. The respective prob-
abilities for a woman holding unsecured consumer debt are rather unchanged 
MEYLL/PAULS/WALTER When do households fail to repay their debt?  
 
III-57 
 
compared to a woman holding any debt and equal 10.3% and 1.6%, respectively. 
Hence, a man with a financial literacy score of zero holding unsecured debt is 2.8 
times, and a man with a financial literacy score of three is 4.6 times more likely 
to be over-indebted when compared to a woman with the same financial literacy 
scores. As unsecured consumer debt are frequently used to facilitate impulse-
driven consumption purchases and thus require a higher amount of self-control 
(Gathergood, 2012), our results not only indicate that women are better in coping 
with their debt burdens, but also that they, despite being commonly found to be 
highly vulnerable to compulsive buying (Achtziger et al., 2015; Dittmar, 2005), 
seem to be less prone to the self-control problems associated with unsecured con-
sumer debt. 
 
Figure III-3: Marginal effects from Probit models in Table III-2 
 
 
We control our regression results for potential endogeneity of financial literacy 
by estimating linear probability instrumental variable models instrumenting fi-
nancial literacy using generated instruments after Lewbel (2012). Table III-3 
shows that the instrumented coefficients remain economically and statistically 
significant and the endogeneity tests indicate that the null hypothesis of the fi-
nancial literacy score’s exogeneity cannot be rejected. 
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Table III-3: IV Regressions with generated instruments 
This table presents second stage IV GMM linear probability model estimates of our baseline models in Table III-2, 
instrumenting financial literacy using generated instruments after Lewbel (2012). Standard errors are robust. All data are 
weighted and representative for German households.  
 All Debt  Unsecured Debt 
  Marginal Effect Std. Error   Marginal Effect Std. Error 
Financial literacy -0.040* (0.024)  -0.070* (0.039) 
Female -0.025 (0.019)  -0.098** (0.042) 
Education (mid) -0.031 (0.026)  -0.035 (0.048) 
Education (hi) -0.030 (0.026)  0.016 (0.052) 
Risk attitude 0.009** (0.004)  0.010 (0.010) 
Married -0.044 (0.032)  -0.027 (0.042) 
Divorced -0.063 (0.046)  0.016 (0.074) 
Age 0.006 (0.005)  0.005 (0.009) 
Age² -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) 
log(income) -0.032* (0.017)  -0.091* (0.047) 
log(wealth) -0.017*** (0.005)  -0.013 (0.008) 
Shock: wealth 0.033 (0.032)  0.083 (0.059) 
Shock: job 0.041 (0.056)  0.187** (0.085) 
log(all debt) 0.009 (0.007)    
log(unsecured debt)    0.020 (0.012) 
      
Constant 0.374** (0.164)  0.802** (0.354) 
      
Observations 1,362   353  
R-squared 0.12   0.21  
Endog test 1.14   1.16  
(p-value) (0.29)   (0.28)  
Hansen J statistic 14.46   17.03  
(p-value) (0.27)   (0.15)  
F-Test of excluded Instruments 53.94   22.86  
(p-value) (0.00)   (0.00)  
 
4. Conclusion 
Our results highlight the importance of a sufficient understanding of basic 
financial concepts in order to cope with everyday financial decisions. In line with 
the literature, we find women to possess less financial literacy compared to men 
on population level. However, when it comes to holding debt, only financially 
literate women participate in the debt markets, indicating that financially illit-
erate women might be aware of their financial illiteracy or at least seem to be 
unsecure about their financial capabilities and restrain themselves from debt mar-
kets. Those women who hold debt seem to be better able in coping with their 
debt burdens compared to men, as we find them to be less often over-indebted. 
Generally, but particularly when it comes to unsecured consumer debt, men are 
dramatically more often over-indebted than women. Thus, our results might in-
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dicate that women, who are commonly found to be highly vulnerable to compul-
sive buying, are less susceptible for such self-control problems when it comes to 
their financing decisions. Finally, using a robust measure of over-indebtedness, 
we find that financial literacy reduces over-indebtedness significantly for both 
genders and we show this effect to be robust against potential endogeneity. 
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6. Appendix 
Appendix III-1: Variable descriptions 
This table contents the descriptions of our variables in alphabetical order.  
Variable Name Variable Description 
Age Continuous variable that measures the respondent’s age in (years). 
Over-indebted Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent was not able pay a monthly in-
stallment within the last 12 months. Zero otherwise. Underlying PHF Item: 
(Were you / Was your household / Was the household) able to make all the due 
payments for the various loans, mortgage loans and leasing contracts on time over 
the past 12 months? 
Divorced Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is divorced. Zero otherwise. 
Debt (all) Continuous variable that measures the household’s amount of debt (EUR). 
Debt (unsecured) Continuous variable that measures the household’s amount of unsecured debt 
(EUR). 
Education (low) Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has low-level education 
(“Hauptschulabschluss” or lower), zero otherwise. 
Education (mid) Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has mid-level education (“Mit-
tlere Reife”), zero otherwise.  
Education (high) Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has A-level education 
(“(Fach-)Hochschulreife”), zero otherwise. 
Female Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is female, zero otherwise. 
Financial Literacy Ordinal variable that measures the number of correctly answered financial literacy 
questions. Underlying PHF-items: 
Question 1: Compound Interest effect 
Let us assume that you have a balance of €100 on your savings account. This 
balance bears interest at a rate of 2% per year and you leave it for 5 years on this 
account. How high do you think your balance will be after 5 years?  
1 - More than €102 [correct]     2 - Exactly €102     3 - Less than €102 
Question 2: Inflation 
Let us assume that your savings account bears interest at a rate of 1% per year 
and the rate of inflation is 2% per year. Do you think that in one year's time the 
balance on your savings account will buy the same as, more than or less than today    
1 - More     2 - The same     3 - Less than today [correct] 
Question 3: Diversification 
Do you agree with the following statement: "Investing in shares of one company is 
less risky than investing in a fund containing shares of similar companies"?    
1 - Agree     2 – Disagree [correct] 
Income Continuous variable that measures the household’s monthly income in (EUR). 
Shock: wealth Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent's net worth has decreased sub-
stantially during the last two years. Zero otherwise. 
Shock: job Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent lost his/her job within the last 
two years. Zero otherwise. 
Wealth Continuous variable that measures the household’s gross wealth in (EUR). 
Married Dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is married, zero otherwise. 
Risk Attitude Ordinal variable that measures the respondents’ propensity to take financial risks 
on a scale from 0 [highly risk-averse] to 10 [very happy to take risks].  
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Abstract - Computer-aided quantitative content analyses have re-
cently gained a lot of attention. Applied on different elements of 
business communication such as financial disclosures, analyst re-
ports, earnings announcements or IPO prospectuses, they have 
been shown to deliver relevant information to financial market 
participants. However, most analyses of business-specific texts 
have been conducted using English documents solely. To contrib-
ute to a wider usage of the analytical instruments developed so 
far, we create a content-specific German dictionary for textual 
sentiment analysis. The so-called BPW dictionary is based on the 
widely used English language dictionary by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011). We extensively evaluate our dictionary and 
find our adaptation to be widely equivalent compared to its Eng-
lish original.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent financial research has acknowledged the information value of the qual-
itative characteristics of text documents, i.e., their textual sentiment (Kearney & 
Liu, 2014; Loughran & McDonald, 2016). Fostered by an increasing computing 
performance, the dictionary-based approach has become a commonly used tool to 
capture the sentiment of various kinds of documents such as, e.g., financial dis-
closures, analyst reports, earnings press releases, IPO prospectuses, internet board 
postings, or newspaper articles (Kearney & Liu, 2014). Particularly with regard 
to finance-related applications, Loughran and McDonald (2015) have shown the 
superiority of context-specific dictionaries over the use of more general word lists. 
However, hardly any adaptations of business-specific dictionaries exist outside the 
English language. This may come as a surprise since many text documents con-
taining value-relevant information like news articles, product information, and 
business communication, are published only in the native language. Even if these 
documents are translated into English, they are typically altered, shortened, or 
summarized in the translation process, so that the original sentiment gets ob-
scured. In addition, the translated versions are often published later than the 
initial documents, so that it will be hard to profit from an analysis of their senti-
ment on financial markets. 
We try to fill this gap and contribute to broadening the use of dictionary-
based content analyses by creating a business-specific dictionary for the German 
language. Following the methodology of Wolf et al. (2008), we translate and ad-
just the positive, negative, uncertainty wordlists of the dictionary compiled by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), which has evolved as the industry standard in 
textual analysis of documents in the fields of finance and accounting. We refer to 
our German adaptation as the BPW dictionary. We test the equivalence of our 
adaptation using a sample of 1,402 quarterly and annual reports of German DAX 
and MDAX companies which are available in German and English. For that pur-
pose, we estimate simple pairwise correlations, Spearman rank correlations, intra-
class correlations (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979), and test the dictionaries’ equivalence 
via two-sided equivalence testing as introduced by Blair and Cole (2002). Our 
results show a high correlation and equivalence to the English counterpart, indi-
cating the reliability of our adaptation. Finally, we compare our dictionary to two 
general German dictionaries and present evidence for the BPW dictionary being 
better suited to capture the sentiment of business-specific documents. Our con-
tribution to the literature is threefold. First, we create a tool that allows a con-
text-specific evaluation of the qualitative information disclosed in German text 
documents. It broadens the applicability of content analyses as our dictionary is 
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not sample specific, i.e., it can be used on any type of business communication 
with a focus on delivering value-relevant information. The BPW dictionary will 
be available at www.uni-giessen.de/BPW, paving the way for further German 
content analyses on business related documents. Second, we compare our context-
specific dictionary with general language dictionaries and, in line with studies on 
the English language, find evidence for the superiority of context-specific diction-
aries in measuring the textual sentiment of documents. Finally, by giving a de-
tailed account of the adaptation process, we describe a framework for future ad-
aptations of dictionaries in other languages. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
content analyses. Section 3 describes the underlying dictionary introduced by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) as well as the adaptation process for creating the 
BPW dictionary. In section 4, we present our adaptation, show the results of the 
correlation and equivalence tests and compare our dictionary to general German 
language dictionaries. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
2.1. General language dictionaries 
Early studies conducting content analyses on business-related documents uti-
lize the comprehensive Harvard University’s General Inquirer IV-41 (hereafter 
HARVARD) dictionary introduced by Stone et al. (1966). HARVARD contains 
dozens of categories, such as, positive, negative, strong, weak, political, or reli-
gious to capture the sentiment of a text. Its positive and negative wordlists con-
tain 2,577 and 3,699 words, respectively. Despite its general character, the HAR-
VARD dictionary has been used frequently in the finance literature. For example, 
Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al. (2008) use the HARVARD dictionary and meas-
ure the pessimism in news articles. They find that high values of media pessimism 
convey negative information about firms’ earnings and induce downward pressure 
on market prices. The HARVARD dictionary is also used for analyzing text doc-
uments of 10-Ks and 10-Qs filings, earnings conference calls, earnings press re-
leases, and news articles (Kearney & Liu, 2014). 
Another general language dictionary, which was repeatedly used in the finan-
cial literature, is included in the Diction2 software (hereafter DICTION). Its orig-
inal area of application is the analysis of political language and rhetorical analysis. 
                                      
1
  See http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/. 
2
   See http://www.dictionsoftware.com/. 
BANNIER/PAULS/WALTER Content analysis of business-specific text documents  
 
IV-65 
 
In its latest version, DICTION comprises 10,000 words and 35 sentimental cate-
gories, of which the negative wordlist includes 914 words and the positive wordlist 
697. Davis et al. (2012) use the DICTION dictionary to gauge the optimism in 
earnings press releases and find it to be predictive of future firm performance. In 
a subsequent study, Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) employ the DICTION diction-
ary to investigate the sentiment of earnings press releases and of the correspond-
ing management discussion and analyses (MD&A) sections in the companies’ an-
nual reports. The authors find that firms which exactly meet or just beat earnings 
benchmarks report a lower proportion of total pessimistic language in their earn-
ings press releases. In addition, they find the level of pessimistic language in the 
MD&A sections to be predictive of future firm performance. Furthermore, DIC-
TION was also used to examine earnings conference calls (Davis et al., 2012) and 
IPO prospectuses (Ferris et al., 2013).  
A third general language dictionary is the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count3. Its 
purpose is to capture people’s social and psychological states. Its language cate-
gories are created by researchers with a special interest in social, clinical, health, 
and cognitive psychology. The Linguistic Inquiry Word Count contains 72 senti-
mental categories and more than 2,300 different words. It has been used in nu-
merous studies containing social-, personality-, or clinical psychological research 
questions on a variety of different text-documents, such as lyric, therapeutic es-
says, political speeches, daily conversations, and computer-based communication 
(Wolf et al., 2008). Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) utilize the Linguistic Inquiry 
Word Count to gauge deceptive tone of CEO and CFO narratives during earnings 
conference calls. The authors show the textual sentiment to be indicative of fi-
nancial misreporting. However, Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) admit that the 
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count as a general language dictionary might not be 
appropriate for capturing the sentiment with a business-specific focus. According 
to Loughran and McDonald (2015) this criticism also applies to both the HAR-
VARD and DICTION dictionaries. 
2.2. Context-specific dictionaries 
Henry (2008) was the first to compose a dictionary explicitly designed to ex-
amine the tone of financial documents. She customizes a dictionary on a specific 
financial text sample: earnings press releases. Her dictionary reveals that the earn-
ings press releases’ positive sentiment positively affects the market reaction sub-
sequent to the earnings announcements. Due to the customization to one specific 
                                      
3
 See http://www.liwc.net. 
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text type, the Henry (2008) (hereafter HENRY) dictionary contains only 85 neg-
ative and 105 positive words. Despite the small number of words, various studies 
describe the superiority of the context-specific HENRY dictionary over the DIC-
TION and HARVARD dictionaries (Doran et al., 2012; Henry & Leone, 2016; 
Price et al., 2012) when applied to business-related text documents. 
Nonetheless, the HENRY dictionary’s applicability is clearly limited by its 
small number of words included. Hence, Loughran and McDonald (2011) create a 
comprehensive dictionary by evaluating all words appearing in at least 5% of the 
entire 10-K disclosure universe. Apart from a positive and negative wordlist to 
capture optimism and pessimism in a text, it also contains wordlists for uncer-
tainty or modal words to assess a text’s “tonality” in a broader sense. The 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) (hereafter LM) dictionary contains 2,354 nega-
tive and 354 positive words. The authors state that 73.8% of the HARVARD 
negative word count does actually not have a negative meaning in financial doc-
uments. In subsequent work, the authors compare their dictionary with the 
HENRY dictionary and emphasize that none of the most frequently occurring 
negative words of the LM dictionary (loss, losses, claims, impairment, against, 
adverse, restated, adversely, restructuring, and litigation) are included in the 
HENRY dictionary (Loughran & McDonald, 2015). In addition to that, Loughran 
and McDonald (2015) use the LM and the DICTION dictionaries to gauge the 
sentiment of financial disclosures and compare both dictionaries’ explanatory 
power on post 10-k filing stock return volatility. The authors find 83% of the 
words in the DICTIONs positive wordlist and 70% of the words in the DICTION 
negative wordlist to be misclassified. Furthermore, the sentiment gauged by the 
LM dictionary seems to significantly better explain post 10-k filing stock return 
volatility. Thus, the authors argue that DICTION, as a general dictionary, is 
inappropriate to assess the sentiment of financial documents. Due to its compre-
hensiveness and its appropriateness for financial documents, the LM dictionary 
has become the most widely used dictionary in business research. It has been 
utilized to assess the tone of a variety of different documents, for example, 10-k 
filings (Loughran & McDonald, 2011), earnings conference calls (Davis et al., 
2015), news articles (García, 2013), and IPO prospectuses (Ferris et al., 2013; 
Jegadeesh & Wu, 2013).4 
                                      
4
  For a comprehensive overview over studies using mentioned general and context-specific dic-
tionaries, see Kearney and Liu (2014) and Loughran and McDonald (2016). 
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2.3. German dictionaries 
When it comes to the analysis of German text documents, two comprehensive 
general German language dictionaries exist. Remus et al. (2010) created the “Sen-
timentWortschatz” (hereafter SENTIWS) dictionary, which is based on and ex-
tends the General Inquirer lexicon by Stone et al. (1966). The SENTIWS diction-
ary comprises 15,466 negative and 15,536 positive individual words and has been 
used in the fields of, for example, political communication (Haselmayer & Jenny, 
2016), as well as art and literature (Zehe et al., 2016). The second general lan-
guage dictionary was created by Wolf et al. (2008), who adapted the English 
version of the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count to the German language. Their 
dictionary (hereafter LIWC) contains 1,049 negative and 646 positive words and, 
like its English original, puts special emphasis on analyses of essays in the context 
of expressive writing experiments. It has also been used in other research domains 
such as, for example, political analysis (Caton et al., 2015; Jacobi et al., 2016). 
However, no comprehensive context-specific dictionary for the analysis of busi-
ness-related text-documents exists in the German language. This is despite the 
notion that, like for the English language, German general language dictionaries 
are likely to be inferior compared to context-specific dictionaries in assessing the 
textual sentiment of business-related text documents. In this respect, Ammann 
and Schaub (2016) analyze data from an online social trading network, where 
traders publish their trading strategies for followers to comment on and invest in. 
Using a sample specific ad-hoc dictionary, they find that online investors adjust 
their trading behavior to the commentaries’ sentiment but the commentaries do 
not seem to have predictive power for the trading strategies’ future performance. 
Next to their ad-hoc dictionary, the authors also utilize the general SENTIWS 
and LIWC dictionaries and derive similar, albeit weaker results. Mengelkamp et 
al. (2016) also create simple, sample specific ad-hoc dictionaries from a manually 
categorized subsample of Twitter messages and find them to perform quite well. 
Furthermore, the authors compare their ad-hoc dictionaries’ performance to that 
of SENTIWS and report a significantly higher performance of their specific dic-
tionaries. Thus, Ammann and Schaub (2016) as well as Mengelkamp et al. (2016) 
highlight the superiority of content-specific dictionaries over general language dic-
tionaries. However, their ad-hoc dictionaries are restrictive in their use of specific 
sample text documents. Deriving a sample-independent context-specific diction-
ary would therefore be clearly preferable. 
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3. The creation of the BPW dictionary 
3.1. Translating a dictionary 
Wolf et al. (2008) adapt the English version of the Linguistic Inquiry Word 
Count dictionary to the German language. Their methodology follows the trans-
lation of the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count into other languages such as, for 
example, Dutch (Zijlstra et al., 2004) or Spanish (Ramírez-Esparza et al., 2007).5  
For the translation, all words in each category of the English version are summa-
rized in a table and, with the aid of common English-German dictionaries, a 
parallel version is created and supplemented by meaningful and relevant related 
words. 25% of the words are retranslated to check their meaning equivalence. 
Afterwards, Wolf et al. (2008) utilize 122 English text-documents and their re-
spective German translations and estimate a two-sided equivalence test of the 
difference between the means following Blair and Cole (2002) as well as the in-
traclass correlations (ICC) following Shrout and Fleiss (1979) in order to test 
their translated German dictionary’s equivalence to the English version. For the 
adaption of the LM dictionary, we build upon the methodology of Wolf et al. 
(2008), using 1,402 German quarterly and annual reports and their corresponding 
English versions for the equivalence tests. However, we adjust their methodology 
by accounting for a number of linguistic issues as explained in the following. 
3.2. Inflections 
Probably the most prevalent issue to be considered in the adaptation process 
are differences in the inflectional morphology between German and English. In 
general, there are two possibilities to account for inflections using the dictionary- 
based approach: One could include all possible inflections of a word into the dic-
tionary. Alternatively, one could reduce morphological variants of words to their 
word stem or root form (stemming). Unlike the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count, 
the LM dictionary uses inflections to avoid errors associated with stemming. 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) draw attention to the problem that a word’s 
meaning might change when common prefixes or suffixes are added. For example, 
“ODD” and “BITTER” take on different meanings when made plural: “ODDS” and 
“BITTERS”. As a consequence, the authors advise using explicit inflections as 
these are less prone to error than using stemming (Loughran & McDonald, 2015). 
This is true also for the German language. For example, the negative wordlist of 
the German version of the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count includes the stem 
                                      
5
  The LIWC dictionaries are also translated in Norwegian, Italian, and Portuguese. Other trans-
lations into Arabic, Korean, Turkish, and Chinese are in progress (Pennebaker et al., 2015). 
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“WEINE”, which is the stemmed form of the verb “WEINEN” (in English to cry). 
However, “WEINE” is also the plural form of “WEIN”, which is the German word 
for wine. 
As German grammar is more explicit compared to English (Hawkins, 2015; 
König & Gast, 2012), the use of inflections creates specific problems when it comes 
to German language. Looking at nouns, both languages distinguish with respect 
to singular and plural. However, the German language further distinguishes four 
cases in the noun phrase: nominative, accusative, genitive, and dative. In contrast, 
English only retains a separate genitive case which is not relevant in terms of 
computational analysis as the English genitive form is reduced to the respective 
singular or plural stem in the tokenization process (Hawkins, 2015). With respect 
to verbs, German distinguishes indicative and subjunctive forms whereas English 
employs a single form for both. Further, German verbs are distinguished with 
respect to person and number, whereas the bare stem in English is used for all 
persons and numbers except for the third person singular (Hawkins, 2015). For 
example, the English present tense forms “LAY“ and “LAYS“ correspond to the 
German indicatives “LEGE“, “LEGST“, “LEGT“, “LEGEN“, and “LEGET“, while 
the past tense form “LAID“ corresponds to the German “LEGTE“, “LEGTEST“, 
“LEGTE“, “LEGTEN“, and “LEGTET“ (König & Gast, 2012). Thus, less inflec-
tions are needed to comprise the morphology of English adjectives. Likewise, the 
only inflectional forms we find for English adjectives are the comparative and 
superlative forms, for example, “HAPPY“, “HAPPIER“, and “HAPPIEST“. Fur-
ther, when constructed with a verb or another adjective, English adjectives attach 
the marker “–ly“ (i.e. “HAPPILY“) (König & Gast, 2012). In German, adjectives 
are distinguished with respect to gender, case (nominative, accusative, dative, and 
genitive), as well as comparative and superlative forms. Consequently, the four 
inflections of “happy“ correspond to the German “GLÜCKLICH“, “GLÜCKLI-
CHE“, “GLÜCKLICHER“, “GLÜCKLICHEN“, “GLÜCKLICHEM“, “GLÜCKLI-
CHES“, the comparative forms “GLÜCKLICHER“, “GLÜCKLICHERE“ and 
“GLÜCKLICHERES“, and the superlative forms “GLÜCKLICHSTE“, “GLÜCK-
LICHSTES“, “GLÜCKLICHSTEN“, “GLÜCKLICHSTEM“ (König & Gast, 2012). 
In order to address the issue of inflectional morphology, we therefore system-
atically generate German inflections next to the direct translations and add them 
to our wordlists. However, a certain inflection might have additional meanings 
that may not fit into the respective sentimental wordlist. For example, one trans-
lation of the English verb “CUT“, which is included in the LM negative wordlist, 
is the German verb “KÜRZEN“. The German first person singular is “KÜRZE“, 
which might not only be retranslated into “CUT“, but also into “SHORTNESS“ 
or “BRIEFNESS“. In the latter cases, the retranslations would not have a negative 
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context. To address this issue, we retranslate each generated inflection using com-
mon German-English dictionaries and exclude inflections that have additional 
meanings and do not fit into the respective sentimental category of the English 
original word. 
3.3. Lexical morphology 
German and English are also different with respect to lexical morphology. In 
particular, German not only requires more inflectional accuracy, but also more 
semantic distinctions within a lexical field where English uses undifferentiated 
and broader terms (Hawkins, 2015). For example, the English verb “STOP“ trans-
lates into the German verbs “AUFHÖREN“, “HALTEN“, “STEHENBLEIBEN“, 
“AUFHALTEN“, “INNEHALTEN“, “ANHALTEN“, and “(UNTER-)LASSEN“. 
German speakers have to identify the specific type of “STOP“ which is defined by 
the context in which it is used. For example, “to stop working“ translates into 
“aufhören zu arbeiten“, “to stop somebody (from doing something)“ translates into 
“jemanden aufhalten (etwas zu tun)“, or “to stop a car“ translates into “ein Auto 
anhalten“. Each German verb is restricted in its semantic coverage, whereas the 
English single verb extends over all the semantic distinctions. In order to address 
the differences in lexical morphology, we, in a first step, gather all translations 
using common English – German dictionaries. In a second step, we retranslate 
each translation and exclude those translations which are not of clear sentimental 
implication with respect to the sentimental wordlist the English original word 
was included in. The English verb “ESCALATE“, which is included in the LM 
dictionary’s negative wordlist, might serve as an example. Its German translations 
are “ANSTEIGEN“, “AUSUFERN“, “ZUSPITZEN“, and “ESKALIEREN“. While 
the latter three translations will most likely be used to describe negatively con-
noted events, “ANSTEIGEN“ might be used to describe the growth of, for exam-
ple, costs, which might be negative in context, but also the growth of, for example, 
sales, which would be positive in context. Consequently, we add “AUSUFERN“, 
“ZUSPITZEN“, and “ESKALIEREN“ to the negative wordlist of our dictionary 
while we do not include “ANSTEIGEN.“ 
3.4. Compound words 
German compound words are described by a single word in German whereas 
they are described by several words in English (König & Gast, 2012). For exam-
ple, the German noun “LEBENSVERSICHERUNGSFACHANGESTELLTER“ 
translates into “LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY EMPLOYEE“. This may easily 
lead to problems in a content analysis. For example, the LM uncertainty word 
list includes the word “RISK“, whose German translation is “RISIKO“. Including 
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only the direct translation “RISIKO“ would underestimate the German share of 
uncertain words. This is because German compound words such as, for example, 
“AUSFALLRISIKO“ (default risk), “LIQUIDITÄTSRISIKO“ (liquidity risk), 
“MARKTRISIKO“ (market risk), “FINANZRISIKO“ (financial risk), “KREDIT-
RISIKO“ (credit risk), “WÄHRUNGSRISIKO“ (currency risk), “ZINSRISIKO“ 
(interest rate risk), “GESCHÄFTSRISIKO“ (business risk), or “REPUTA-
TIONSRISIKO“ (reputation risk) would then not be assessed as uncertain using 
the German dictionary. As a consequence, we explicitly search for German com-
pound words and add them to our dictionary. 
3.5. Retranslation 
In a final step, we retranslate all words in our dictionary, review their meaning 
with respect to the sentimental category and drop non-fitting words that may 
have multiple meanings which do not all correspond to the respective sentimental 
category. Retranslation confirmability, which represents the share of words which 
remain in our wordlists after first including all possible translations from the LM 
dictionary and then retranslating all words with special attention to their fit into 
the respective sentiment category, takes on values of 84.34%, 75.61%, and 87.43% 
for the negative, positive and uncertainty list, respectively. This is close to the 
values in Wolf et al. (2008), who retranslate only 25% of their words and observe 
a retranslation conformability of 89%. Table IV-1 provides the final number of 
words in our (hereafter BPW) dictionary’s wordlists and those of the LM, 
HENRY, HARVARD and DICTION dictionaries. 
 
Table IV-1: Number of words in wordlists 
This table shows the number of words in the English language dictionary’s wordlists and the corresponding number of 
words in our adaption. 
  BPW LM HENRY HARVARD DICTION 
Negative 10,147 2,354 85 3,699 914 
Positive 2,223 354 105 2,577 697 
Uncertainty 1,697 297     
 
4. Evaluation  
4.1. Equivalence of the BPW to the LM dictionary 
After creating the BPW dictionary, we evaluate its quality of fit compared to 
its English counterpart, the LM dictionary. For this evaluation, we utilize quar-
terly and annual reports from German DAX and MDAX companies from end 
2008 to early 2015. We gather those reports from DGAP, a German information 
BANNIER/PAULS/WALTER Content analysis of business-specific text documents  
 
IV-72 
 
platform where stock-listed companies publish company-specific news in order to 
fulfil ad-hoc and other obligations.6 Our sample consists of 1,402 German reports 
and their corresponding English versions. These extensive reports are publicly 
available in German and in English for all listed companies in Germany, they are 
translated by professional translation bureaus, and are released simultaneously. 
Before we can analyze the reports quantitatively, we have to convert the doc-
uments, which are typically available in PDF file format, to TXT format. 
Thereby, we replace typographic ligatures and employ UTF-8 character encoding 
on all files in order to allow for German-specific characters such as ‘Ä’,’Ü’,’Ö’, or 
‘ß’. All characters are transformed into lower case and tokenized afterwards, 
where we define a token as any subsequent order of at least three alphabetic 
characters. In order to exclude potential spelling errors, we exclude tokens that 
do not occur in at least one percent of the reports. 
Afterwards, we apply a stop-word list on the reports in both languages to filter 
words that might have important semantic functions, but that rarely contribute 
information (Manning & Schütze, 1999). For the English versions of the reports, 
we use the stop-word list provided by Loughran and McDonald which includes 
common names, dates, numbers, geographic locations, or currencies.7 We supple-
ment the list, amongst others, with the names of German DAX and MDAX com-
panies, popular German pre- and surnames, and the names of the largest German 
and European cities. For the German reports, we adapt the stop-word list by 
adding the German translations.8 The dictionary-based approach, which is thus 
also called bag-of-words approach, implies words to be independent from each 
other and dissolves the sequential order of words. Consequently, the documents 
are hereafter transformed to word count vectors using the Rapidminer software.9 
In a final step, the German and English documents’ sentiment is assessed by 
counting their quantity of negative, positive, and uncertain words with respect to 
the word lists of the BPW and LM dictionary, respectively. The corresponding 
shares of sentimental words are then calculated by dividing the number of senti-
mental words with respect to one category by the respective report’s total number 
of words. For the English versions of the reports, the textual sentiment is hence 
measured using the LM dictionary’s wordlists and for the German versions of the 
reports, the textual sentiment is measured using our BPW dictionary. 
                                      
6
  For more information, please see http://www.dgap.de/. 
7
  For more information, please see http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html. 
8
  We will provide the stop word list at www.uni-giessen.de/bpw.  
9
  The transformation to lower-case characters, the tokenization, the stop-word filtering and the 
generation of the word count vectors were conducted with the Rapidminer software. For more 
information, please see https://rapidminer.com/.  
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Note that the use of quarterly and annual reports obliges make two exemptions 
from the dictionary-based approach’s word independence assumption. Specifi-
cally,  we have to control for certain combinations of “PROFITS”, “GAINS”, and 
“LOSSES” as not doing so would result in an overestimation of the English re-
ports’ shares of positive and negative words compared to their German counter-
parts. See Appendix IV-1 for complete list of all combinations we controlled for 
in our analyses on our sample of quarterly and annual reports. Further, for the 
same reason, we counted the terms “IMPAIRMENT LOSS” and “IMPAIRMENT 
LOSSES” as one negative occurrence. We also conduct our analysis on the quar-
terly and annual reports without making any exception from the word independ-
ence assumption. The results are presented in Appendix IV-2. 
Table IV-2 provides summary statistics for our set of quarterly and annual 
reports. While the German versions of the reports contain only slightly more 
words in total compared to their English counterparts, they contain significantly 
more individual words per document: The German reports contain 2.63% (4.90%) 
more total words in the mean (median) and 66.08% (51.24%) more individual 
words per report in the mean (median). As the content of the corresponding texts 
should be broadly identical, the large difference highlights that German has more 
distinct word forms compared to English and underlines the necessity for the 
adjustments in our adaptation process.  
 
Table IV-2: Summary statistics of the quarterly and annual reports 
This table presents summary statistics of our sample of corresponding 1,402 English and German quarterly 
and annual reports.  
  Total  
Words 
 Words per document  Individual words per document 
  Reports  Mean Median SD Min Max  Mean Median SD Min Max 
ENG 1,402 33,226,602  23,699 11,398 26,486 444 185,071  2,432 1,780 1,571 122 7,806 
GER 1,402 34,099,075  24,322 11,957 27,143 396 195,713  4,039 2,692 3,054 150 15,237 
 
Table IV-3 reports the ten most common English and German negative, posi-
tive, and uncertain words in our sample of quarterly and annual reports according 
to the LM dictionary and our BPW dictionary respectively. Comparing our re-
sults from the English versions of the reports with those of the German versions, 
the total numbers of sentimental words are quite comparable, providing first ev-
idence for the equivalence of our translation. Moreover, Table IV-3 highlights the 
necessity for the adaptions we described in the previous section. 
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Table IV-3: Most frequent sentimental words: LM and BPW 
This table presents the most frequent positive, negative and uncertain words occurring in the quarterly and annual reports. 
For the English versions of the reports, the LM dictionary (Loughran & McDonald, 2011) was utilized to classify the 
words with respect to their sentimental categories. For the German versions of the reports, we utilized our own (BPW) 
dictionary. Note that the use of quarterly and annual reports obliges us to control for certain combinations of “PROFITS“, 
“GAINS“, and “LOSSES“ as not doing so would result in an  overestimation of the English speeches’ shares of positive and 
negative words compared to the German counterparts. See Appendix IV-1 for complete list of all combinations we con-
trolled for. Further, for the same reason, we counted the terms “IMPAIRMENT LOSS“ and “IMPAIRMENT LOSSES“ as 
one negative occurrence. The combined terms “IMPAIRMENT LOSSES“ and “IMPAIRMENT LOSS“ occurred 9,533 times 
and 2,776 times, respectively. 
  English (LM)  German (BPW) 
Rank Word Total %  
cumulative 
%    Word Total % 
cumulative 
% 
Panel A: Most common negative words 
1 LOSS 37,522 7.6% 7.6%  VERLUSTE 20,624 4.2% 4.2% 
2 LOSSES 21,378 4.3% 11.9%  GEGEN 19,371 3.9% 8.1% 
3 AGAINST 19,898 4.0% 15.9%  BETRUG 17,987 3.7% 11.8% 
4 NEGATIVE 17,198 3.5% 19.4%  RÜCKGANG 15,113 3.1% 14.9% 
5 IMPAIRMENT 16,690 3.4% 22.8%  VERPFLICHTUNGEN 13,231 2.7% 17.6% 
6 CLAIMS 14,852 3.0% 25.8%  VERLUST 11,191 2.3% 19.8% 
7 DECLINE 12,907 2.6% 28.4%  WERTMINDERUNGEN 9,567 1.9% 21.8% 
8 RESTRUCTURING 11,353 2.3% 30.7%  SCHADEN 9,245 1.9% 23.7% 
9 DISCONTINUED 11,297 2.3% 33.0%  ERMITTLUNG 7,740 1.6% 25.2% 
10 CRISIS 9,748 2.0% 35.0%  VERFÜGUNG 6,992 1.4% 26.6% 
All   494,055         491,805     
Panel B: Most common positive words 
1 POSITIVE 25,526 6.7% 6.7%  POSITIVE 10,071 2.6% 2.6% 
2 OPPORTUNITIES 20,339 5.3% 12.0%  ERTRAG 8,847 2.3% 4.8% 
3 EFFECTIVE 14,109 3.7% 15.7%  POSITIV 8,650 2.2% 7.0% 
4 ABLE 13,853 3.6% 19.3%  POSITIVEN 8,164 2.1% 9.1% 
5 BENEFIT 13,245 3.5% 22.8%  ERREICHEN 6,749 1.7% 10.8% 
6 IMPROVED 11,148 2.9% 25.7%  ERREICHT 6,529 1.7% 12.5% 
7 GAINS 10,242 2.7% 28.4%  ERFOLG 6,191 1.6% 14.1% 
8 ACHIEVED 10,222 2.7% 31.0%  VERBESSERUNG 6,102 1.6% 15.6% 
9 SUCCESS 9,186 2.4% 33.5%  STEIGERUNG 5,911 1.5% 17.1% 
10 LEADING 9,157 2.4% 35.8%  ERFOLGREICH 5,468 1.4% 18.5% 
All   382,246         392,469     
Panel C: Most common uncertain words 
1 RISK 104,547 25.9% 25.9%  RISIKEN 45,179 11.8% 11.8% 
2 RISKS 64,677 16.0% 41.9%  KANN 23,513 6.2% 18.0% 
3 INTANGIBLE 26,516 6.6% 48.5%  RISIKO 19,699 5.2% 23.2% 
4 COULD 15,034 3.7% 52.2%  IMMATERIELLE 18,788 4.9% 28.1% 
5 POSSIBLE 14,195 3.5% 55.7%  ETWA 10,236 2.7% 30.8% 
6 VARIABLE 11,941 3.0% 58.7%  ANNAHMEN 9,692 2.5% 33.3% 
7 ASSUMPTIONS 11,032 2.7% 61.4%  PROGNOSE 6,318 1.7% 35.0% 
8 APPROXIMATELY 10,192 2.5% 63.9%  MÖGLICH 6,287 1.6% 36.6% 
9 EXPOSURE 8,512 2.1% 66.0%  IMMATERIELLEN 6,050 1.6% 38.2% 
10 CONTINGENT 8,350 2.1% 68.1%  KÖNNTEN 5,996 1.6% 39.8% 
All   403,844         381,551     
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While the ten most frequent English negative, positive and uncertain words 
account for 35.0%, 35.8% and 68.1% of all negative, positive and uncertain words, 
their respective German counterparts only account for 26.6%, 18.5% and 39.8%, 
respectively. Apparently, as the total numbers of sentimental words are quite 
comparable between the sentimental categories, the German report’s textual sen-
timent seems to be spread more widely among inflections. This result underlines 
that the sentiment in the German texts would have been strongly underestimated 
without the adjustments to the translation process and thus supports the neces-
sity of the described adaptations in the creation of word lists for sentiment anal-
yses.10 
To further shed light on the equivalence of our BPW dictionary to the LM 
dictionary, we follow Wolf et al. (2008) and estimate simple pairwise correlations, 
Spearman rank correlations and intra-class correlations (ICC[3,2]) according to 
Shrout and Fleiss (1979), using our sample of 1,402 corresponding German and 
English quarterly and annual reports. Figure IV-1 graphically plots the 1,402 
German and English reports’ negative, positive and uncertain share of words and 
provides evidence of a strong and positive correlation. Table IV-4 displays sum-
mary statistics on the English and German reports’ sentimental share of words. 
On average, the English versions of the reports, which are assessed with the LM 
dictionary, contain 1.41% negative, 1.13% positive and 1.02% uncertain words. 
These numbers are quite similar compared to the German reports which, using 
the BPW dictionary, contain 1.40% negative, 1.15% positive and 1.01% uncertain 
words. 
 
                                      
10
  Loughran and McDonald (2011) give an account of the most frequently employed negative 
words in their sample of 10-K documents. The results for our sample of English quarterly and 
annual reports are quite comparable: All but one of the ten most common negative English 
words in our texts appear among the 30 most common negative words in Loughran and McDon-
ald (2011). Furthermore, the distribution of the most common words within both samples 
appears to be quite comparable. While the ten most common negative words in our sample 
account for 35.0% of the negative word count, the ten most common negative words in 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) account for 33.8%. 
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Figure IV-1: Correlation plots of quarterly and annual reports 
This figure plots the share of negative, positive and uncertain words for the quarterly and annual reports. The x-axis 
depicts the sentiment inherent the German version of the report as measured by our dictionary (BPW) and the y-axis 
depicts the sentiment inherent the English version of the report as measured by the dictionay by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) (LM). The solid line reflects a linear regression. 
 
 
We assess the significance of these differences using two-sided equivalence test-
ing following Blair and Cole (2002). As in Wolf et al. (2008), the area of insignif-
icant deviation is set to 0.5 standard deviations around the zero difference be-
tween the standardized English original category and the German translation. In 
a two-sided approach, 90% confidence intervals are calculated for all category 
differences and compared in terms of their inclusion in the equivalence area. Fig-
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ure IV-2 shows the results of the two-sided equivalence testing. All three catego-
ries are strikingly within the equivalence area, providing support for the equiva-
lence of our BPW dictionary to the LM dictionary. 
 
Figure IV-2: Equivalence tests after Blair and Cole (2002) 
Figure II shows the results of the two-sided equivalence tests after Blair and Cole (2002). The area of insignificant devi-
ation is it set to 0.5 standard deviations around the zero difference between the standardized English original category 
and the German translation. In a two-sided approach, 90% confidence intervals are calculated for all category differ-
ences, which corresponds to the calculation of two 95% confidence intervals, and compared in terms of their inclusion in 
the equivalence area. 
 
 
Finally, Table IV-4 provides pairwise correlations, Spearman rank correlations 
and intraclass correlations (ICC[3,2]) between the English and German reports’ 
shares of sentimental words. All correlations are considerably above 0.7, where 
values above 0.7 are considered to indicate reliability (Wolf et al., 2008).11 
 
                                      
11
 We retest the BPW dictionary’s equivalence to the LM dictionary not making any exemption 
from the word independency assumption explained in Appendix IV-1. The results are presented 
in Appendix IV-2 and support the dictionaries’ equivalence. 
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Table IV-4: English vs. German textual sentiment: Reports 
This table presents summary statistics for the quarterly and annual reports’ shares of sentimental words with respect to 
the dictionary by Loughran and McDonald (2011) (LM) for the English versions of the reports and with respect to our 
(BPW) dictionary for the German versions of the reports. Further, this table shows simple pairwise correlations, Spearman 
rank correlations and intra-class correlations (ICC) after Shrout and Fleiss (1979) between the English and German textual 
sentiment with respect to the negative, positive and uncertainty wordlists by Loughran and McDonald (2011) and our 
adapted dictionary, respectively. 
 English (LM)  German (BPW)     
  
Mean 
[%] 
Median 
[%] 
SD 
[%] 
Min  
[%] 
Max 
[%]   
Mean 
[%] 
Median 
[%] 
SD 
[%] 
Min  
[%] 
Max 
[%]   
Pairwise 
Corr. 
Spearman 
Corr. ICC[3,2] 
NEG 1.41 1.32 0.54 0.29 3.49  1.40 1.31 0.47 0.16 3.30  0.769 0.779 0.865 
POS 1.13 1.10 0.30 0.34 2.48  1.15 1.14 0.31 0.00 2.37  0.725 0.734 0.840 
UNC 1.02 0.96 0.40 0.31 3.25  1.01 1.01 0.26 0.25 2.13  0.752 0.774 0.811 
 
4.2. Out of sample equivalence 
In this section, we examine whether the BPW dictionary’s equivalence holds 
with business-specific documents other than quarterly and annual reports. For 
this purpose, we re-estimate Table IV-3 and Table IV-4 using a sub-sample of the 
texts used in Bannier et al. (2017), who manually collect CEO speeches held at 
German DAX and MDAX companies’ annual shareholder meetings from the com-
panies’ homepages. Our sub-sample consists of 270 speeches that are both avail-
able in English as well as in German. We conduct the same text processing steps 
as with the quarterly and annual reports, however, we do not apply any modifi-
cations to the bag-of-words model and its assumption of word independence. Sum-
mary statistics of the CEO speeches are provided in Table IV-5. 
 
Table IV-5: Summary statistics of the CEO speeches 
This table presents summary statistics of our sample of corresponding 270 English and German CEO speeches which were 
gathered from the companies’ homepages. 
    Words per document   Individual words per document 
  Reports Total Words   Mean Median SD Min Max   Mean Median SD Min Max 
ENG 270 892,557  3,306 3,181 1,056 1,172 6,176  979 966 224 447 1,635 
GER 270 931,213  3,449 3,343 1,047 1,327 6,392  1,126 1,114 265 530 1,835 
 
Table IV-6 shows the CEO speeches’ textual sentiment measured by the LM 
dictionary (English version) and by the BPW dictionary (German version). Un-
like quarterly and annual reports (Table IV-4), CEO speeches appear to contain 
a considerably higher share of positive words. Specifically, while the quarterly and 
annual reports’ English (German) versions share of positive words is 1.13% 
(1.15%), the respective CEO speeches’ share is 3.14% (3.02%). The higher posi-
tivity does not come as a surprise, because CEOs have already been shown to 
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adjust their language in order to influence the audience. For example, Arslan-
Ayaydin et al. (2015) find that CEOs inflate the use of positive language in earn-
ings press releases, especially when their compensation is equity-based. Table IV-6 
further shows the results for the simple pairwise correlations, Spearman rank cor-
relations and ICC[3,2] using the 270 corresponding CEO speeches. The results are 
even stronger compared to the findings from the quarterly and annual reports, 
providing further support for our dictionary’s equivalence to the LM dictionary. 
 
Table IV-6: English vs. German textual sentiment: CEO speeches 
This table presents summary statistics for our sample of 270 corresponding German and English CEO speeches’ shares of 
sentimental words with respect to the dictionary by Loughran and McDonald (2011) for the English versions of the 
speeches and with respect to the BPW dictionary for the German versions. Further, this table shows simple pairwise 
correlations, Spearman rank correlations and intra-class correlations (ICC[3,2]) after Shrout and Fleiss (1979) between the 
English and German textual sentiment with respect to the negative, positive and uncertain wordlists dictionary by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) and our adapted dictionary, respectively. 
 English LM  German BPW     
  
Mean 
[%] 
Median 
[%] 
SD 
[%] 
Min 
[%]  
Max 
[%]   
Mean 
[%] 
Median 
[%] 
SD 
[%] 
Min 
[%]  
Max 
[%]   
Pairwise 
Corr. 
Spearman 
Corr. ICC[3,2] 
NEG 1.37 1.24 0.67 0.23 4.44  1.14 1.05 0.55 0.24 3.24  0.875 0.868 0.924 
POS 3.14 3.22 0.71 1.55 5.29  3.02 2.99 0.64 1.66 5.42  0.841 0.845 0.911 
UNC 0.72 0.67 0.31 0.08 2.08  0.77 0.74 0.31 0.14 1.82  0.749 0.735 0.856 
 
4.3. The BPW dictionary vs. general language dictionaries 
Table IV-7 compares the number of words in the BPW dictionary with the 
two general German dictionaries SENTIWS and LIWC. The SENTIWS diction-
ary comprises about 1.5 times more negative and about 6.9 times more positive 
words compared to our dictionary. Although all dictionaries appear quite com-
prehensive, the number of common words included in both dictionaries is quite 
low. The SENTIWS dictionary shares only 2,179 of the BPW’s negative words 
and 993 of the BPW’s positive words. Looking at the LIWC, the absolute number 
of included words is substantially lower compared to the BPW and the LIWC 
shares only 437 negative words and 247 positive words with the BPW. This is 
because the LIWC includes word stems, which account for several inflections of a 
word. As a consequence, the ‘true’ number of words in the LIWC as well as the 
‘true’ match between the LIWC and the BPW is likely to be higher. To yield 
results comparable to the BPW and SENTIWS dictionaries, we therefore use a 
stemming algorithm by Caumanns (1999) on our sample of quarterly and annual 
reports before gauging their textual sentiment using the LIWC. 
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Table IV-7: Number of words in wordlists 
This table shows the number of words in BPW, SENTIWS and LIWC dictionaries’ positive and negative wordlists. Note 
that the LIWC, unlike the BPW and SENTIWS dictionaries, does not include broad sets of inflections but word stems 
which account for several inflections. 
 BPW  SENTIWS  LIWC 
  No. of words   No. of words Matching words   No. of words Matching words 
Negative 10,147  15,466 2,179  1,049 437 
Positive 2,223   15,536 993   646 247 
 
Table IV-8 shows the quarterly and annual reports’ ten most frequent negative 
and positive words according to the SENTIWS and LIWC dictionaries. Panel A 
reveals that SENTIWS contains a similar number of negative words (451,933) 
compared to the BPW (491,805)12. However, SENTIWS includes a number of 
words that are inevitably used in business-related documents but are not neces-
sarily negatively connoted. As examples, consider “ABSCHREIBUNGEN“ (depre-
ciation), “RISIKO“ (risk), or “SCHULDEN“ (debt). These three words alone ac-
count for 13.7% of negatively assessed words by SENTIWS. Of the ten most 
frequent negative words according to the LIWC, only two are not included in the 
BPW. However, this cannot be seen as an indication for a good match between 
the BPW and the LIWC, as the LIWC in total assesses only 142,710 words to be 
negative which is substantially lower compared to the BPW and SENTIWS dic-
tionaries. As the BPW and LIWC assess quite comparable numbers of words as 
negative and the LIWC seems to miss a great share of negative words, our results 
rather indicate that the LIWC underestimates the negativity of business-related 
documents. 
Panel B of Table IV-8 shows the quarterly and annual reports’ ten most fre-
quent positive words according to the SENTIWS and LIWC dictionaries. Com-
pared to the BPW, it can be inferred that the general language dictionaries assess 
a considerable larger number of words as positive. More precisely, the SENTIWS 
(LIWC) yields 1,853,753 (461,341) positive words, while the BPW assesses 
392,469 words as positive (Table IV-3). However, Panel B of Table IV-8 also 
shows that both general German dictionaries include words that are likely to be 
mis-specified in business-specific documents: “LEISTUNG(EN)“ (service(s)), or 
“GEWINN“ (profit), which represent the most frequent and second most frequent 
positive words according to SENTIWS and LIWC, are inevitably used within this 
context without necessarily having a positive connotation. Furthermore, the SEN-
TIWS’ ten most frequently employed positive words include “EIGENKAPITAL“ 
(equity), “ANTEIL(E)“ (share(s)), “INVESTITIONEN“ (investments), “AK-
                                      
12
  See Table IV-3.  
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TIVITÄTEN (activities), and “WACHSTUM“ (growth), which might not neces-
sarily be considered as positive in business-specific documents. As a consequence, 
eight of the ten most frequent positive words in the SENTIWS dictionary seem 
to be mis-specified in the business context. These results indicate that both gen-
eral language dictionaries, particularly the SENTIWS, might overestimate the 
positive sentiment of business-related text documents. 
 
Table IV-8: Most frequent sentimental words: SENTIWS and LIWC 
This table shows the quarterly and annual reports’ most frequent negative and positive words with respect to the SEN-
TIWS and LIWC dictionaries. Note that the LIWC contains word stems rather than comprehensive sets of inflections as 
the BPW and SENTIWS. Thus, we use a stemming algorithm by Caumanns (1999) on our sample of reports before 
gauging the textual sentiment using the LIWC. 
Panel A: Negative textual sentiment  
SENTIWS    LIWC 
No.   Word # % Cum. %     Word # % Cum. % 
1 
 
ABSCHREIBUNGEN 26,526 5.87% 5.87% 
 
VERLUST* 34,621 24.26% 24.26% 
2 
 
ENDE 23,638 5.23% 11.10% 
 
BETRUG* 23,408 16.40% 40.66% 
3 
 
RISIKO 19,699 4.36% 15.46% 
 
SCHULD* 18,425 12.91% 53.57% 
4 BETRUG 17,987 3.98% 19.44% 
 
SCHWACH* 7,183 5.03% 58.61% 
5 
 
SCHULDEN 15,684 3.47% 22.91% 
  
AUFGAB* 6,306 4.42% 63.03% 
6 RÜCKGANG 15,113 3.34% 26.25% 
 
BELAST* 5,839 4.09% 67.12% 
7 VERLUST 11,191 2.48% 28.73% 
 
KLAG* 4,846 3.40% 70.51% 
8 SCHADEN 9,245 2.05% 30.78% 
 
SCHWIERIG* 4,081 2.86% 73.37% 
9 
 
TROTZ 8,332 1.84% 32.62% 
  
FREMD* 3,653 2.56% 75.93% 
10 NEGATIVE 6,564 1.45% 34.07% 
 
NOT* 3,263 2.29% 78.22%             
All     451,933           142,710     
Panel B: Positive textual sentiment  
SENTIWS 
 
LIWC 
No.   Word # % Cum. %     Word # % Cum. % 
1 
 
LEISTUNGEN 35,333 1.91% 1.91% 
  
GEWINN* 57,789 12.53% 12.53% 
2 
 
GEWINN 35,281 1.90% 3.81% 
  
LEISTUNG* 42,921 9.30% 21.83% 
3 
 
ERTRÄGE 33,471 1.81% 5.61% 
 
ERFOLG* 39,883 8.65% 30.47% 
4 
 
EIGENKAPITAL 30,854 1.66% 7.28% 
 
POSITIV* 30,055 6.51% 36.99% 
5 
 
ANTEILE 30,772 1.66% 8.94% 
  
BESTIMM* 23,635 5.12% 42.11% 
6 
 
INVESTITIONEN 25,618 1.38% 10.32% 
 
ERREICH* 20,846 4.52% 46.63% 
7 
 
AKTIVITÄTEN 25,501 1.38% 11.70% 
  
GUT* 18,839 4.08% 50.71% 
8 
 
NEUE 24,929 1.34% 13.04% 
  
STARK* 18,633 4.04% 54.75% 
9 
 
ANTEIL 24,334 1.31% 14.35% 
  
AKTIV* 15,947 3.46% 58.21% 
10 
 
WACHSTUM 23,917 1.29% 15.64% 
  
WICHTIG* 15,593 3.38% 61.59%             
All     1,853,753          461,341     
 
Table IV-9 shows Pearson and Spearman correlations between the reports’ 
shares of sentimental words according to the BPW, SENTIWS and LIWC dic-
tionaries. The correlation coefficients between the negative shares measured via 
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BPW and SENTIWS equal 0.749 (Pearson) and 0.740 (Spearman) and those be-
tween the respective positive shares equal 0.519 (Pearson) and 0.539 (Spearman). 
The correlation coefficients between the assessed textual sentiment of the BPW 
and SENTIWS are fairly high. Comparing the reports’ shares of sentimental 
words according to the BPW and LIWC dictionaries, the correlation coefficients 
between the measures of negativity equal 0.519 (Pearson) and 0.539 (Spearman) 
and those between the measures of positivity equal 0.126 (Pearson) and 0.218 
(Spearman). The correlation coefficients between the assessed textual sentiment 
of the BPW and LIWC dictionaries are lower compared to those between the 
BPW and SENTIWS dictionaries. Generally, our BPW dictionary seems to be 
more strongly correlated to the general language dictionaries when it comes to 
negative textual sentiment. This is in line with our previous finding, which indi-
cates that the positive sentiment in business-specific text documents might be 
overestimated by the general language dictionaries. 
 
Table IV-9: Correlations among sentiment measures 
This table shows correlations among the sentiment measures. Note that the LIWC contains word stems rather than 
comprehensive sets of inflections as the BPW and SENTIWS. Thus, we use a stemming algorithm by Caumanns (1999) 
on our sample of reports before gauging the textual sentiment using the LIWC. Pearson correlations are below the diagonal, 
Spearman correlations are above the diagonal. P-values in parentheses. 
 Negative     Positive 
  BPW SENTIWS LIWC   BPW SENTIWS LIWC 
Negative        
   BPW  0.740 0.562  -0.121 -0.078 -0.028 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.004) (0.295) 
   SENTIWS 0.749  0.578  -0.126 -0.085 0.046 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.085) 
   LIWC 0.539 0.554   -0.173 -0.208 0.146 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Positive        
   BPW -0.129 -0.122 -0.208   0.539 0.218 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
   SENTIWS -0.073 -0.038 -0.186  0.519  0.317 
 (0.006) (0.160) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
   LIWC 0.013 0.072 0.181  0.126 0.402  
  (0.623) (0.007) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
 
5. Conclusion 
We introduce a German adaptation of the widely-used dictionary by Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) that has been developed for analysis of business-specific 
text documents. Following the methodology of Wolf et al. (2008), we translate 
and adjust the positive, negative and uncertainty wordlists of the LM dictionary. 
We test the equivalence of our adaptation using a sample of 1,402 quarterly and 
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annual reports of German DAX and MDAX companies which are available in 
German and English. Our results provide broad evidence for the equivalence and 
reliability of our adaptation to its English original. We compare the BPW dic-
tionary to two existing general German dictionaries, the SENTIWS and the 
LIWC dictionaries. With regard to the assessment of negative textual sentiment, 
the BPW and SENTIWS dictionaries appear to be highly and positively corre-
lated. The LIWC dictionary, in contrast, seems to underestimate the negative 
textual sentiment. With respect to the assessment of positive textual sentiment, 
our results indicate that the SENTIWS and the LIWC dictionaries are likely to 
overestimate the positive textual sentiment, as they include a number of words, 
that cannot unequivocally be considered as positive in business specific text doc-
uments. 
We contribute to the existing literature by providing a tool that allows to 
evaluate the qualitative nature of information disclosed in German text docu-
ments using the dictionary-based approach. Our BPW dictionary is not only spe-
cifically suited to examine business specific documents but also derived inde-
pendently of a given text sample and hence applicable to different text types and 
formats. Furthermore, our approach describes a framework for future adaptations 
of English dictionaries into other languages and thus paves the way not only for 
further German content analyses, but also for studies in other languages and, 
thus, cultural backgrounds. 
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7. Appendix 
Appendix IV-1: Adjustments to word independency assumption 
This table lists word combinations we controlled for in our equivalence tests. While the bag-of-words model generally 
assumes word independence, the evaluation of quarterly and annual reports obliges us to control for certain combinations 
of words. A company’s “GAINS AND LOSSES“ or “PROFITS AND LOSSES“ are frequently mentioned without negative 
or positive connotation in the quarterly reports. This would, in comparison to the German documents where the equivalent 
“GEWINN- UND VERLUSTRECHNUNG“ is not included in the BPW dictionary, lead to a more extreme assessment of 
the English documents’ positivity and negativity. Thus, we identify 40 combinations of the words “GAIN(S)“ and 
“LOSSE(S)“ as well as “PROFIT(S)“ and “LOSSE(S)“ and exclude them from the equivalence analyses. Likewise, the terms 
“IMPAIRMENT LOSS“ and “IMPAIRMENT LOSSES“ would account for two negative words while the German counter-
parts “WERTMINDERUNGSVERLUST“ and “WERTMINDERUNGSVERLUSTE“ would only account for one negative 
word. As this would also lead to an overestimation of the English documents’ negativity compared to their German 
counterparts, we counted “IMPAIRMENT LOSS“ and “IMPAIRMENT LOSSES“ each as one negative word for our equiv-
alence analyses. Note that we also controlled for different number of spaces between the combinations. 
GAINS & LOSSES PROFITS & LOSSES LOSSES & GAINS LOSSES & PROFITS 
GAINS/LOSSES PROFITS/LOSSES LOSSES/GAINS LOSSES/PROFITS 
GAINS (LOSSES) PROFITS (LOSSES) LOSSES (GAINS) LOSSES (PROFITS) 
GAINS AND LOSSES PROFITS AND LOSSES LOSSES AND GAINS LOSSES AND PROFITS 
GAINS OR LOSSES PROFITS OR LOSSES LOSSES OR GAINS LOSSES OR PROFITS 
GAIN & LOSS PROFIT & LOSS LOSS & GAIN LOSS & PROFIT 
GAIN/LOSS PROFIT/LOSS LOSS/GAIN LOSS/PROFIT 
GAIN (LOSS) PROFIT (LOSS) LOSS (GAIN) LOSS (PROFIT) 
GAIN AND LOSS PROFIT AND LOSS LOSS AND GAIN LOSS AND PROFIT 
GAIN OR LOSS PROFIT OR LOSS LOSS OR GAIN LOSS OR PROFIT 
 
Appendix IV-2: English vs. German textual sentiment: No adjustment 
This table presents summary statistics for the 1,402 quarterly and annual reports’ shares of sentimental words with respect 
to the dictionary by Loughran and McDonald (2011) for the English versions of the reports and with respect to the BPW 
dictionary for the German versions of the reports. Further, this table shows simple pairwise correlations, Spearman rank 
correlations and intra-class correlations (ICC[3,2]) after Shrout and Fleiss (1979) between the English and German textual 
sentiment with respect to the negative, positive and uncertain wordlists dictionary by Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
and our adapted dictionary, respectively. For the analysis in this table, we do not make any exception from the word 
independence assumption. 
 English LM  German BPW     
 
Mean 
[%] 
Median 
[%] 
SD 
[%] 
Min 
[%] 
Max 
[%]  
Mean 
[%] 
Median 
[%] 
SD 
[%] 
Min 
[%] 
Max 
[%]  
Pairwise 
Corr. 
Spearman 
Corr. ICC[3,2] 
NEG 1.58 1.47 0.57 0.34 3.84  1.40 1.31 0.47 0.16 3.30  0.779 0.779 0.863 
POS 1.27 1.25 0.29 0.40 2.53  1.15 1.14 0.31 0.00 2.37  0.676 0.680 0.806 
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Abstract - We analyze the market reaction to the sentiment of the 
CEO speech at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). As the 
AGM is typically preceded by several information disclosures, the 
CEO speech may be expected to contribute only marginally to 
investors’ decision-making. Surprisingly, however, we observe 
from the transcripts of 338 CEO speeches of German corporates 
between 2008 and 2016 that their sentiment is significantly re-
lated to abnormal stock returns and trading volumes following 
the AGM. Using a novel business-specific German dictionary 
based on Loughran and McDonald (2011), we find a negative as-
sociation of the post-AGM returns with the speeches’ negativity 
and a positive association with the speeches’ relative positivity 
(i.e. positivity relative to negativity). Relative positivity moreo-
ver corresponds with a lower trading volume in a short time win-
dow surrounding the AGM. Investors hence seem to perceive the 
sentiment of CEO speeches at AGMs as a valuable indicator of 
future firm performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Companies distribute information to relevant stakeholders by various means. 
Recent research has acknowledged the value not only of quantitative data disclo-
sures but also of qualitative information, predominantly in the form of the textual 
sentiment of business communication. Sentiment is typically examined via con-
tent analyses which have been applied on several types of business communication 
such as annual reports (Feldman et al., 2008; Jegadeesh & Wu, 2013; Loughran 
& McDonald, 2011, 2015), earnings press releases (Davis et al., 2012; Davis & 
Tama-Sweet, 2012; Henry, 2008; Henry & Leone, 2016; Huang et al., 2014), IPO 
prospectuses (Demers & Vega, 2008; Ferris et al., 2013; Jegadeesh & Wu, 2013), 
CEO letters (Boudt & Thewissen, 2016), and earnings conference calls (Davis et 
al., 2015; Doran et al., 2012; Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2012; Price et al., 2012). In 
general, these studies find that qualitative information is indeed processed by 
investors and helps to predict future accounting returns, stock returns, stock vol-
atility, and stock trading volume.1 
Surprisingly, the Annual General Meeting (AGM) received only little atten-
tion so far and the CEO’s speech held at the AGM hardly any. Only few studies 
investigate the market reaction to the AGM at all and those that do report in-
conclusive and partly diverging results. Firth (1981), for example, does not find 
a market reaction in terms of abnormal returns and trading volume. Brickley 
(1986) and Rippington and Taffler (1995) report only small price reactions around 
the AGM for US and UK firms, respectively. Olibe (2002) presents evidence of a 
minimal trading-volume response to UK companies’ AGM. Martinez-Blasco et al. 
(2015) find no significant market reactions in Japan and Spain and only trading 
volume increases for US, UK, and French stocks. For German stocks, in contrast, 
they observe significant market responses to the AGM in terms of increased re-
turns, return volatility and trading volume.  
The generally weak market reaction to the AGM may be explained by the fact 
that the AGM is typically preceded by several information disclosures such as 
preliminary earnings announcements and the full release of the annual report. As 
a consequence, the AGM can hardly deliver any new quantitative information. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no attempts have been made so far to 
investigate the qualitative content of the AGM and of the CEO’s speech in par-
ticular. This is despite the fact that the AGM offers managers the rare oppor-
tunity to personally address the company’s stockholders in order to share their 
views on the firm’s prospects (Martinez-Blasco et al., 2015). 
                                      
1
  See Kearney and Liu (2014) or Loughran and McDonald (2016) for a comprehensive overview. 
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The lack of studies on the qualitative content of CEO speeches is particularly 
surprising, since CEO communication in general has been shown to exhibit valu-
able qualitative information. For example, Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2015) find that 
incentivized managers use positive words more aggressively in an attempt to in-
fluence share prices. Similarly, Boudt and Thewissen (2016) report that CEOs 
strategically present negative and positive words in CEO letters in order to 
prompt a more positive perception by the reader. Price et al. (2012) and Doran 
et al. (2012) show that the tone of earnings conference calls - which are typically 
conducted by the firm’s top management team - is a significant predictor of sub-
sequent returns and trading volume. We therefore hypothesize that CEO speeches 
held at AGMs contain valuable qualitative information that should influence the 
market reaction to the AGM. As Demers and Vega (2008) find that financial 
markets tend to incorporate qualitative information with delay, we furthermore 
presume investors to initially underreact to the speeches’ sentiment so that the 
full market reaction will present itself only in a protracted time period after the 
AGM. 
We test our hypothesis on the CEO speeches of publicly listed companies in 
Germany. We choose German firms as they regularly release the speeches’ tran-
scripts on their websites immediately after the AGM. US companies, in contrast, 
only rarely provide respective transcripts: While 72.50% of the German DAX and 
MDAX2 companies offer transcripts, only 5.8% of all S&P 500 firms do so, ren-
dering a meaningful empirical analysis on US data all but impossible.3 We con-
sider 338 CEO speeches of DAX and MDAX-listed corporations in Germany from 
2008 to 2016. In a first step, we analyze whether AGMs systematically reveal new 
information per se and measure the financial market reaction subsequent to the 
AGM. Our univariate results show that AGMs do not seem to be followed by 
abnormal returns and we find a higher trading volume only in a short time win-
dow around the AGM.  
In a second step, we examine whether the CEO speeches’ sentiment at the 
AGM contains value-relevant information that is picked up by financial market 
participants. Sentiment is typically measured via a dictionary-based approach by 
assigning the words in a text or speech to different sentiment categories in ac-
cordance with a predefined dictionary (Manning & Schütze, 1999). Using a novel 
dictionary by Bannier et al. (2017), we gauge the sentiment of the CEO speeches 
                                      
2
  The DAX and MDAX indices comprise the 80 largest German stock-listed companies in terms 
of order book volume and market capitalization. For more information on the indices, see 
http://www.dax-indices.com/EN/.   
3
  Altogether, we were able to download only 54 speeches of US companies listed in the S&P 500. 
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and assess the financial market reaction to the AGM with respect to this senti-
ment. Our results show the sentiment to be significantly related to cumulative 
abnormal returns and trading volume. More precisely, we find the cumulative 
abnormal returns to decrease along with a speech’s negativity and to increase 
with a speech’s relative positivity, i.e., its positivity relative to negativity. Inves-
tigating the time structure of the sentiment’s effect, we find that only a small 
part of the full market reaction occurs in the immediate vicinity around the AGM. 
Most of the market reaction, however, is observed in the time period between 2 
and 30 days post AGM. This observation may be interpreted as an initial un-
derreaction to the speeches’ sentiment and could be an indication that qualitative 
information indeed needs more time to become fully incorporated in stock prices. 
Interestingly, the speeches’ relative positivity is also significantly associated with 
a lower cumulative abnormal trading volume, but only in a short time window 
around the AGM. In summary, we find that a more positive relative to negative 
sentiment of a CEO speech goes along with higher cumulative abnormal returns 
and lower short-term cumulative abnormal trading volumes of the company’s 
stock, whereas a lower positive relative to negative sentiment triggers lower re-
turns and higher trading volumes.  
Our paper’s contribution to the existing literature is twofold. To begin with, 
we are the first to measure the sentiment of corporate texts in the German lan-
guage using the business-specific dictionary introduced by Bannier et al. (2017). 
While the studies by Ammann and Schaub (2016) or Mengelkamp et al. (2015) 
also investigate the sentiment in German corporate texts, they either utilize only 
general German language dictionaries or ad-hoc dictionaries restricted to the re-
spective sample of text documents at hand. The dictionary of Bannier et al. 
(2017), in contrast, is designed to capture the business-specific sentiment of any 
sample of German documents in a comprehensive way and follows the setup of 
the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary for English documents.  
As we are the first to employ this context-specific dictionary, we compare our 
results to those derived from using two general German language dictionaries. 
These are the “SentimentWortschatz” by Remus et al. (2010) and the German 
adaptation of the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count by Wolf et al. (2008). In line 
with content analyses on English documents (Henry & Leone, 2016; Loughran 
& McDonald, 2011, 2015; Price et al., 2012), we find the context-specific diction-
ary to be better suited for assessing the textual sentiment of business-related 
documents than general language dictionaries. Given the economic importance of 
firms in Germany and other German-speaking countries and the robust perfor-
mance of the dictionary introduced by Bannier et al. (2017), the dictionary can 
hence be seen as a helpful tool to assess the qualitative information contained in 
BANNIER/PAULS/WALTER CEO Speeches and stock returns  
 
V-92 
 
these firms’ communication. We also check the robustness of our results to differ-
ent word weighting schemes, i.e., equal weighting vs. inverse document frequency 
weighting as proposed by Loughran and McDonald (2011). We find no improve-
ment from using inverse document frequency weighting, similar to Henry and 
Leone (2016). Finally, we determine which measure of textual sentiment is most 
appropriate to gauge the qualitative information within German text documents. 
Consistent with Price et al. (2012) and Henry and Leone (2016) for English con-
tent analyses, we find the measure of relative positivity, which combines both 
positive and negative sentiment, to perform better than the positivity or negativ-
ity measure in isolation.  
The second and main contribution of our study, however, is to show that there 
is valuable qualitative information hidden in the annual get-together of managers 
and shareholders. Our results suggest that financial market participants do indeed 
pick up the qualitative information contained in the CEO’s speech for their in-
vestment decisions. However, both negativity and relative positivity - as the two 
most meaningful sentiment categories - are incorporated in the stock price only 
with a certain delay: While in the short time period around the AGM the associ-
ation between the speeches’ relative positivity and cumulative abnormal returns 
is only weak, the major part of the market reaction occurs in the time period 
between 2 and 30 days after the AGM. At the same time, however, we find a 
significant association between the relative positivity and the cumulative abnor-
mal trading volume solely in the short time window immediately surrounding the 
AGM. The comparably long-lasting impact of the CEO speeches’ sentiment on 
stock returns hence seems to be accompanied by an attention-capturing effect on 
the trading volume that is, however, quickly evaporating. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews 
the literature on the information provided in AGMs as well as on content anal-
yses. Further, it introduces the dictionary developed by Bannier et al. (2017). 
Section 3 describes our data and the methodology employed. Section 4 presents 
the respective results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
2.1. Informational content of the annual general meeting 
Companies typically release their annual results in three stages. First, a pre-
liminary announcement is made including information about the company’s prof-
its, earnings per share, dividend per share, and sales turnover. A few weeks later, 
the company releases its annual report and finally, some weeks after that, the 
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company’s AGM takes place. Accordingly, Firth (1981) finds that the preliminary 
announcement and the release of the annual report induce significant abnormal 
returns and trading volume, while he finds no such market reaction following the 
AGM. Hence, he concludes that the AGM does not seem to provide new infor-
mation to financial markets. This is supported by García-Blandón et al. (2012) 
who evaluate the AGM’s information value in Spain and find no market reaction 
at all. Brickley (1986), Rippington and Taffler (1995) and Olibe (2002) observe 
only small price and trade volume reactions around the AGM. The most compre-
hensive study on the AGM’s information value has been conducted by Martinez-
Blasco et al. (2015) on a sample of common- and civil-law countries. The authors 
examine changes in abnormal returns, return volatility, and trading volume. Their 
analysis reveals no market reaction in Japan and Spain, and only small increases 
in trading volume in the US, the UK, and in France. In Germany, in contrast, 
the authors observe significant increases in abnormal returns, return volatility, 
and trading volume following the AGM, indicating that the AGMs of German 
companies exhibit substantial new information.  
Despite the mixed results, none of the earlier studies - to the best of our 
knowledge - attempts to investigate the source or type of any potential infor-
mation disclosure at the AGM. This is surprising since the AGM is a rare oppor-
tunity for a firm’s management to get into direct contact with its shareholders 
(Martinez-Blasco et al., 2015) and since there is plenty of evidence on qualitative 
information inherent in the language of CEOs. Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2015) find 
that managers adjust their language to specific situations at hand and inflate the 
use of positive language the higher their fraction of equity-based compensation. 
Doran et al. (2012) and Price et al. (2012) report that conference calls’ positive 
sentiment is a significant predictor of subsequent returns and trading volume. 
Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012) and Hobson et al. (2012) analyze conference 
call audio files using vocal emotion analysis software. They come to the conclusion 
that positive and negative emotions expressed in the voice of managers can be 
informative about the firm’s financial future and potential financial misreporting. 
It is hence reasonable to believe that qualitative information may be contained in 
the AGM even though substantial quantitative information has already been dis-
tributed to investors prior to the meeting. We therefore assess whether this qual-
itative information is inherent in the verbal communication of the CEO at the 
AGM. 
2.2. Dictionary-based approach 
The dictionary-based approach has become a commonly used tool to measure 
the textual sentiment of various kinds of documents such as financial disclosures, 
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analyst reports, earnings press releases, IPO prospectuses, internet board post-
ings, or newspaper articles (Kearney & Liu, 2014). The individual dictionaries 
typically include various wordlists with respect to sentimental categories such as 
negativity or positivity. Text documents with a comparably high share of, for 
example, negative words are then considered to be more pessimistic compared to 
text documents with a comparably high share of positive words (Loughran 
& McDonald, 2015).  
Early content analyses of financial texts (Davis et al., 2012; Davis & Tama-
Sweet, 2012; Feldman et al., 2008; Ferris et al., 2013; Henry & Leone, 2016; Ko-
thari et al., 2009; Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2012; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 
2008) utilized general English dictionaries such as the Harvard University’s Gen-
eral Inquirer IV-44 dictionary, the dictionaries included in the Diction5 software, 
or the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count6 software. Henry (2008) is the first to com-
pose a dictionary explicitly designed to examine the tone of financial documents. 
Despite the comparably small number of words in her positive and negative word 
lists, various studies comment on the superiority of the dictionary presented by 
Henry (2008) over the Diction and General Inquirer dictionaries (Doran et al., 
2012; Henry & Leone, 2016; Price et al., 2012). Based on this finding, Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) create a more comprehensive dictionary (hereafter LM dic-
tionary) by evaluating all words that appear in at least 5% of the entire 10-K 
disclosure universe. The LM dictionary contains 2,329 negative and 354 positive 
words. To assess the quality of their dictionary, the authors show that 73.8% of 
the General Inquirer dictionary’s negative words do not have a negative meaning 
in financial documents and, in later work, demonstrate that none of the most 
frequently occurring negative words in the 10-K disclosures are included in the 
Henry (2008) dictionary (Loughran & McDonald, 2015). Due to its comprehen-
siveness and its appropriateness for financial documents, the LM dictionary has 
become the most widely used dictionary in business research and has been used 
to assess the textual sentiment of 10-K filings (Loughran & McDonald, 2011), 
earnings conference calls (Davis et al., 2015), news articles (García, 2013), or IPO 
prospectuses (Ferris et al., 2013; Jegadeesh & Wu, 2013).7 
                                      
4
  See http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/. 
5
   See http://www.dictionsoftware.com/. 
6
 See http://www.liwc.net. 
7
  For a comprehensive overview of dictionaries used in content analyses, see Kearney and Liu 
(2014) and Loughran and McDonald (2016). 
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2.3. German language dictionaries 
When it comes to the analysis of German text documents, two comprehensive 
general German language dictionaries but no business-specific dictionary exist: 
Remus et al. (2010) created the “SentimentWortschatz” (hereafter SENTIWS) 
dictionary, which is based on and extends the General Inquirer lexicon by Stone 
et al. (1966). SENTIWS has been used in studies of political communication 
(Haselmayer & Jenny, 2016), or art and literature (Zehe et al., 2016). The second 
general language dictionary was created by Wolf et al. (2008), who adapted the 
English version of the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count to the German language. 
Their dictionary (hereafter LIWC) puts special emphasis on analyzing essays in 
the context of expressive writing experiments, but has also been used in other 
research domains such as, for example, political analyses (Caton et al., 2015; Ja-
cobi et al., 2016). However, with respect to business-related documents, there is 
no context-specific dictionary.  
As many text documents containing relevant information on German compa-
nies are published exclusively in German, the absence of a context-specific dic-
tionary in German is associated with very little research on German qualitative 
information. Rare exceptions are Ammann and Schaub (2016) and Mengelkamp 
et al. (2015), who investigate German corporate texts for their textual sentiment 
and utilize ad-hoc dictionaries that are constructed from - and thus restricted to - 
a given set of sample text documents. Similar to the studies conducted on English 
text documents, the authors also find that their ad-hoc dictionaries achieve more 
reliable results than the general German language dictionaries SENTIWS and 
LIWC.  
In order to analyze German business-related texts comprehensively, Bannier 
et al. (2017) adapt the English business-specific dictionary by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) to the German language. They follow the methodology of Wolf 
et al. (2008) and control for several linguistic issues such as inflections, compound 
words, or lexical morphology that are specific to the German language (König & 
Gast, 2012; Hawkins, 2015).8 For a detailed explanation of the setup of word lists 
to measure sentiment in German corporate texts, see Bannier et al. (2017). The 
                                      
8
  German speakers are forced to make certain inflectional distinctions which can regularly be left 
unspecified in English. Looking at verbs, for example, the German language distinguishes in-
dicative and subjunctive forms whereas English employs a single form for both. Further, Ger-
man verbs differ with respect to person and number, whereas the bare stem in English is used 
for all except the third person singular. As German nouns and adjectives need more inflections 
as well, a simple word-by-word translation of the LM dictionary will not fully cover the German 
inflectional morphology with the consequence of an underestimation of the German texts’ sen-
timent. 
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authors also test the equivalence of their adaptation (hereafter BPW dictionary) 
using a broad sample of quarterly and annual reports of German companies that 
are available in German and English language.9 The results show that all senti-
ment categories display high correlation and equivalence to their English coun-
terparts, indicating the reliability of their adaptation.10  
Table V-1 presents a brief comparison of the LM dictionary, the BPW dic-
tionary and the two general German dictionaries, SENTIWS and LIWC, that 
allows to put the specificities of the German language into perspective and helps 
to see the differences between general and context-specific wordlists. 
 
Table V-1: Dictionaries for content analysis 
This table shows the number of words contained in the positive and negative wordlists of existing English and German 
language dictionaries for content analysis. Note that the LIWC contains word stems rather than comprehensive sets of 
inflections as LM, BPW, and SENTIWS.  
 English    German 
  LM  BPW SENTIWS LIWC 
Negative 2,354  10,147 15,466 1,049 
Positive 354  2,223 15,536 646 
 
Table V-1 shows that the German dictionaries’ word lists contain far more 
individual words than the English LM dictionary. This is mainly due to the lin-
guistic issues referred to above. However, even within the German language, there 
are strong differences between the dictionaries. Comparing the BPW to the SEN-
TIWS dictionary reveals that SENTIWS includes about 50% more negative and 
about 700% more positive words than the BPW. Overall, SENTIWS contains as 
many negative as positive words. This stands in contrast to the other dictionaries, 
most obviously the LM dictionary, which contains a much smaller number of 
positive than negative words. Note that a direct comparison of the number of 
individual words between the BPW and the LIWC dictionaries is not feasible as 
LIWC includes word stems rather than inflections. However, both general Ger-
man dictionaries are likely to include words that may misclassify sentiment in a 
business context. For example, “LEISTUNG(EN)” (service(s)), or “GEWINN” 
(profit), which are both classified as positive words by SENTIWS and LIWC, are 
regularly used in business documents without a necessarily positive connotation. 
Other examples such as “EIGENKAPITAL” (equity), “ANTEIL(E)” (share(s)), 
                                      
9
  We estimate simple pairwise correlations, Spearman rank correlations, intra-class correlations 
Shrout and Fleiss (1979), and test the dictionaries’ equivalence via two-sided equivalence test-
ing following Blair and Cole (2002). 
10
  For more information on the adaptation process and equivalence tests of the BPW dictionary, 
see Bannier et al. (2017). 
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“INVESTITIONEN” (investments), “AKTIVITÄTEN (activities), and 
“WACHSTUM” (growth) are also counted as generally positive, while this may 
not be the case in business-related documents. As a consequence, both general 
language dictionaries and particularly the SENTIWS word lists might overesti-
mate the positive sentiment of business-related text documents. While the higher 
fit of context-specific dictionaries has already been confirmed by English language 
studies (Price et al., 2012; Loughran & McDonald, 2011, 2015; Henry & Leone, 
2016), this issue is still unresolved in the German language. In the following anal-
ysis, we will therefore put some emphasis on evaluating the efficacy of the BPW 
dictionary relative to the two general language dictionaries, SENTIWS and 
LIWC, when employing the different dictionaries on the CEO speeches. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data and variable measurement 
We attempt to capture the sentiment in CEO speeches held at German com-
panies’ AGMs and to assess whether this sentiment is associated with significant 
market reactions subsequent to the AGM. For that purpose, we gather the CEO 
speeches held at German DAX and MDAX companies’ annual shareholder meet-
ings from 2008 to 2016 by manually collecting transcripts from the companies’ 
internet webpages. Our initial sample consists of 356 CEO speeches by 58 com-
panies. We evaluate further documents, such as company charters, shareholder 
meeting invitations, and audio or video material from the companies’ webpages, 
in order to confirm that the CEO speeches are indeed initially held in German. 
Based on this additional analysis, we exclude 18 speeches resulting in a final 
sample of 338 speeches.  
Before we can segment the reports into vectors of word counts, we have to 
convert the documents, which are typically available in PDF file format, to TXT 
format. In this process, we also replace typographic ligatures and employ UTF-8 
character encoding on all files in order to allow for German-specific characters 
such as ‘Ä’,’Ü’,’Ö’, or ‘ß’. All characters are transformed into lower case and 
tokenized afterwards, whereby we define a token as any subsequent order of at 
least three alphabetic characters. In order to exclude potential spelling errors, we 
exclude tokens that do not occur in at least one percent of the speeches. After 
that, we apply a stop-word list on the reports to filter out words that might have 
important semantic functions, but rarely contribute information (Manning 
& Schütze, 1999). We use the stop-word list provided by Bannier et al. (2017) 
which includes common names, dates, numbers, geographic locations, currencies, 
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the names of German DAX and MDAX companies, popular German pre- and 
surnames, and the names of the largest German and European cities. Hereafter, 
the documents are transformed to word count vectors using the Rapidminer soft-
ware.11 In a final step, the CEO speeches’ numbers of negative and positive words 
are counted with respect to the word lists of the BPW, SENTIWS and LIWC 
dictionaries. 
Several measures to gauge textual sentiment have been utilized in the litera-
ture. Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) and García (2013) employ direct measures of 
positivity and find statistically significant market reactions. Loughran and 
McDonald (2011, 2016), however, point out that positive words are frequently 
used to frame negative words, whereas negative words are unambiguous in their 
usage. Consequently, Tetlock (2007) and Loughran and McDonald (2011) find 
little incremental information using only a positive wordlist and suggest using a 
documents’ share of negative words to assess its textual sentiment. We therefore 
estimate the CEO speeches’ share of negative words as follows:12 
 
𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝐵𝑃𝑊𝑗 =
𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑗
∗ 100 (1) 
 
Here, COUNTj is the total number of words of CEO speech j and NEGATIVEj 
represents the number of negative words in CEO speech j with respect to the 
negative wordlist of the BPW dictionary. NEG_SENTIWSj and NEG_LIWCj 
are calculated analogously.  
Recent studies point out, however, that recipients of financial documents 
might not consider positive and negative textual sentiment separately but rather 
in relation to each other. We therefore follow Henry (2008), Price et al. (2012), 
and Henry and Leone (2016) and estimate the CEO speeches’ relative positivity 
(TONE) in the following way: 
 
𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸_𝐵𝑃𝑊𝑗 =
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗 + 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗
 (2) 
 
Here, POSITIVEj is the number of positive words in CEO speech j with respect 
to the positive wordlist of the BPW dictionary. TONE_SENTIWSj and 
                                      
11
  The transformation to lower-case characters, the tokenization, the stop-word filtering and the 
generation of the word count vectors were conducted with the Rapidminer software. For more 
information, please see https://rapidminer.com/.  
12
  We re-estimate our main-analysis grasping the CEO speeches sentiment using a measure of 
positivity. The results are shown in Table V-6.   
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TONE_LIWCj are calculated analogously. The relative positivity measure - also 
referred to as tonality - hence combines the information of the negative and pos-
itive sentiment as it measures the positivity of speech j relative to its negativity. 
The TONE measures are scaled between -1 and 1, so that a purely positive CEO 
speech displays a score of 1, a purely negative speech a score of -1, and a neutral 
speech scores a 0. 
In order to measure the stock price reaction subsequent to a CEO speech, we 
calculate Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). For this, daily abnormal re-
turns are calculated using the return of the CDAX13 index as the expected return, 
which reflects the performance of the entire German equity market: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐶𝐷𝐴𝑋,𝑡 (3) 
 
Here, ARj,t is the abnormal return on company j’s stock at day t and Rj,t is 
the actual return of company j’s stock at day t. RCDAX,t is the return of the CDAX 
on day t. As Demers and Vega (2008) find that qualitative information is more 
difficult for market participants to process than quantitative information, we may 
expect any market reaction to the sentiment in CEO speeches to not be overly 
quick. We therefore examine the market reaction by cumulating the abnormal 
returns for each stock over a relatively long time period from day -1 to day 30, 
where 0 represents the day of the AGM at which speech j is held. To analyze the 
time structure of a potential market reaction in more detail, we then segregate 
this total time window into the three-day period around the AGM (-1,1) and the 
remaining period after the AGM (2,30). This approach should allow us to see 
whether the market reaction to the sentiment in CEO speeches operates in an 
immediate or a delayed fashion. We hence employ three CAR measures, estimated 
in the following way: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,30)𝑗 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
30
𝑡=−1
 (4) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,1)𝑗 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
1
𝑡=−1
 (5) 
 
                                      
13
 The CDAX comprises the price development of all 852 German stocks across the Deutsche 
Börse’s prime and general standard. For more information on the CDAX, see http://www.dax-
indices.com/EN/.  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅(2,30)𝑗 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡
30
𝑡=2
 (6) 
 
In addition to analyzing the CEO speeches’ sentiment effect on stock prices, 
we also measure the effect on actual trading. For this purpose, we estimate the 
Cumulative Abnormal Trading Volume (CAV) following Barber and Odean 
(2008) and Price et al. (2012), where the Abnormal Trading Volume (AV) is in a 
first step calculated as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑉𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗,𝑡
− 1 (7) 
 
Here, VOLUMEj,t is the trading volume for company j at day t, and VOLUME̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ j,t 
is the mean trading volume for company j from t-252 to t-1. Consequently, a 
value of zero for the abnormal trading volume AVj,t indicates that a company’s 
stock j was not traded abnormally at day t compared to the previous 252 days, 
i.e., over the last year. A positive value indicates that the stock was traded more 
than usual and a negative value indicates that the stock was traded less than 
usual. Analogously to abnormal returns, AVj,t is accumulated over day -1 to 30, 
CAV(-1,30), day -1 to 1, CAV(-1,1), and day 2 to 30, CAV(2,30). 
 
3.2. Empirical approach 
In a first univariate analysis, we sort the CEO speeches into quartiles with 
respect to the measures of textual sentiment and compare the mean and median 
CAR(-1,30), CAR(-1,1), and CAR(2,30) differences between the highest and low-
est quartiles of textual sentiment. We then test the mean and median differences 
for statistical significance using t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests, respectively. 
To check whether the univariate results of our sentiment measures hold in a 
multivariate setting, we then conduct cross-sectional OLS regressions with a com-
prehensive set of control variables of the following form:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1,𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛼2,𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑘,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗   (8) 
 
Here, CARj is the measure of cumulative abnormal returns for CEO speech j, 
SENTIMENTi,j is a vector of the different sentiment measures i for speech j which 
are calculated as described above. CONTROLSk,j represents a vector of control 
variables for speech j which include the speech’s length (COUNT), the speech’s 
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share of individual words (IND), the earnings surprise (EPS_SURP), the divi-
dend surprise (DIV_SURP_POS and DIV_SURP_NEG), the market capitali-
zation (SIZE), market to book ratio (M2B), leverage (LEVERAGE), return on 
assets (ROA), return volatility (VOLATILITY), and trading volume (VOL-
UME).14 
COUNT represents the CEO speeches’ length in terms of the total number of 
words. IND is the number of individual words in a CEO speech divided by the 
speech’s total number of words. The earnings surprise (EPS_SURP) of CEO 
speech j is estimated in accordance with Price et al. (2012) as the difference be-
tween the last reported earnings per share for the company at time t minus the 
latest reported earnings per share in the year prior to date t, divided by the stock 
price one year before t: 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝑗 =
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗 − 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗,𝑡−1
∗ 100 (10) 
 
Here EPSj is the most recent earnings-per-share release for the company at 
the time of speech j, EPSj,t-1 is the most recent earnings-per-share release for the 
company one year before the day of speech j and STOCKPRICEj,t-1 is the stock 
price of the company one year before the date of speech j. While the earnings 
surprise has been shown to affect returns and volatility following earnings an-
nouncements and earnings conference calls, we hypothesize that EPS_SURP 
should only have a limited effect on the CARs following the CEO speeches since 
the surprise is already known from the quarterly report und, thus, should already 
be incorporated in the stock price at the time the speech is held. We include the 
indicator variables DIV_SURP_POS and DIV_SURP_NEG to control for div-
idend surprises. Here, DIV_SURP_POS is equal to one if a company’s dividend 
per share is increased compared to the previous year, zero otherwise, and 
DIV_SURP_NEG is equal to one if a company’s dividend per share is decreased 
compared to the previous year, zero otherwise. In contrast to the earnings sur-
prise, the dividend surprise might strongly influence the post AGM returns and 
trading volume, as the dividend is actually agreed on at the AGM. SIZE measures 
the company’s equity market value at the day of the speech as the share price 
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares outstanding. It is displayed in Euro 
millions. We include the market to book ratio (M2B) to control for the company’s 
growth opportunities. M2B is defined as the market value of the ordinary equity 
                                      
14
  Note that we include COUNT, IND, SIZE and VOLUME in logarithmic format in the regres-
sions.  
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divided by the balance sheet value of the ordinary equity in the company. We 
include ROA, LEVERAGE and VOLATILITY to control for a potentially higher 
information demand by investors which might result from low profitability, fi-
nancial distress or other forms of uncertainty, respectively. ROA is estimated as 
net income divided by total assets times one hundred. LEVERAGE is calculated 
as total liabilities divided by total assets and VOLATILITY is estimated as the 
daily returns’ standard deviation in the time window of minus 90 days to minus 
10 days prior to the AGM. Finally, VOLUME describes the number of shares 
traded of a stock on the day of the shareholder meeting and is expressed in thou-
sands. While our sentiment measures, COUNT, and IND are collected directly 
from the CEO speeches, the data to estimate the remaining control variables are 
gathered from Thompson Reuters Datastream. We repeat all previously described 
analyses, substituting CAV for CAR. In the multivariate analyses we then utilize 
the same set of control variables except for VOLUME. 
 
3.3. Weighting scheme 
The majority of studies employing the dictionary-based approach use equal 
weighting of individual words. This method values each individual word in a 
document equally and implies that a more frequent occurrence of a word indicates 
a higher importance.15 However, as the impact of words might be diluted the 
more often they are used, Manning and Schütze (1999) propose a term-inverse 
document frequency measure (tf-idf) which weights each word inversely propor-
tionally to its frequency in a document. Loughran and McDonald (2011) advocate 
the use of tf-idf weighting by arguing that a word’s impact is likely to diminish 
with its frequency. Measuring the textual sentiment of annual 10-K reports with 
equal weights and with tf-idf weights and analyzing its impact on subsequent 
stock returns, they find that tf-idf weighting mitigates the impact of misclassified 
words in the measurement of textual sentiment. However, Henry and Leone 
(2016) point out that while tf-idf weighting might mitigate the impact of misclas-
sification for frequent words, it concomitantly exacerbates the impact of misclas-
sified words that are used only infrequently. They further argue that tf-idf weight-
ings are sample-dependent and thus impede replication. In order to evaluate the 
efficacy of equal weighting versus tf-idf weighting, Henry and Leone (2016) gauge 
the textual sentiment in earnings announcements using both weighting schemes 
and analyze the subsequent capital market reaction. They find that using tf-idf 
weighting provides no improvement compared to equal weighting. As these issues 
                                      
15
 For a comprehensive overview of studies using equal weighting, see Henry and Leone (2016). 
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have never been discussed for German language content analyses, we will not only 
measure the sentiment of CEO speeches using the context-specific BPW diction-
ary and compare the results to the general SENTIWS and LIWC dictionaries, 
but we will also evaluate the efficacy of equal weighting versus tf-idf weightings 
in measuring sentiment. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table V-2 contains descriptive statistics for the CARs and CAVs (Panel A), 
for the CEO speeches’ textual sentiment and other measures estimated from the 
CEO speeches (Panel B), as well as for the remaining control variables that we 
use in our multivariate regressions (Panel C). 
 
Table V-2: Descriptive statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the full sample of 338 CEO speeches. ***,**, and * indicate statistical signif-
icance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1.  
  Mean Min p25 p50 p75 Max SD N T-Statistic  
Panel A: CARs and CAVs  
CAR(-1,30) -0.001 -0.277 -0.043 0.004 0.048 0.209 0.071 338 -0.202  
CAR(-1,1) 0.001 -0.195 -0.017 0.000 0.017 0.095 0.029 338 0.317  
CAR(2,30) -0.001 -0.261 -0.042 -0.001 0.041 0.212 0.069 338 -0.346  
CAV(-1,30) 0.999 -15.174 -4.403 -0.910 3.397 84.763 10.221 338 1.797 * 
CAV(-1,1) 1.502 -1.566 -0.147 0.626 1.954 19.424 3.089 338 8.942 *** 
CAV(2,30) -0.503 -13.948 -4.751 -1.975 1.310 83.692 8.839 338 -1.047 
Panel B: CEO speeches and their sentiment 
COUNT 3,433 1,327 2,783 3,363 3,999 6,392 985 338   
IND 0.334 0.245 0.308 0.330 0.354 0.428 0.032 338   
NEG_BPW 1.154 0.235 0.759 1.057 1.508 3.237 0.549 338   
TONE_BPW 0.439 -0.207 0.268 0.459 0.621 0.894 0.237 338   
NEG_SENTIWS 1.309 0.293 0.917 1.231 1.637 2.832 0.521 338   
TONE_SENTIWS 0.740 0.420 0.670 0.754 0.824 0.947 0.105 338   
NEG_LIWC 0.359 0.000 0.233 0.337 0.460 0.962 0.182 338   
TONE_LIWC 0.717 0.213 0.649 0.741 0.815 1.000 0.140 338   
Panel C: Company-level controls variables 
EPS_SURP 0.030 -43.996 -1.567 0.374 2.055 57.060 7.933 330   
DIV_SURP_POS 0.589 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.493 338   
DIV_SURP_NEG 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.383 338   
SIZE 15,484 195 2,185 7,637 20,196 105,412 19,468 338   
M2B 2.08 0.16 1.05 1.75 2.70 10.33 1.56 338   
LV 0.07 -0.20 0.01 0.05 0.09 2.21 0.15 311   
ROA 3.68 -12.68 0.69 3.36 5.80 67.93 5.68 311   
VOLA 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 338   
VOLUME 28.65 0.00 2.10 6.00 31.70 406.60 53.63 337     
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Panel A of Table V-2 shows that, at the mean, all CARs under investigation 
are economically small and not statistically different from zero. This finding in-
dicates that, on average, we do not observe a significant market reaction around 
the AGM. This is in contrast to Martinez-Blasco et al. (2015), who investigate 
companies from the German DAX30 index and report statistically significant pos-
itive cumulative abnormal returns around the AGM. With respect to cumulative 
abnormal trading volumes, we find statistically significant trading volumes for 
CAV(-1,1), indicating that German stocks are more frequently traded around the 
AGM. In contrast to our finding on CARs, our results on CAVs are in line with 
Martinez-Blasco et al. (2015), who also report an increase in trading volume 
around the day of the AGM.  
Panel B of Table V-2 presents summary statistics with regard to the CEO 
speeches and their sentiment and reveals that CEO speeches, on average, contain 
1.15% negative words using the BPW dictionary and display a relative positivity, 
TONE_BPW, of 0.439. While the share of negative words is slightly larger using 
the SENTIWS dictionary (1.31%), it is much smaller employing the LIWC dic-
tionary (0.36%). Both general dictionaries, however, also show a positive tonality. 
Altogether, this can be interpreted as a higher positivity than negativity of the 
average CEO speech. As CEOs should be expected to use public communication 
to present their company in a positive light, the higher positive word share does 
not come as a surprise. Boudt and Thewissen (2016), for instance, investigate 
CEO letters using the LM dictionary and find quite comparable values for nega-
tivity and relative positivity. On average, they report 1.03% of the letters’ words 
to be negative and the relative positivity equals 0.485. Furthermore, Kim and 
Meschke (2014) investigate CEO interviews on CNBC using the Harvard Univer-
sity’s General Inquirer IV-4 dictionary and find the share of negative words to be 
1.38% and the relative positivity to equal 0.582.  The results from the BPW word 
lists are hence well in line with the earlier studies.  
Panel C of Table V-2 presents the control variables that we use in our multi-
variate regressions. Surprisingly, in only 23.3% of our observations the dividend 
per share is unchanged compared to the previous year, while it is decreased in 
17.8% of the cases and increased in 58.9%. This is quite high compared to the 
results by, for example, Andres et al. (2009), who investigate German companies 
from 1987 to 2005 and find the dividends for German companies to be stable in 
46.4%, to increase in 33.7% and to decrease in 19.9% of all cases. However, as our 
sample period comprises the aftermath of the financial crises, the higher fraction 
of dividend increases is likely to reflect stepwise re-increases of the dividend after 
sharp dividend cuts due to the financial crises. 
 
BANNIER/PAULS/WALTER CEO Speeches and stock returns  
 
V-105 
 
Table V-3: Correlations 
This table shows pairwise correlations for the full sample of 338 CEO speeches. Note that the LIWC contains word stems 
rather than comprehensive sets of inflections as BPW and SENTIWS. Thus, we use a stemming algorithm by Caumanns 
(1999) on our sample of reports before gauging the textual sentiment using the LIWC. Pearson correlations are below the 
diagonal, Spearman correlations are above the diagonal. P-values are in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appen-
dix V-1. 
             
 
CAR 
(-1,30) 
CAR 
(-1,1) 
CAR 
(2,30) 
CAV 
(-1,30) 
CAV 
(-1,1) 
CAV 
(2,30) 
NEG_ 
BPW 
TONE_ 
BPW 
NEG_ 
SENTIWS 
TONE_ 
SENTIWS 
NEG_ 
LIWC 
TONE_ 
LIWC 
CAR(-1,30)  0.258 0.904 -0.001 -0.008 0.023 -0.257 0.265 -0.215 0.241 -0.207 0.200 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.985) (0.879) (0.674) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAR(-1,1) 0.296  -0.106 -0.090 0.031 -0.095 -0.073 0.075 -0.032 0.056 -0.038 0.059 
 (0.000)  (0.051) (0.100) (0.573) (0.082) (0.179) (0.168) (0.561) (0.303) (0.489) (0.282) 
CAR(2,30) 0.912 -0.121  0.016 -0.039 0.048 -0.241 0.254 -0.211 0.230 -0.182 0.173 
 (0.000) (0.026)  (0.771) (0.473) (0.383) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
CAV(-1,30) 0.044 -0.077 0.078  0.713 0.949 -0.002 -0.013 0.004 -0.001 -0.058 0.005 
 (0.423) (0.159) (0.151)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.975) (0.810) (0.946) (0.985) (0.291) (0.921) 
CAV(-1,1) -0.037 0.008 -0.042 0.568  0.522 0.104 -0.129 0.091 -0.094 0.004 -0.048 
 (0.504) (0.879) (0.447) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.057) (0.018) (0.095) (0.084) (0.938) (0.383) 
CAV(2,30) 0.063 -0.092 0.105 0.958 0.308  -0.044 0.038 -0.027 0.036 -0.068 0.019 
 (0.246) (0.093) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.417) (0.484) (0.615) (0.513) (0.211) (0.724) 
NEG_BPW -0.265 -0.046 -0.255 -0.017 0.082 -0.048  -0.941 0.894 -0.880 0.692 -0.703 
 (0.000) (0.398) (0.000) (0.763) (0.134) (0.383)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE_BPW 0.274 0.060 0.259 -0.003 -0.114 0.037 -0.935  -0.857 0.904 -0.636 0.715 
 (0.000) (0.274) (0.000) (0.962) (0.036) (0.500) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NEG_SENTIWS -0.221 -0.035 -0.214 -0.032 0.071 -0.062 0.901 -0.849  -0.959 0.657 -0.679 
 (0.000) (0.517) (0.000) (0.562) (0.193) (0.260) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE_SENTIWS 0.239 0.052 0.226 0.029 -0.068 0.057 -0.886 0.908 -0.950  -0.630 0.709 
 (0.000) (0.337) (0.000) (0.602) (0.213) (0.299) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
NEG_LIWC -0.203 -0.048 -0.190 -0.054 -0.016 -0.056 0.673 -0.619 0.662 -0.638  -0.924 
 (0.000) (0.382) (0.000) (0.327) (0.777) (0.301) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
TONE_LIWC 0.213 0.073 0.190 0.019 -0.007 0.025 -0.675 0.691 -0.652 0.700 -0.916  
  (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) (0.727) (0.896) (0.653) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Table V-3 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations among CARs, CAVs 
and the measures of textual sentiment for the BPW, SENTIWS and LIWC dic-
tionaries. For all three dictionaries, the measures of negativity appear to be neg-
atively correlated and the measures of positivity to be positively correlated to 
CARs of all three time windows. However, none of the measures’ correlations to 
CAR(-1,1) are statistically significant, while they are statistically significant at 
the 1%-level to CAR(2,30) and CAR(-1,30). With respect to trading volumes, the 
picture is less clear: The BPW and SENTIWS measures of the speeches’ negativ-
ity seem to be positively correlated to CAV(-1,1) and negatively to CAV(2,30) 
and CAV(-1,30). The BPW and SENTIWS measures of the speeches’ relative 
positivity seem to be negatively correlated to CAV(-1,1) and positively to 
CAV(2,30) and CAV(-1,30). The LIWC measures, in contrast, show no significant 
correlation to trading volumes. 
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4.2. The CEO speeches’ sentiment effect on stock prices 
4.2.1. The business-specific BPW dictionary 
Before we proceed with the examination of the association between CEO 
speeches’ sentiment and the stock price reaction in a multivariate analysis, we 
will consider the univariate dimension. In this respect, Figures V-1 and V-2 show 
the accumulation of abnormal returns from 5 days before to 30 days after the 
AGM for different levels of negativity and tonality. Figure V-1 displays the accu-
mulated abnormal returns of high and low negativity CEO speeches, where the 
sample is split at the median of NEG_BPW. As can be seen from the figure, at 
the day of the AGM, firms with less negative CEO speeches show a 0.55% higher 
accumulated abnormal return than firms with more negative speeches. Over the 
next days after the AGM, firms with less negative CEO speeches show positive 
and increasing CARs. Firms with more negative CEO speeches, in contrast, dis-
play CARs that are close to zero. While the spread in CARs between the two 
groups increases only slowly in the first days after the AGM, it accelerates dras-
tically from day 15 on. This may be seen as a first indication that investors indeed 
process qualitative information only slowly, supporting the earlier findings by 
Demers and Vega (2008). 
 
Figure V-1: CARs following the AGM by high vs. low NEG_BPW 
This figure shows cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) across all CEO speeches as well as segregated by a median 
split on NEG_BPW. The speeches’ negativity and abnormal returns are estimated as described in Appendix V-1. Ab-
normal returns are cumulated from 5 days before the AGM until 30 days after the AGM. CARs are shown in percent. 
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Figure V-2: CARs following the AGM by high vs. low TONE_BPW 
This figure shows cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) across all CEO speeches as well as segregated by a median split 
on TONE_BPW. The speeches’ negativity and abnormal returns are estimated as described in Appendix V-1. Abnor-
mal returns are cumulated from 5 days before the AGM until 30 days after the AGM. CARs are shown in percent.  
 
 
Figure V-2 depicts the development of accumulated abnormal returns, differ-
entiating between firms with high and low tonality speeches. The sample is split 
along the median TONE_BPW. Similarly to the results from Figure V-1, firms 
with high tonality speeches display positive and increasing CARs following the 
AGM, while firms with low tonality speeches show CARs that are close to zero 
in the first days after the AGM. From day 15 on, the difference between the 
CARs of the two groups increases strongly as firms with low tonality speeches 
then show strongly negative and decreasing CARs. Again, this might be inter-
preted as an initial underreaction of investors to the sentiment of the CEO 
speeches at the AGM. 
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Table V-4: Test of differences of cumulative abnormal returns  
This table sorts the CARs following the annual general meeting into quartiles with respect to NEG_BPW and 
TONE_BPW and compares the differences in mean and median CARs between the highest and lowest quartiles of textual 
sentiment for all time windows under investigation. Statistical significance of the differences in CARs between the highest 
and the lowest quartile are assessed by t and z test statistics, respectively. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
        
Wilcoxon rank-
sum  
    Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 DIFF Q4-Q1 t-Statistic z-Statistic 
Panel A: CAR (-1,30)     
NEG_BPW Mean 0.018 0.009 0.007 -0.038 -0.057 -5.117 ***   
 Median 0.019 0.008 0.008 -0.042 -0.061   -5.050 *** 
          
TONE_BPW Mean -0.033 0.003 0.009 0.018 0.051 4.525 ***   
 Median -0.034 0.006 0.008 0.017 0.052   4.441 *** 
          
Panel B: CAR (-1,1)       
NEG_BPW Mean 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.980   
 Median 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.008   -1.377  
          
TONE_BPW Mean -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.868   
 Median -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005   1.077  
           
Panel C: CAR (2,30)     
NEG_BPW Mean 0.016 0.007 0.007 -0.036 -0.052 -4.920 ***   
 Median 0.016 0.012 0.009 -0.040 -0.056   -4.874 *** 
          
TONE_BPW Mean -0.031 0.001 0.008 0.016 0.047 4.394 ***   
 Median -0.036 0.007 0.010 0.016 0.052   4.451 *** 
 
Table V-4 gives further information on the univariate relation between senti-
ment and stock market reaction. The table sorts the CEO speeches into sentiment 
quartiles with respect to NEG_BPW and TONE_BPW and compares mean and 
median CARs of the highest and lowest sentiment quartiles for all time windows. 
Panel A of Table V-4 presents the results for the total time period. The 
CAR(-1,30) differences between the highest and lowest sentiment quartile are 
significantly different from zero with respect to both NEG_BPW and 
TONE_BPW. The CAR(-1,30) mean (median) difference between the highest 
and lowest NEG_BPW quartiles equals -5.7 (-6.1) percentage points, and 5.1 
(5.2) percentage points between the highest and lowest TONE_BPW quartiles. 
Panel B of Table V-4 contains the univariate results for CAR(-1,1). In this short 
time window around the AGM, no statistically or economically significant differ-
ences can be found between the extreme quartiles, irrespective of the sentiment 
measure applied. Panel C of Table V-4 presents the results for CAR(2,30). In this 
longer time window, we observe economically and statistically significant differ-
ences Q4-Q1 both with respect to the speeches’ negativity and relative positivity. 
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More precisely, the CAR(2,30) mean (median) difference between the highest and 
lowest NEG_BPW quartiles equals -5.2 (-5.6) percentage points. With respect to 
TONE_BPW, the CAR(2,30) difference between the highest and lowest quartile 
is positive and equals 4.7 (5.2) percentage points. These first univariate results 
suggest that negative textual sentiment is negatively related to cumulative ab-
normal returns while relative positive textual sentiment shows a positive relation. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate that investors initially underreact to the CEO 
speeches’ textual sentiment, as only little of the total effect is explained by an 
immediate reaction around the AMG. 
Table V-5 finally presents multivariate regressions of CAR(-1,30), CAR(-1,1), 
and CAR(2,30) on NEG_BPW and TONE_BPW and a comprehensive set of 
control variables. Looking at the (-1,30) event window, NEG_BPW and 
TONE_BPW also have a strong statistically significant association with the 
CAR(-1,30). An increase in NEG_BPW by the interquartile change of 0.749 
yields a 2.77 percentage points lower CAR(-1,30), while an increase in a CEO 
speech’s TONE_BPW by the interquartile range of 0.353 induces a 3.14 percent-
age points higher CAR(-1,30). With regard to an immediate market reaction, i.e. 
the short-term event window (-1,1), NEG_BPW does not significantly affect the 
cumulative abnormal returns, thus confirming the univariate results. The relative 
positivity measure, TONE_BPW, in contrast, displays a statistically significant 
association with CAR(-1,1). However, this effect is only weakly significant and 
also quite small in economic terms. Nonetheless, this finding presents some first 
evidence that a combined positive and negative sentiment measure may capture 
qualitative information more effectively than a solely negative measure. In the 
more distant time period (2,30), NEG_BPW has a statistically significant nega-
tive effect on the cumulative abnormal returns. An increase in negativity by the 
interquartile change of 0.749 yields a 2.32 percentage points lower CAR(2,30). 
TONE_BPW also significantly affects CAR(2,30). An increase in a CEO speech’s 
tonality by the interquartile range of 0.353 induces a 2.5 percentage points higher 
CAR(2,30).16 In line with the univariate results, the mostly non-significant or 
only small effects of the sentiment measures in the immediate vicinity around the 
AGM indicate an initial investor underreaction to qualitative information as com-
pared to the stronger reaction in the longer time period following the AGM. In 
this respect, our results are indeed consistent with Engelberg (2008), Demers and 
Vega (2008), and Price et al. (2012).  
                                      
16
  Note that the CEO speeches’ sentiment with respect to all our measures varies only little 
(Table V-2). As a consequence, interpreting the increase in terms of interquartile changes is 
more useful to illustrate our results.  
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Table V-5: Determinants of cumulative abnormal returns 
This table shows regression results of CAR(-1,30), CAR(-1,1), and CAR(2,30) on our measures of textual sentiment as 
well as on a comprehensive set of control variables. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
 CAR(-1,30)  CAR(-1,1)  CAR(2,30) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
NEG_BPW -0.037 ***    -0.006    -0.031 ***   
 (0.010)   (0.005)    (0.010)   
TONE_BPW   0.089 ***    0.018 *    0.071 *** 
   (0.022)    (0.010)    (0.021) 
log(COUNT) 0.015 0.016  0.003 0.004  0.012 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.026) (0.025) 
log(IND) 0.100 0.090  0.020 0.021  0.080 0.069 
 (0.084) (0.082)  (0.034) (0.034)  (0.084) (0.082) 
EPS_SURP 0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
DIV_SURP_POS -0.005 -0.005  0.001 0.001  -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.010)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.011) 
DIV_SURP_NEG 0.003 0.005  -0.004 -0.003  0.006 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.014)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.013) (0.013) 
log(SIZE) 0.002 0.001  0.003 0.003  -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005) 
M2B -0.002 -0.003  -0.004 ** -0.004 **  0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
LEVERAGE -0.129 -0.137  -0.009 -0.009  -0.119 -0.129 
 (0.088) (0.090)  (0.050) (0.050)  (0.092) (0.094) 
ROA 0.004 0.004  0.001 0.001  0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
VOLATILITY -0.565 -0.689  0.040 0.025  -0.605 -0.713 
 (0.835) (0.807)  (0.614) (0.601)  (0.850) (0.840) 
log(VOLUME) -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.002  0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.004) 
              
Constant 0.062 -0.024  -0.004 -0.011  0.023 0.026 
 (0.143) (0.148)  (0.063) (0.061)  (0.143) (0.139) 
               
Year Dummies yes yes   yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 304 304  304 304  304 304 
R-squared 0.140 0.142  0.051 0.056  0.133 0.131 
 
With respect to the control variables, neither the quantity of information as 
measured by the speeches’ length (COUNT), nor the speeches’ complexity as 
approximated by the share of individual words (IND) are significantly associated 
with cumulative abnormal returns. The same is true for EPS_SURP, supporting 
our conjecture that any EPS surprise is likely to be already processed by financial 
market participants after the earlier announcement in the annual report. In con-
trast, a change in dividends might have an effect on the CARs, as the dividend’s 
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payout is agreed upon at the AGM. Nevertheless, neither positive dividend sur-
prises (DIV_SURP_POS), nor negative dividend surprises (DIV_SURP_NEG) 
seem to have a statistically significant effect on CARs. 
To summarize, our analyses of cumulative abnormal returns highlight several 
interesting facts. Our measures of negative and relative positive sentiment show 
strong and statistically significant associations with CAR(-1,30) in univariate and 
multivariate analyses. When dissecting this time window into the period immedi-
ately surrounding the AGM (-1,1) and the subsequent period (2,30), we see that 
the market reaction occurs in a  delayed fashion: Only a small fraction of the full 
effect is seen immediately and the larger part follows afterwards. It hence seems 
to be the case that the market indeed takes more time to process the qualitative 
information captured by the speeches’ sentiment and to incorporate this in the 
stock price as compared to quantitative information. 
Table V-6 re-estimates Table V-5, substituting NEG_BPW and 
TONE_BPW with the speeches’ share of positive words (POS_BPW).17 It re-
veals no significant relationship of POS_BPW with CAR(-1,1) or CAR(2,30). 
Looking at both time windows combined, we find a positive relation with 
CAR(-1,30) which is, however, statistically significant only at the 5% level. Com-
pared to the speeches’ negativity and relative positivity (Table V-5), the speeches’ 
share of positive words hence seems to be less suited to capture the qualitative 
information of text-documents. Our results therefore support Tetlock (2007) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), who observe little incremental information using 
only a positive wordlist for the English language and suggest using a documents’ 
share of negative words instead to assess its textual sentiment. We show that 
their observation holds for analyses on German text documents as well. Given 
the stronger statistical significance of the combined TONE_BPW measure, we 
furthermore underline the earlier suggestion that recipients tend to assess a text’s 
positivity and negativity not in isolation but rather in relation to each other. As 
a consequence, tonality, i.e., relative positivity, appears to be a superior measure 
for capturing the qualitative information in a text or speech in the German lan-
guage as well.  
 
                                      
17
 We calculate POS_BPW analogously to NEG_BPW, where the number of negative words is 
replaced by the number of positive words in the respective speech. 
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Table V-6: Positive textual sentiment and cumulative abnormal returns 
This table shows regression results of CAR(-1,30), CAR(-1,1), and CAR(2,30) on POS_BPW and on a comprehensive set 
of control variables. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
 CAR(-1,30)   CAR(-1,1)   CAR(2,30) 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
POS_BPW 0.014 **  0.004   0.010  
 (0.006)   (0.003)   (0.006)  
log(COUNT) -0.008   0.000   -0.008  
 (0.025)   (0.010)   (0.024)  
log(IND) 0.024   0.008   0.016  
 (0.078)   (0.034)   (0.078)  
EPS_SURP 0.000   -0.000   0.001  
 (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)  
DIV_SURP_POS 0.001   0.002   -0.001  
 (0.011)   (0.004)   (0.011)  
DIV_SURP_NEG 0.004   -0.003   0.007  
 (0.014)   (0.006)   (0.014)  
log(SIZE) 0.002   0.003   -0.001  
 (0.005)   (0.003)   (0.006)  
M2B -0.001   -0.004 **  0.002  
 (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.003)  
LEVERAGE -0.182 *  -0.018   -0.164 * 
 (0.093)   (0.050)   (0.095)  
ROA 0.006 *  0.001   0.005  
 (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.003)  
VOLATILITY -0.778   0.007   -0.785  
 (0.821)   (0.593)   (0.868)  
log(VOLUME) -0.002   -0.002   -0.000  
 (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.004)  
         
Constant 0.075   -0.006   0.081  
 (0.140)   (0.060)   (0.134)  
         
Year Dummies yes   yes   yes  
Observations 304   304   304  
R-squared 0.108   0.051   0.106  
 
4.2.2. The BPW vs. general German language dictionaries 
In our analyses we so far applied the business-specific BPW dictionary. In 
order to evaluate its suitability for examining sentiment in business texts vis-à-
vis more general word lists, we rerun our analyses using the general German 
language dictionaries instead. In this respect, Table V-7 re-estimates the earlier 
regression models using once the SENTIWS dictionary and once the LIWC dic-
tionary to measure the sentiment of the CEO speeches. It should be noted that 
the following analyses employ standardized sentiment measures (with a mean of 
0 and a standard deviation of 1) in order to facilitate comparisons between the 
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results for each dictionary. We also include the (now standardized) regression 
coefficients for the sentiment measured via the BPW dictionary in the first line 
of Table V-7.  
 
Table V-7: Determinants of CARs: Different word lists 
This table shows regression results of CAR(-1,30), CAR(-1,1), and CAR(2,30) on our measures of textual sentiment as 
well as on a comprehensive set of control variables. Measures of textual sentiment are standardized to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
Panel A: Regression Results for negative textual sentiment 
 CAR(-1,30)  CAR(-1,1)  CAR(2,30) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
                                         
NEG_BPW -0.020 ***   -0.003    -0.017 ***   
 (0.006)    (0.003)    (0.005)    
NEG_SENTIWS   -0.014 **     -0.002     -0.011 **  
   (0.006)     (0.003)     (0.005)   
NEG_LIWC    -0.01 **    -0.002     -0.008 * 
    (0.005)     (0.002)     (0.005) 
             
Constant 0.019  0.069  0.144  -0.004  0.003  0.016  0.023  0.066  0.128 
 (0.147)  (0.146)  (0.137)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.058)  (0.143)  (0.143)  (0.134) 
             
Year dummies yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Controls yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Observations 304  304  304   304  304  304   304  304  304  
R-squared 0.140  0.115  0.109   0.051  0.048  0.047   0.133  0.114  0.109  
Panel B: Regression results for relative positive textual sentiment 
 CAR(-1,30)  CAR(-1,1)  CAR(2,30) 
 (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17) (18) 
                                         
TONE_BPW 0.021 ***    0.004 *    0.017 ***   
 (0.005)     (0.002)     (0.005)    
TONE_SENTIWS   0.015 ***     0.003      0.012 **  
   (0.005)      (0.003)      (0.005)   
TONE_LIWC    0.010 *     0.003      0.007 
    (0.005)     (0.002)      (0.005) 
             
Constant 0.015  0.08  0.128  -0.011  0.002  0.011   0.026  0.078  0.118  
 (0.144)  (0.144)  (0.136)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.059)   (0.139)  (0.140)  (0.133)  
                    
Year dummies yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Controls yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Observations 304  304  304   304  304  304   304  304  304  
R-squared 0.142  0.119  0.108   0.056  0.051  0.051   0.131  0.115  0.106  
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Panel A considers the negative sentiment. As can be seen, irrespective of the 
dictionary used, none of the measures of negative textual sentiment has a statis-
tically significant effect on CAR(-1,1). With respect to CAR(2,30) and 
CAR(-1,30), in contrast, all measures show a statistically significant negative re-
lationship. However, NEG_BPW always delivers the highest and most strongly 
significant coefficient. Panel B of Table V-7 refers to the tonality measure, i.e. 
relative positivity. In the time window (-1,30), both TONE_BPW and 
TONE_SENTIWS are significantly related to CARs at the 1%-level while 
TONE_LIWC shows a significance only at the 10%-level. Still, the effect of 
TONE_BPW is of higher magnitude compared to TONE_SENTIWS and 
TONE_LIWC. In the time window (-1,1), TONE_BPW is significantly related 
to CARs, while the tonality measures based on the general language dictionaries 
are not. In time window (2,30), only TONE_BPW and TONE_SENTIWS show 
a significant association with CARs, with a stronger effect again for 
TONE_BPW.  
Table V-8 presents J-test (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1981) and Cox-Pesaran-
Deaton (Pesaran & Deaton, 1978) test statistics for non-nested regressions in 
order to compare the in Table V-7 presented models’ efficacy. The results show 
that none of the models using measures from the BPW dictionary can be rejected 
in favor of the respective models using measures from the SENTIWS or LIWC 
dictionaries according to both test statistics. Vice versa, the CAR(2,30) and 
CAR(-1,30) models including NEG_BPW (models (4) and (7)) and TONE_BPW 
(models (13) and (16)) are more favorable compared to the corresponding models 
using the general language SENTIWS and LIWC dictionaries according to both 
test statistics. Thus, our results indicate the superiority of context-specific dic-
tionaries in capturing the textual sentiment of German business-related docu-
ments, underlining the earlier results from English text analyses (Price et al., 
2012; Loughran & McDonald, 2011, 2015; Henry & Leone, 2016). 
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Table V-8: Model comparison tests 
This table present J-test and Cox-Pesaran Deaton test statistics for models presented in Table V-7. 
  J-test  Cox-Pesaran-Deaton test 
Model (1) vs (2)  -1.08   1.00  
Model (2) vs (1)  3.04 ***  -4.47 *** 
Model (1) vs (3)  -0.10   0.11  
Model (3) vs (1)  3.19 ***  -7.19 *** 
     
Model (4) vs (5)  -0.24  0.23 
Model (5) vs (4)  0.98  -1.36 * 
Model (4) vs (6)  0.07  -0.08 
Model (6) vs (4)  1.10  -2.26 ** 
     
Model (7) vs (8)  -1.01  0.93 
Model (8) vs (7)  2.70 ***  -4.02 *** 
Model (7) vs (9)  -0.14  0.14 
Model (9) vs (7)  2.80 ***  -6.39 *** 
     
Model (10) vs (11)  -0.90  0.86 
Model (11) vs (10)  2.88 ***  -4.03 *** 
Model (10) vs (12)  -0.16  0.16 
Model (12) vs (10)  3.32 ***  -7.82 *** 
     
Model (13) vs (14)  -0.36   0.34  
Model (14) vs (13)  1.29   -1.77 ** 
Model (13) vs (15)  0.36   -0.42  
Model (15) vs (13)  1.31   -2.41 *** 
     
Model (16) vs (17) -0.77   0.73  
Model (17) vs (16) 2.39 **  -3.35 *** 
Model (16) vs (18)  -0.33   0.31  
Model (18) vs (16)  2.84 ***  -7.24 *** 
  
 
4.2.3. Weighting schemes 
The previous results have been estimated using equal weighting of words in 
calculating sentiment measures for the CEO speeches. In order to test whether 
the weighting scheme drives our results, Table V-9 re-estimates the regressions 
from Table V-5 using equal weighting and tf-idf weighting for calculating the 
sentiment measures NEG_BPW and TONE_BPW in comparison.18  
 
                                      
18
 We are still employing standardized sentiment measures. 
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Table V-9: Determinants of CARs, by weighting schemes employed 
This table shows regression results of CAR(-1,30), CAR(-1,1), and CAR(2,30) on our measures of textual sentiment as 
well as on a comprehensive set of control variables. Measures of textual sentiment are standardized to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
Panel A: Regression Results 
 CAR(-1,30)  CAR(-1,1)  CAR(2,30) 
 equal idf equal idf  equal idf equal idf  equal idf equal idf 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                                                    
NEG_ 
BPW 
-0.020 *** -0.012 ** 
   
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
    
-0.017 *** -0.011 * 
   
 (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.005)  (0.006)    
TONE_ 
BPW    
0.021 *** 0.020 
    
0.004 * 0.004 
     
0.017 *** 0.016 *** 
    (0.005)  (0.005)     (0.002)  (0.002)     (0.005)  (0.005)  
                
Constant 0.019  -0.032  0.015  0.011  -0.004  0.003  -0.011  -0.009  0.023  -0.034  0.026  0.02  
 (0.147)  (0.158)  (0.144)  (0.140)  (0.063)  (0.076)  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.143)  (0.152)  (0.139)  (0.135)  
                           
Year  
dummies 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
  
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
  
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Controls yes  yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  yes  
N 304  304  304  304   304  304  304  304   304  304  304  304  
R² 0.140   0.110   0.142   0.140   0.051  0.046  0.056   0.054   0.133   0.112   0.131   0.131   
 
Panel B: Model comparison tests 
               
  J-test  
Cox-Pesaran-Deaton  
test 
     
Model (1) vs (2)  -0.85   0.78  
Model (2) vs (1)  3.25 ***  -5.85 *** 
Model (3) vs (4)  0.69   -0.75  
Model (4) vs (3)   0.91  -1.00  
     
Model (5) vs (6)  -0.87  0.63  
Model (6) vs (5)  1.59  -4.89 *** 
Model (7) vs (8)  -0.11   0.11  
Model (8) vs (7)  0.82   -0.95  
     
Model (9) vs (10)  -0.48   0.46  
Model (10) vs (9)  2.63 ***  -4.45 *** 
Model (11) vs (12)  0.77   -0.84  
Model (12) vs (11)  0.57   -0.61  
 
Panel A of Table V-9 shows that most of the coefficients estimated via tf-idf 
weighting are comparable in size and significance to those estimated via equal 
weighting. However, the coefficients of NEG_BPW in CAR(-1,30) and 
CAR(2,30) regressions equal -0.020 and -0.017 and are statistically significant at 
the 1%-level using equal weighting (models (1) and (9)), while they decrease 
to -0.012 and -0.011 and are only significant at the 10%-level (model (2)) and 5%-
level (model (10)) with tf-idf weighting. In both cases, tf-idf weighting hence 
seems to unfavorably affect the results.  
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Panel B of Table V-9 reports the results from J-tests and Cox-Pesaran-Deaton 
tests. They show that none of the equally weighted NEG_BPW or TONE_BPW 
models can be rejected in favor of the tf-idf weighted models. Vice versa, all but 
two tf-idf weighted models cannot be rejected in favor of the respective equally 
weighted models. Only model (1) seems to be preferable compared to model (2). 
Model (9) seems to be preferable compared to model (10). Consequently, the 
results presented in Table V-9 indicate that, for our sample, tf-idf weighting seems 
to provide no improvement over equal weighting with respect to measures of 
relative positive textual sentiment. It may provide even less effective results with 
respect to measures of negative textual sentiment. With respect to the latter 
point, our results on NEG_BPW are in contrast to Loughran and McDonald 
(2011), who find tf-idf weighting to improve the effectiveness of their measure of 
negative textual sentiment. With respect to TONE_BPW, in contrast, our results 
are in line with Henry and Leone (2016), who find no improvement for measures 
of relative positivity using tf-idf weighting. 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) argue that tf-idf weighting mitigates the im-
pact of misclassified words (or noise) in the dictionaries, as words which appear 
more frequently are weighted less. To test this final aspect, we re-estimate Ta-
ble V-7 using tf-idf weighting for all measures of textual sentiment, i.e., also those 
based on the SENTIWS and LIWC word lists, in Table V-10. Indeed, we find 
that some coefficients on general language sentiment SENTIWS and LIWC 
measures improve in magnitude and statistical significance. However, they still 
do not exceed the context-specific BPW measures. This finding is largely con-
cordant with Henry and Leone (2016), who report that tf-idf weighting modestly 
increases statistical significance for general language measures of negative senti-
ment, but does not improve the results for measures of relative positivity. 
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Table V-10: Weighted CAR regressions with general language dictionaries  
This table shows regression results of CAR(-1,30), CAR(-1,1), and CAR(2,30) on our measures of textual sentiment 
individually, as well as on a comprehensive set of control variables. Measures of textual sentiment are standardized to 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
Panel A: Regression results for negative textual sentiment 
 CAR(-1,30)  CAR(-1,1)  CAR(2,30) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
                                         
NEG_BPW -0.012 **    -0.001     -0.011 *    
 (0.006)    (0.003)    (0.006)    
NEG_SENTIWS   -0.008     -0.001     -0.008   
   (0.006)     (0.003)     (0.006)   
NEG_LIWC    -0.008 *     0.000      -0.008 * 
    (0.004)     (0.002)     (0.004)  
             
Constant -0.032  0.030  0.050  0.003  0.009  0.018  -0.034  0.021  0.031  
 (0.158)  (0.159)  (0.146)  (0.076)  (0.078)  (0.067)  (0.152)  (0.157)  (0.139)  
             
Year dummies yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Controls yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Observations 304  304  304   304  304  304   304  304  304  
R-squared 0.110  0.103  0.103   0.046  0.045  0.045   0.112  0.106  0.107  
Panel B: Regression results for relative positive textual sentiment 
 CAR(-1,30)  CAR(-1,1)  CAR(2,30) 
 (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17) (18) 
                                         
TONE_BPW 0.020 ***     0.004      0.016 ***    
 (0.005)     (0.002)     (0.005)    
TONE_SENTIWS   0.016 ***      0.002       0.014 ***   
  (0.005)      (0.002)      (0.005)   
TONE_LIWC    0.010 **     0.001      0.009 ** 
   (0.004)     (0.002)      (0.004)  
             
Constant 0.011  0.053  0.082  -0.009  0.004  0.009   0.020  0.049  0.074  
 (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.137)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.060)   (0.135)  (0.138)  (0.132)  
                    
Year dummies yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Controls yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Observations 304  304  304   304  304  304   304  304  304  
R-squared 0.140  0.125  0.111   0.054  0.048  0.046   0.131  0.123  0.112  
 
4.3. The CEO speeches’ sentiment effect on trading volume 
In addition to our analyses of stock prices, we also examine the relation be-
tween the CEO speeches’ sentiment and the abnormal trading volume. For this 
examination, we employ the BPW dictionary and again start with a univariate 
analysis. Analogously to Table V-4 for CARs, Table V-11 shows the differences 
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in CAV(-1,30), CAV(-1,1), and CAV(2,30) sorted for quartiles with respect to 
NEG_BPW and TONE_BPW.  
 
Table V-11: Test of differences of cumulative abnormal trading volumes  
This table sorts the CAVs following the annual general meeting into quartiles with respect NEG_BPW and TONE_BPW 
and compares the mean and median CAV differences between the highest and lowest quartiles of textual sentiment for all 
time windows under investigation. Statistical significance of the CAV differences between the highest and the lowest 
quartile are assessed by t and z test statistics, respectively. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
    Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 DIFF Q4-Q1 
t-Statis-
tic 
Wilcoxon rank-
sum 
z-Statistic 
Panel A: CAV (-1,30)     
NEG_BPW Mean 0.663 1.586 1.423 0.323 -0.341 0.231   
 Median -1.767 -0.182 -0.461 -1.274 0.493   -0.201  
          
TONE_BPW Mean 1.114 1.590 0.590 0.706 0.911 0.269   
 Median -1.038 0.032 -0.999 -1.164 -0.126   -0.123 
          
Panel B: CAV (-1,1)       
NEG_BPW Mean 1.125 1.304 1.671 1.912 0.786 1.634   
 Median 0.377 0.556 0.853 0.735 0.358   1.481  
          
TONE_BPW Mean 1.853 2.250 0.877 1.033 -0.819 -1.857 *   
 Median 1.076 0.924 0.320 0.327 -0.749   -1.984 ** 
     
Panel C: CAV (2,30)     
NEG_BPW Mean -0.462 0.282 -0.248 -1.589 -1.127 -0.934   
 Median -2.183 -1.178 -1.844 -2.982 -0.799   -0.871  
          
TONE_BPW Mean -0.739 -0.660 -0.287 -0.327 0.411 0.310   
 Median -2.362 -1.179 -2.049 -1.821 0.541   0.663  
 
As Table V-11 shows, we find statistically significant differences in the accu-
mulated trading volume between the fourth and first sentiment quartiles only in 
the short time window, CAV(-1,1), and only with respect to tonality measure. 
Significance is given both with parametric and non-parametric test statistics. 
Firms with highest tonality speeches hence show a smaller abnormal trading in 
the time period immediately surrounding the AGM than firms with lowest tonal-
ity speeches. This may be taken as an indication that a higher “relative negativity” 
seems to draw investors’ attention and leads to higher abnormal trading. As we 
find no significant Q4-Q1 differences with respect to the longer time windows 
CAV(2,30) and CAV(-1,30), the observed investor attention seems to be quickly 
evaporating.  
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Table V-12: Determinants of cumulative abnormal trading volume 
This table shows regression results of CAV(-1,30), CAV(-1,1), and CAV(2,30) on our measures of textual sentiment as 
well as on a comprehensive set of control variables. Compared to the analyses of abnormal returns, we utilize the same 
set of control variables for our analyses on abnormal trading volume except for log(VOLUME), which is not included in 
the CAV regressions. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
 CAV(-1,30)  CAV(-1,1)  CAV(2,30) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
NEG_BPW -0.044     0.417     -0.461   
 (1.107)     (0.437)     (0.862)   
TONE_BPW   -2.413     -2.305 **    -0.108  
   (2.654)     (1.025)     (2.240)  
log(COUNT) 0.917  0.056   1.520  1.063   -0.603  -1.007  
 (3.033)  (3.068)   (0.942)  (0.908)   (2.573)  (2.641)  
log(IND) 5.102  3.111   3.860  2.946   1.242  0.165  
 (9.778)  (9.724)   (2.884)  (2.876)   (8.442)  (8.304)  
EPS_SURP 0.144  0.147   0.036  0.037 *  0.108  0.110  
 (0.095)  (0.094)   (0.022)  (0.022)   (0.088)  (0.089)  
DIV_SURP_POS -1.429  -1.232   -0.068  0.037   -1.362  -1.269  
 (1.597)  (1.573)   (0.438)  (0.432)   (1.416)  (1.386)  
DIV_SURP_NEG -0.272  -0.392   0.009  -0.077   -0.281  -0.314  
 (1.674)  (1.683)   (0.647)  (0.653)   (1.280)  (1.293)  
log(SIZE) 0.908 *** 0.944 ***  0.494 *** 0.527 ***  0.414  0.416  
 (0.321)  (0.325)   (0.132)  (0.136)   (0.255)  (0.260)  
M2B 0.273  0.375   0.250 * 0.313 **  0.023  0.061  
 (0.402)  (0.418)   (0.138)  (0.142)   (0.330)  (0.344)  
LEVERAGE -4.190  -5.479   -2.037  -2.600   -2.153  -2.879  
 (11.240)  (11.117)   (3.783)  (3.779)   (8.889)  (8.804)  
ROA -0.117  -0.075   -0.029  -0.010   -0.089  -0.065  
 (0.358)  (0.351)   (0.108)  (0.108)   (0.287)  (0.281)  
VOLATILITY -240.315 *** -243.972 ***  -99.783 *** -100.202 ***  -140.531 ** -143.771 ** 
 (87.767)  (86.419)   (31.305)  (30.827)   (67.208)  (66.215)  
              
Constant -1.608  3.358   -7.746  -4.161   6.138  7.519  
 (16.994)  (17.560)   (5.109)  (4.951)   (14.294)  (15.178)  
              
Year Dummies yes  yes   yes  yes   yes  yes  
Observations 304  304   304  304   304  304  
R-squared 0.168  0.170   0.255  0.267   0.104  0.103  
 
Table V-12 is estimated analogously to Table V-5, substituting CAV for CAR. 
Table V-12 confirms the univariate findings from Table V-11 and shows that a 
higher tonality goes along with lower CAV(-1,1). Also in accordance with the 
univariate results, NEG_BPW does not seem to affect CAV(-1,1). With respect 
to the longer time horizons, we observe no statistically significant relationships 
between the measures of textual sentiment and CAV(-1,30) or CAV(2,30).  
Table V-13 tests whether results for CAVs are influenced by the word 
weighting scheme applied and Table V-14 investigates the relationship among 
CAVs and the general language measures of textual sentiment. Similar to our 
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results on CARs, Table V-13 shows that tf-idf weighting does not seem to improve 
the results and Table V-14 reports that general language SENTIWS and LIWC 
measures do not possess higher explanatory power compared to the context-spe-
cific BPW measures. In particular, measuring textual sentiment via the SEN-
TIWS or LIWC dictionaries does not yield any statistically significant relation-
ship between textual sentiment and CAVs. 
 
Table V-13: CAV regressions and weighting 
This table shows regression results of CAV(-1,30), CAV(-1,1), and CAV(2,30) on our measures of textual sentiment 
individually, as well as on a comprehensive set of control variables. Measures of textual sentiment are standardized to 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
Panel A: Regression results 
 CAV(-1,30)  CAV(-1,1)  CAV(2,30) 
 equal idf equal idf  equal idf equal idf  equal idf equal idf 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                                                     
NEG_BPW -0.024  -0.346    0.229  0.106    -0.253  -0.452    
 (0.608)  (0.628)    (0.240)  (0.301)    (0.473)  (0.512)    
TONE_BPW    -0.571  -0.447      -0.546 ** -0.450 *     -0.025  0.003  
    (0.628)  (0.607)     (0.243)  (0.242)     (0.530)  (0.510)  
                  
Constant -1.659  -6.818  2.299  1.788  -7.265  -7.162  -5.173  -5.490  5.606  0.344  7.472  7.278  
 (17.256)  (18.694)  (17.246)  (16.935)  (5.185)  (7.054)  (4.896)  (4.891)  (14.522)  (15.080)  (14.819)  (14.585)  
                           
Year dummies yes  yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  yes  
Controls yes  yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  yes  
Observations 304  304  304  304   304  304  304  304   304  304  304  304  
R-squared 0.168  0.168  0.17  0.169   0.255  0.253  0.267  0.263   0.104  0.105  0.103  0.103  
 
Panel B: Model comparison tests 
       J-test       Cox-Pesaran-Deaton test 
Model (1) vs (2)  0.65  -6.65 *** 
Model (2) vs (1)  -0.44  0.40 
Model (3) vs (4)  -0.22  0.21 
Model (4) vs (3)   0.53    -0.64  
     
Model (5) vs (6)  -0.41  0.34  
Model (6) vs (5)  1.00  -2.14 ** 
Model (7) vs (8)  -0.38   0.38  
Model (8) vs (7)  1.31   -1.55 * 
     
Model (9) vs (10)  0.60   -1.05  
Model (10) vs (9)  -0.14   0.13  
Model (11) vs (12)  0.11   0.05  
Model (12) vs (11)  0.12   -0.43  
 
In sum, our findings on CAVs appear to some extent inverse to the results on 
cumulative abnormal stock returns: While the speeches’ sentiment seems to be 
incorporated into returns rather slowly, it appears to draw investors’ attention 
via trading volumes only during the short-term announcement period. For both 
returns and trading volumes, however, it is the relative positivity of the speeches 
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that shows the predominant effect. In the longer time periods, (-1,30) and (2,30), 
none of the sentiment measures displays a significant association with the CAVs. 
The latter finding is in contrast to Price et al. (2012), who observe for US earnings 
conference calls that the sentiment’s effect on abnormal trading volume is statis-
tically significant only in longer time windows. Our findings are in accordance 
with Martinez-Blasco et al. (2015), however, who report that the trading volume 
of German stocks is economically and statistically significantly increased on the 
day of the AGM and the two days surrounding the AGM. According to our re-
sults, this observation may at least partly be explained by the sentiment of the 
CEO speeches at the AGM: Speeches with particularly low relative positivity, or 
high “relative negativity” respectively, should draw investors’ attention in the 
short term and go hand in hand with heightened trading volumes. 
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Table V-14: CAV regressions and general language dictionaries 
This table shows regression results of CAV(-1,30), CAV(-1,1), and CAV(2,30) on our measures of textual sentiment 
individually, as well as on a comprehensive set of control variables. Measures of textual sentiment are standardized to 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***,**, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix V-1. 
Panel A: Regression Results for negative textual sentiment 
 CAV(-1,30)  CAV(-1,1)  CAV(2,30) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
                                        
NEG_BPW -0.024    0.229    -0.253    
 (0.608)    (0.240)    (0.473)    
NEG_SENTIWS   -0.118     0.185     -0.303   
   (0.595)     (0.211)     (0.487)   
NEG_LIWC    -0.377     0.062     -0.440  
    (0.485)     (0.160)     (0.401)  
             
Constant -1.659  -2.259  -2.077  -7.265  -7.609  -8.704 *  5.606  5.350  6.627  
 (17.256)  (17.157)  (16.845)  (5.185)  (5.203)  (5.169)  (14.522)  (14.442)  (14.130)  
             
Year dummies yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Controls yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Observations 304  304  304   304  304  304   304  304  304  
R-squared 0.168  0.168  0.169   0.255  0.254  0.253   0.104  0.104  0.106  
Panel B: Regression Results for TONE 
 CAV(-1,30)  CAV(-1,1)  CAV(2,30) 
 (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17) (18) 
                                        
TONE_BPW -0.571      -0.546 **     -0.025    
 (0.628)     (0.243)     (0.530)    
TONE_SENTIWS   -0.329      -0.347      0.018   
  (0.597)      (0.233)      (0.474)   
TONE_LIWC    -0.097     -0.238      0.141  
   (0.517)     (0.188)      (0.425)  
             
Constant 2.299  0.168  -1.205  -5.173  -7.045  -8.083   7.472  7.213  6.878  
 (17.246)  (16.948)  (16.959)  (4.896)  (5.084)  (5.146)   (14.819)  (14.385)  (14.272)  
                    
Year dummies yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Controls yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes   yes  yes  yes  
Observations 304  304  304   304  304  304   304  304  304  
R-squared 0.170  0.169  0.168   0.267  0.258  0.256   0.103  0.103  0.103  
 
5. Conclusion 
CEOs’ language has been repeatedly shown to exhibit information that is rel-
evant for financial market participants, for example, in analyses on earnings con-
ference calls (Davis et al., 2015; Doran et al., 2012; Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2012; 
Price et al., 2012), or CEO letters (Boudt & Thewissen, 2016). Nevertheless, CEO 
speeches held at companies’ annual general meetings have received no attention 
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in studies of qualitative content analysis yet. We try to fill this gap by analyzing 
the investor reaction to the textual sentiment in German CEO speeches held at 
the companies’ AGMs. We examine the speeches held by the CEOs of stock-listed 
German firms which regularly publish the speeches’ transcripts on their internet 
webpages. In order to be able to analyze German texts, we utilize a novel business-
specific dictionary by Bannier et al. (2017) which converts the commonly used 
English dictionary by Loughran and McDonald (2011) to the German language. 
We gather the transcripts of 338 German CEO speeches, assess the speeches’ 
textual sentiment and measure the sentiment’s effect on both stock prices and 
trading volumes following the AGM. 
We find that the CEO speeches’ textual sentiment is significantly related to 
abnormal stock returns and trading volume. In particular, the negativity of CEO 
speeches is negatively associated with abnormal returns, whereas the relative pos-
itivity of speeches is positively associated abnormal returns. With regard to the 
time structure of the information incorporation, we see a delayed reaction that 
may be interpreted as an initial underreaction to the speeches’ sentiment. With 
respect to cumulative abnormal trading volume, in contrast, sentiment seems to 
have only short term effects. CEO speeches with low relative positivity are fol-
lowed by increased trading volume only in the three-day window surrounding the 
AGM. Further, similar to content analyses on English text documents, we find 
that context-specific measures of textual sentiment are better suited to capture 
the sentiment of business-related text documents compared to general language 
dictionaries. Moreover, and also in accordance with literature on English content 
analyses (Henry & Leone, 2016), we find using combined measures of a docu-
ment’s positivity relative to its negativity to be advantageous compared to posi-
tive or negative measures of sentiment in isolation. Finally, our results also high-
light that inverse term weighting does not yield improvements over equal 
weighting.  
We are aware of some limitations of our analyses. First, our study is limited 
by the data availability of CEO speeches. As there is no compulsory register for 
CEO speeches, we are only able to gather CEO speeches whose transcripts are 
offered on the companies’ homepages or sent to us on request. As most companies 
in our sample either offer transcripts of the speeches or do not, we can rule out 
the possibility that companies selectively publish only favorable speeches. How-
ever, the speeches are typically only offered a few years back, so that extending 
our sample poses difficulties and seems to be only possible using prospective CEO 
speeches. Further, the study at hand is limited to the examination of textual 
sentiment. Other channels of communication, for example the managers’ voice, 
have been found to contain qualitative information as well (Hobson et al., 2012; 
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Mayew & Venkatachalam, 2012). Future research might extend the analysis of 
textual sentiment by qualitative information communicated by the managers’ 
voice, or other channels such as, for example, gestures. 
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7. Appendix 
Appendix V-1: Variable descriptions 
This table shows descriptions of the variables used in our analyses. COUNT, IND, and our sentiment measures are 
estimated directly from the CEO speeches. The data to estimate CARs, CAVs, and the remaining variables are gathered 
from Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
Variable Description 
CAR(-1,30) CAR(-1,30) is cumulative abnormal return from day -1 to day 30 where day 0 is the day of the AGM. 
Abnormal returns are estimated via a market return model as 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑅𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐴𝑋,𝑡 where ARj,t is 
the abnormal return for speech j at day t and RIj,t is the total return index for speech j at day t, 
which reflects the theoretical growth in value of a share over a specified period, assuming that divi-
dends are re-invested to purchase additional units of an equity. RICDAX,t is the mean total return 
index of the German CDAX index which 852 German stocks across the Deutsche Börse’s prime and 
general standard.  
CAR(2,30) CAR(-1,1) is cumulative abnormal return from day -1 to day 1 where day 0 is the day of the AGM. 
Abnormal returns are estimated as described for CAR(-1,30). 
CAR(2,30) CAR(2,30) is cumulative abnormal return from day 2 to day 30 where day 0 is the day of the AGM. 
Abnormal returns are estimated as described for CAR(-1,30). 
CAV(-1,30) CAV(-1,30) is cumulative abnormal trading volume from day -1 to day 30 where day 0 is the day of 
the AGM. The abnormal trading volume is estimated as 𝐴𝑉𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑗,𝑡
− 1 where VOLUMEj,t is the 
volume for company j at day t, and 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑀𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗,𝑡 is the mean volume for firm j from day t=-252 to t=-1. 
CAV(-1,1) CAV(-1,1) is cumulative abnormal trading volume from day -1 to day 1 where day 0 is the day of the 
AGM. Abnormal trading volume are estimated as described for CAV(-1,30). 
CAV(2,30) CAV(2,30) is cumulative abnormal trading volume from day 2 to day 30 where day 0 is the day of 
the AGM. Abnormal trading volume are estimated as described for CAV(-1,30). 
COUNT COUNT represents the CEO speeches’ length in terms of the total number of words. 
IND IND is the number if individual words in a CEO speech divided by the speech’s total number of words.  
POS_BPW POS_BPW represents the CEO speeche’s number positive words as classified by our BPW dictionary, 
divided by the speech’s total number of words.  
NEG_BPW NEG_BPW represents the CEO speeche’s number negative words as classified by our BPW diction-
ary, divided by the speech’s total number of words. NEG_SENTIWS and NEG_LIWC are estimated 
analogously using the SENTIWS and LIWC dictionary, respectively. 
TONE_BPW TONE measures a speeches positivity relative to its negativity and is calculated as 𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸1,𝑗 =
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗−𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗+𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑗
 where POSITIVEj is the number of positive words, NEGATIVEj the number of 
negative words of speech j as classified by our BPW dictionary. TONE_SENTIWS and TONE_LIWC 
are estimated analogously using the SENTIWS and LIWC dictionary, respectively. 
EPS_SURP EPS_SURP is the earnings surprise and is calculated as 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝑗 =
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗−𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡−1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗,𝑡−1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
∗ 100 where 
EPSj is the most recent earnings per share release for the CEO’s company at the time of speech j, 
EPSj,t-1YEAR is the most recent earnings per share release for the CEO’s company one year before the 
day of speech j and STOCKPRICEj,t-1YEAR is the stock price of the CEO’s company one year before 
the date of speech j. 
DIV_SURP_POS DIV_SURP_POS is a dummy variable that equals one if the dividend was increased compared to 
the previous year. Zero otherwise. 
DIV_SURP_NEG DIV_SURP_NEG is a dummy variable that equals one if the dividend was decreased compared to 
the previous year. Zero otherwise. 
SIZE SIZE measures the companies’ market value at the day of the speech as the share price multiplied by 
the number of ordinary shares in issue. It is displayed in Euro millions. 
M2B M2B reflect the market to book ratio and is defined as the market value of the ordinary equity divided 
by the balance sheet value of the ordinary equity in the company. 
LEVERAGE LEVERAGE describes the total liabilities by total assets ratio. 
ROA ROA describes the companies’ return on assets and is estimated as net income divided by total assets 
times one hundred. 
VOLATILITY VOLATILITY is estimated as the daily returns’ standard deviation for the time window of minus 90 
days to minus 10 days prior the AGM. 
VOLUME VOLUME describes the number of shares traded for a stock on the day of shareholder meeting and 
is expressed in thousands. 
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Thomas Pauls 
Gießen, 29.03.2017 
 
 
 
Submitted Papers 
 
I. Kerl, A. G., & Pauls, T. (2014). Analyst herding and investor protection. 
A cross-country study. Applied Financial Economics, 24(8), 533-542. 
II. Pauls, T., Stolper, O. A., & Walter, A. (2016). Trust and the supply side 
of financial advice. Working paper. 
III. Meyll, T., Pauls, T., & Walter, A. (2017). When do households fail to 
repay their debt? The role of gender and financial literacy. Working paper. 
IV. Bannier, C. E., Pauls, T., & Walter, A. (2017). Content analysis of busi-
ness-specific text documents: Introducing a German dictionary. Working 
paper. 
V. Bannier, C. E., Pauls, T., & Walter, A. (2017). CEO-Speeches and stock 
returns. Working paper. 
